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ABSTRACT:
Among the causes of nationalism is a lack of empathy (the ability to
stand in the position of another person and see legal issues from that per-
son’s perspective). A lack of empathy, in turn, is caused in part by a lack of
understanding (of the legal culture of the other), which leads to prejudice
(the demonization of the other). Once prejudice sets in, nationalism thrives:
one country and its citizens (e.g., the US and Americans) are exalted over
another country and its citizens (e.g., Iran and Iranians). Nationalism, how-
ever, is distinct from patriotism: nationalism, but not patriotism, violates the
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fundamental Catholic social justice teaching (CSJT) of human dignity. Pa-
triotism is legitimate love for one’s country, while acknowledging diversity
across and within countries, and recognizing that all persons (including Chi-
nese and Iranian citizens) are created in the image and likeness of God.
In the long term, there is no military or law enforcement solution to
nationalism. The use of force to put down nationalism is a sometimes-nec-
essary measure, but a short-term one to cope with harm or imminent threats
thereof.
The long-term solution is education. The onus is on international legal
educators to be innovative and revise their syllabi to combat ignorance (a
lack of understanding) and stereotypes (born of prejudice). We should as-
pire to be at the forefront to build empathy. Educators would not (or could
not) perform this function during the Nazi era, as visitors to Yad Vashem in
Jerusalem (like me, in 2017 and 2018) know well: these visitors see the
book burning exhibit, and they learn that the majority of participants at the
January 1942 Wannsee Conference were lawyers. (That there were so many
law-trained participants horrified me, made me wonder what I am doing in
my teaching, and made me think about Hannah Arendt’s phrase “the banal-
ity of evil”1 and C. S. Lewis’s writings on white collar professionals doing
evil.)
There is no single correct educational strategy—other than to do noth-
ing, which, candidly, some comfortable tenured professors do. Their syllabi
are stuck in the mid-twentieth century. Their International Trade Law
course syllabi are worthy of the 1976–79 Tokyo Round. To do nothing is
what nationalism needs to triumph.
Yet, nationalism will not be fought by replacing one intellectual ortho-
doxy with another. There are multiple options—ways to revamp scholarship
agendas and teaching pedagogies—to enhance understanding and fight
prejudice.
One way to approach the selection of options is to consider America’s
most pressing national security challenges, those which stoke nationalism.
Dealing with Iran, in particular, and the Near East generally, is at or near
the top of that list. Iran lies at the intersection of my two specialties, inter-
national trade law and Islamic law. It has been of interest to me since No-
vember 4, 1979, when the hostages were seized, and it is of keen
importance to my students, who include US Special Operations Forces.
And, as an Indian American, I am keenly aware that India is one of the few
countries on good terms with both Iran and America.
Therefore, to my mind, learning more about Iran’s legal culture is
among the pertinent strategies for the world into which law students are
1. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1963).
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graduating and in which they are practicing. And that is the world—not the
world of the mid-twentieth century—on which we must focus.
One obvious way to learn about a foreign legal culture is to study its
constitutional structure, in this case, the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. That is, among the ways to break the link from insuffi-
cient empathy to ignorance to prejudice to nationalism is to learn more
about Iran’s Constitution. To be sure, this methodology is not a full remedy.
But it is illustrative. It is what I can do with my scholarship and syllabi.
Simply put, understanding more about Iran can foster empathy among
the next generation of American-trained international lawyers. If those law-
yers are more empathetic than their predecessors, they might help combat
the descent into nationalism, a descent that Catholic social justice teaching
makes clear leads to hell.
I. CATHOLIC SOCIAL JUSTICE TEACHING ON “NATIONALISM”
VERSUS “PATRIOTISM” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524 R
A. Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524 R
B. Reasoned Truth and “Patriotism” versus “Nationalism” . 524 R
C. Revealed Truth and “Patriotism” versus “Nationalism” . 526 R
II. THE EMPATHY-IGNORANCE-PREJUDICE-NATIONALISM LINK
AND CURRICULAR OPTIONS TO SEVER THIS LINK . . . . . . . . . . . 531 R
III. CURRICULAR APPROACH TO IRAN’S CONSTITUTION . . . . . . . . . 532 R
A. Disclaimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532 R
B. Golden Rule Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537 R
C. Structure and Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 542 R
D. Thematic Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551 R
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A. Theme 1: Islamicization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552 R
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I. CATHOLIC SOCIAL JUSTICE TEACHING ON “NATIONALISM” VERSUS
“PATRIOTISM”
A. Thesis
What are the causes of nationalism, and what might international legal
educators do to address those causes? I argue, in part I, that nationalism is
born of ignorance and prejudice, both of which are rooted in a lack of em-
pathy, and that among the options for addressing both is revising appropri-
ate course syllabi to cover postcolonial literary theory and the Constitution
of the Islamic Republic of Iran. That is, my thesis is that a lack of empathy
born of ignorance and prejudice fuels nationalism (as distinct from patriot-
ism), and among the curricular reforms that might engender empathy and
thereby combat nationalism is fostering understanding of the Constitution
of Iran. Part II draws the links from unempathetic thinking to ignorance,
prejudice, and nationalism. Parts III and IV discuss the proposed solution of
curricular reform. This solution is neither all-inclusive (many other options
are available to international law teachers) nor mutually exclusive (in re-
spect of deploying other options contemporaneously).2
This thesis and these parts prompt a question—namely, “What is na-
tionalism?” They presume a clear differentiation of “patriotism” from “na-
tionalism.” So, I begin by clarifying the distinction and assessing why it
matters, relying on reasoned truth—principally, standard lexicography—
and revealed truth—namely, Catholic social justice teaching (CSJT).3
B. “Patriotism” versus “Nationalism”
“Patriotism” and “nationalism” are two easily confused “-isms.” As
the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) points out, “[i]n earlier use, . . . the
two appear to have been more or less interchangeable.”4 Yet the distinction
matters: patriotism is acceptable, even good, while “nationalism” is unac-
ceptable, and even evil. “Patriotism,” the OED teaches, means “love of or
2. For example, another, indeed complementary, option is to learn postcolonial theory, pio-
neered by Edward Said, with a view to studying texts, including the Constitution of Iran. The
methodology of this approach encourages us to examine our “Orientalist” stereotypes and appreci-
ate how legal texts are interpreted in the “Orient.” We may understand better what the “Orient” is
and how it views itself and its engagements with America. For a discussion of postcolonial theory,
see Raj Bhala & Eric Witmer, Interpreting Interpretation: Textual, Contextual, and Pragmatic
Interpretative Methods for International Trade Law, 35 CONN. J.  INT’L L. 58, 112–15 (2020)
[hereinafter, Bhala & Witmer].
3. The CSJT principles discussed and applied herein are explained in PONTIFICAL COUNCIL
FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH (Washington,
D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004)
[hereinafter, COMPENDIUM]. For a thorough historical account of the origins and evolution of
CSJT, see RODGER CHARLES, S.J., CHRISTIAN SOCIAL WITNESS AND TEACHING—THE CATHOLIC
TRADITION FROM GENESIS TO CENTESIMUS ANNUS, VOLUME 1 (FROM BIBLICAL TIMES TO THE
LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY) and VOLUME 2 (THE MODERN SOCIAL TEACHING CONTEXTS: SUM-
MARIES: ANALYSIS) (1998).
4. Nationalism, OED OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com.
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devotion to one’s country.”5 In contrast, “nationalism” refers to
“[a]dvocacy of or support for the interests of one’s own nation, esp. to the
exclusion or detriment of the interests of other nations. Also: advocacy of
or support for national independence or self-determination.”6 Moreover,
“[w]hereas patriotism usually refers to a general sentiment, nationalism
now usually refers to a specific ideology, esp. one expressed through politi-
cal activism.”7 Thus, all “nationalists” are “patriots”—they love their own
country. But not all “patriots” are “nationalists”—they do not denigrate
others.
Under the banner of reasoned truth, there are several justifications for
distinguishing between “patriotism” and “nationalism.” Manifestly, lexico-
graphic accuracy is one of them. Unless terminology is clear, accurate diag-
nosis of a problem and dialogue toward a solution are stymied. That
justification is both necessary and sufficient for present purposes: engender-
ing empathy is not a “nationalistic” aim but is consistent with “patriotism.”
Another rationale for why this distinction matters is utilitarian, in the
sense of devising policies that maximize net social gains. The argument is
that internationalist responses are more effective at solving problems than
nationalist ones (that is, internationalist responses are efficient, producing
the maximum benefits with the least costs). Evidence for this utilitarian
stance is seen in Germany’s multilateral approach to dealing with the
COVID-19 pandemic as contrasted with America’s and India’s nationalist
ones.8 Arguing from efficacy, however, requires a full analysis of costs and
5. Patriotism, OED OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com.
6. Nationalism, supra note 4.
As articulated in the March 20, 2020 presentation at this symposium by Jeremy Rabkin, I
acknowledge a distinction between “nationalism” and “sovereignty.” Viewed historically, “nation-
alism” may be seen as a nineteenth-century doctrine about peoples, namely, that ethnic and lin-
guistic communities should be within the same nation-state. “Nationalism” is a passion, or mood,
which is mobilized in defense of a “nation” drawn along those communal lines, typically because
of a sense of grievance (i.e., a grievance culture unifies these communities). Those lines are short
of a common bond with humanity, but broader than persons’ own immediate families. “Sover-
eignty” is a seventeenth-century concept about states responding to the breakdown of Christen-
dom and the rise of the nation-state. Nationalist movements have no recognition under
international law. That law is primarily concerned with nation-states, which are primarily con-
cerned with protecting their sovereignty. Indeed, not every state is “sovereign,” but only a state is
“sovereign” under international law. To the extent “nationalism” is connected with Enlightenment
ideas (developed, for example, by Jean Jacques Rousseau), it may avoid the uglier, violent dimen-
sions that, unfortunately, it typically spawns. Interestingly, there may be an inverse relationship
between the two: the greater the ability of a nation-state to defend its sovereignty, the less virulent
its nationalist sentiments may be. Or the relationship could be direct: a nation-state’s sense of
national superiority may drive it to conquest (as occurred in Germany during the Nazi period).
A similar distinction exists between “patriotism” and “sovereignty.” But, as per the definition
of “patriotism” discussed above, this distinction is without those nefarious implications. Thus,
whether the relationship between “patriotism” and “sovereignty” is inverse or direct, the impulse
to dominate others does not exist.
7. Id.
8. See Andreas Rinke, For Virus-tamer Merkel, Global Alliances Trumped Nationalism,
REUTERS (June 10, 2020), www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-germany-merkel-ins/
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST302.txt unknown Seq: 6 18-NOV-21 12:53
526 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:3
benefits over time associated with agreed-upon “nationalist” versus “patri-
otic” goals. For example, are “nationalist” trade policies more efficient at
reindustrializing the American heartland than “patriotic” ones? It might be
ventured that the Sino-American trade war, which the United States unilat-
erally launched in March 2018 under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
as amended,9 exemplifies a nationalist trade policy, as distinct from advanc-
ing America’s interests collaboratively through the auspices of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), which is not unpatriotic.10 Tempting as it is,
pursuing that suggestion is not within the scope of my thesis, which is about
combating nationalism through empathy-based curricular reform. I simply
beg indulgence and point to the well-known horrors of twentieth-century
world and regional conflagrations. The arguments from revealed truth (spe-
cifically CSJT) in part I.B, and the two examples in part II, support my
premise that nationalism is, indeed, worth combating.
C. Revealed Truth and “Patriotism” versus “Nationalism”
Reasoned truth, as quoted in the above secular sources, is not the only
justification for distinguishing “nationalism” from “patriotism.” Revealed
truth provides a complementary rationale. Indeed, it would be odd, to say
the least, if the Catholic Church conflated “patriotism” and “nationalism”
and thereby tolerated both as acceptable. There are three sources of Catholic
doctrine: sacred tradition, sacred scripture, and sacred teaching (magiste-
rium). Each counsels against “nationalism.” Consider three examples, one
from each source, respectively: the Epiphany, the Two Great Command-
ments, and social justice principles.
Long before the institutional Church arose, sacred tradition developed.
“Epiphany” is one such tradition, and the word itself intimates globalist
thinking at variance with “nationalism.” Three Wise Men, known tradition-
ally as “Casper,” “Balthazar,” and “Melchior,” came from afar to pay hom-
age to the baby Jesus.11 These four figures were of different backgrounds:
an Arab, a Turk, and a Persian, on a perilous journey to Bethlehem to see a
Jewish baby.12 As worldly kings, each one of the three might have been
expected to view the ethnic and religious makeup of his secular realm as
for-virus-tamer-merkel-global-alliances-trumped-nationalism-idUSKBN23H1KC; Andy
Mukherjee, Economic Nationalism Is a Wrong Turn for Covid-Hit India, BLOOMBERG (June 8,
2020), www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-06-08/india-s-modi-uses-economic-national
ism-in-covid-19-china-crises.
9. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
10. See generally 3 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK
831–946 (5th ed. 2019) [hereinafter BHALA TRADE TEXTBOOK] (discussing Section 301, and ana-
lyzing the Sino-American Trade War).
11. Jean-Pierre Isbouts, Who were the three kings in the Christmas story?, NAT’L GEO-
GRAPHIC (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/three-kings-magi-
epiphany.
12. Id.
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superior. Yet as far as is known from tradition, none of them exalted his
kingdom over that of the other two. Rather, all three humbled themselves in
the face of difference.
To be sure, the Bible does not explicitly say there were three Wise
Men, nor that there were three kings. Rather, the Epiphany story speaks of
three gifts.13 So, there could have been one gift bearer, or any number of
them. There are different traditions about the details of the journey follow-
ing a star that came to rest in the sky over the Bethlehem manger.14 Regard-
less of their exact historical veracity, the versions share the same theme: to
be open hearted to strangers, like the multicultural gift bearers were to
Jesus.15
Sacred scripture records the teachings of Jesus, among which are the
Two Great Commandments. “Nationalism,” but not “patriotism,” violates
both of the Two Great Commandments. Jesus articulates them as recorded
in the three synoptic Gospels, Matthew 22:35–40, Mark 12:28–34, and
Luke 10:27.16
The second of these Commandments requires love of one’s neighbor
as oneself. It is integrally related to the first Great Commandment—namely,
to love God with all one’s heart, mind, and soul. How one loves God is
manifest in how one loves one’s neighbor, and vice versa. To love God is to
love one’s neighbor; to love one’s neighbor is to love God.
Put differently, as the Holy Father counseled in a February 23, 2020,
homily at an outdoor Mass in Bari (on Italy’s southern coast) concelebrated
with sixty bishops from the Mediterranean basin region (i.e., Europe, the
Middle East, and North Africa), the only acceptable form of extremism for
a Christian is an “extremism of love”:
“‘Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you.’ This
is the Christian innovation. It is the Christian difference,” the
Pope said. . . .
The Mass, . . . marked the conclusion of a five-day meeting
to address common concerns, including the need for peace, the
13. See Matthew 2:10–11 (Catholic Study Bible: New American Bible 1990) [hereinafter
Catholic Study Bible].
14. Id.
15. An interesting variant within the Sacred Tradition is that Casper, Balthazar, and Melchior
were young, middle-aged, and old-aged, respectively. Melchior entered the manger first. He re-
flected with Saint Joseph about life: its ups and downs experienced, and the wisdom gained to
forgive the trespasses of others and be overwhelmed with joy and gratitude for life’s blessings.
Next, Balthazar spoke of middle-aged matters: the need to nurture a strong family and pursue
justice in the society in which the family lives. Finally, Casper entered. He spoke with Saint
Joseph from the perspective of young people: the importance of ideals and never losing sight of
one’s dreams. Together, they marveled at Jesus and observed that He speaks to humanity at all
phases of life: beginning, middle, and end.
16. See Catholic Study Bible, supra note 13, at Matthew 22:35–40, Mark 12:28–34, and Luke
10:27.
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care of migrants and refugees, the defense of religious freedom
and the promotion of interreligious and ecumenical dialogue.
Pope Francis’ homily . . . focused on the day’s Gospel read-
ing from St. Matthew in which Jesus tells his followers not to
retaliate against those who harm them and to love and pray for
their enemies.
“Pray and love: this is what we must do,” Pope Francis said.
“The love of Jesus knows no boundaries or barriers. The Lord
demands of us the courage to have a love that does not count the
cost, because the measure of Jesus is love without measure.”
Jesus’ Commandment of love is not just a suggestion or even
a challenge, the Pope said. “It is the very heart of the Gospel.”
“Where the command of universal love is concerned, let us
not accept excuses or preach prudent caution,” he said. “The Lord
was not cautious; he did not yield to compromises. He asks of us
the extremism of charity. It is the only legitimate kind of Chris-
tian extremism: the extremism of love.”
Pope Francis said he knew some people would object and
say, “That is not how life really is! If I love and forgive, I will not
survive in this world, where the logic of power prevails, and peo-
ple seem to be concerned only with themselves.”
“So is Jesus’ logic, his way of seeing things, the logic of
losers?” the Pope asked. “In the eyes of the world, it is, but in the
eyes of God it is the logic of winners.”17
Vitally, the definition of “neighbor” is not bounded by race, ethnicity,
language, or gender. Pope Francis made that clear in his Divine Mercy Sun-
day homily in April 2020:
As the world slowly recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic,
there is a risk it will be struck by an even worse virus—that of
selfish indifference, Pope Francis said.
This dangerous virus is “spread by the thought that life is
better if it is better for me and that everything will be fine if it is
fine for me. It begins there and ends up selecting one person over
another, discarding the poor and sacrificing those left behind on
the altar of progress”
. . . .
The current pandemic instead must compel people to prepare
for a “collective future” that sees the whole human family as one
and holds all of the earth’s gifts in common in order to be shared
justly with those in need, he said.
17. Cindy Wooden, Gospel Challenges Believers to Love Without Measure, Pope Says,
CATH. NEWS SERV. (Feb. 23, 2020), https://cnstopstories.com/2020/02/23/gospel-challenges-be
lievers-to-love-without-measure-pope-says/#noredirect.
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“This is not some ideology: it is Christianity,” and it mirrors
the way the early Christian community lived.18
Patriotism allows for a citizen of any one country to love equally a
citizen of any other country. In that openness, it is Christlike. Nationalism,
because it exalts one country over another, leaves no such space. Its closure
to love impedes adherence to the first of the Two Great Commandments,
because God’s love is boundless.
The difference between “patriotism” and “nationalism” with respect to
the second of the Two Great Commandments is glaring. In extreme cases,
such as war, patriots and nationalists alike will work toward victory. Which
“-ism,” however, leaves room for post conflict forgiveness?
The love of one’s country resonating within patriotic hearts and minds
does not preclude reconciliation with erstwhile enemies. Patriots are open to
“the path to peace.”19 This path was the theme of a speech at the Apostolic
Palace by the Holy Father in December 2019 to ambassadors from Andorra,
Latvia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, and Seychelles who were presenting their let-
ters of credential to Pope Francis.20 Peace requires “a culture of inclusion, a
more just economic system, and various opportunities for the participation
of all in social and political life,” he said.21 Pope Francis also wrote in the
Spanish magazine Vida Nueva in an April 2020 article entitled “Un Plan
Para Resucitar” (“A Plan to Resurrect”) of paralysis borne of fear and un-
certainty that thwarts new beginnings: “If there’s one thing we’ve been able
to learn in all this time, it’s that no one is saved alone. . . . Borders are
falling, walls are crumbling, and all fundamentalist discourses are dissolv-
ing before an almost imperceptible presence that shows the fragility of
which we are made.”22 Acceptance of this “fragility,” which in effect is a
humble disposition toward realities, is not inconsistent with patriotism.
Nationalism, however, is arrogant. It arouses and sustains ongoing ha-
tred for one’s enemies, because of its innate attitude of relative superiority.
It is incongruous with reconciliation, which is the starting point on the path
to peace. Pope Francis made clear that reconciliation “entails renouncing
18. Carol Glatz, Now Is Time to Build a New World Without Inequality, Injustice, Pope Says,
CATH. NEWS SERV. (Apr. 19, 2020), https://cnstopstories.com/2020/04/19/now-is-time-to-build-a-
new-world-without-inequality-injustice-pope-says/#noredirect.
19. See Carol Glatz, Set Aside Indifference, Fear in Order to Build Peace, Pope Tells Diplo-
mats, CATH. NEWS SERV. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://cnstopstories.com/2019/12/19/set-aside-indiffer-




22. Junno Arocho Esteves, Pope Pens Editorial on Joy in the Time of Coronavirus, CATH.
NEWS SERV. (Apr. 17, 2020), https://cnstopstories.com/2020/04/17/pope-pens-editorial-on-joy-in-
the-time-of-coronavirus/#noredirect (emphasis added). The Holy Father also wrote of the common
good: “Pope Francis said that the current pandemic also has highlighted the need ‘to unite the
entire human family’ and that the only way to conquer the coronavirus is through ‘the antibodies
of solidarity.’” Id. (emphasis added).
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our desire to dominate others and learning to see one another as persons,
sons and daughters of God, brothers and sisters.”23 Yet no such renuncia-
tion resonates in nationalism. Seeing the other—the “enemy”—as not from
a common creator is endemic to nationalist dominance, because it facilitates
indifference and stokes fear. Thus, Pope Francis counsels, “[o]nly when we
set aside indifference and fear can a genuine climate of mutual respect grow
and flourish.”24
As for the third source of Catholic doctrine, the magisterium, Catholic
social justice theory is relevant to understanding why “nationalism,” as dis-
tinct from “patriotism,” is unacceptable. The theory includes four core prin-
ciples: human dignity, common good, preferential option for the poor, and
subsidiarity.25 “Nationalism” is incongruous with each principle.
Human dignity refers to respect for each person as a unique, unrepeat-
able, and priceless creature created in the image and likeness of God. All
persons share this common creator, and thus equal due is owed to the inter-
ests of each person. To exalt the interests of one group over another (for
example, through legislation or policy) necessarily entails acting to the det-
riment of the interests of that other group. Instead, the common good should
be pursued whenever possible. The interests of all groups should be ad-
vanced, or at least no one group should be rendered worse off, by public
decisions. Economists refer to such decisions as “Pareto optimal.” National-
ist-driven decision-making is not about the common good. Rather, it is
about vaulting the good of one group regardless of the consequences to the
well-being of another group.
To be sure, in any society, compromising or excluding the interests of
the most vulnerable—namely, the poor—occurs. By definition, the poor
lack strength of voice and command over resources relative to the rich.
Thus, if a trade-off among interests must be made (again, for example, in
legislative or policy decision-making), then a preference ought to be given
to the poor. This preferential option for the poor may be viewed as an ex-
ception to advancement of the common good so as to safeguard the human
dignity of the poor. Nationalist groups—even if ironically composed in part
of members from lower socioeconomic strata—regard the poor as weak and
diluting the strength of a country, and thus creatures to be marginalized (or
worse) rather than lifted. History has shown nationalism to operate orthogo-
23. Glatz, supra note 19.
24. Id.
25. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 3, at 55–70 (human dignity), 72–75 (common good),
79–80 (universal destination of goods and preferential option for the poor), 81–82 (subsidiarity),
316–18 (entries for human dignity), 342–43 (references to common good), 399–401 (references to
poor and poverty), 430 (references to subsidiarity); 1 BHALA TRADE TEXTBOOK, supra note 10, at
15–31; see generally RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2003) (defining
and applying the different types of “justice” to special and differential treatment rules in interna-
tional trade law). Note additional CSJT principles, such as participation and solidarity. See COM-
PENDIUM, supra note 3, at 83–87.
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nally to this preference, as is demonstrated perhaps most notoriously by the
National Socialist (Nazi) Party in the 1920s through 1945.26 Moreover, na-
tionalism that leads to great power rivalry opposes globalization, as oc-
curred in the early twentieth century, and may again be occurring with
respect to the Sino-American confrontation.27
Finally, and consistent with human dignity and the common good, sub-
sidiarity calls for decision-making at the lowest level, closest to the individ-
ual, as possible. Here, too, historical reference is helpful. Nationalist
regimes, such as those in Nazi Germany (1933–1945), Mussolini’s Italy
(1922–1943), and Franco’s Spain (1936–1975), inclined to centralization
with directives from the top (indeed, from one strongman). The examples
are not confined to far-right-wing (Fascist) regimes.28 Extreme left-wing
ones, such as those of the former Soviet Union (1917–1991) and (with peri-
ods of decentralization) Communist China (1949–present), overrode local
decision-making to suit their ideological, nation-building ends. Indeed, the
central thesis of F. A. Hayek’s critique of socialism, The Road to Serfdom
(1944), was that the centralization of power consequently crushes human
dignity.
II. THE EMPATHY-IGNORANCE-PREJUDICE-NATIONALISM LINK AND
CURRICULAR OPTIONS TO SEVER THIS LINK
What can international legal educators do to combat nationalism? Odd
as it may seem, the answer to that question is not to tighten nationalism, nor
is it to follow the legal instinct to rebut and pretend there is no threat.
Rather, the first resort should be to empathize. What gives rise to and cata-
lyzes a sense of victimhood from a different group or idea, and then leads to
aggressive behavior? While the surest answer might come from interviews
with actors professing aggrievement, I argue the answer is ignorance that
26. In respect of the January 1942 Wannsee Conference, at which the majority of participants
were lawyers, see Ubaka Ogbogu, The Lawyers of Wannsee, UNIV. OF ALTA. FAC. OF L.: FAC.
BLOG (Aug. 7, 2008), https://ualbertalaw.typepad.com/faculty/2008/08/the-lawyers-of.html.
27. For an argument that this confrontation could doom the present era of globalization, as
happened in the early twentieth century amid the rivalry between Britain and Germany in the First
and Second World War periods, see Markus Brunnermeir et al., Beijing’s Bismarckian Ghosts:
How Great Powers Compete Economically, 41 WASHINGTON Q. 161 (2018); Martin Wolf, China-
U.S. Rivalry and Threats to Globalisation Recall Ominous Past, FIN. TIMES (May 26, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/5887ec6c-9d97-11ea-b65d-489c67b0d85d. One consequence for this
end is the length of time needed to restore robust cross-border commercial relations. Measured in
terms of economic integration relative to global output, it took sixty years after 1913 to return to
the levels of 1913. See Maurice Obstfeld, Globalization and Nationalism: Retrospect and Pros-
pect (Italian Econ. Ass’n Ann. Meeting, Palermo, It., Oct. 24, 2019), https://static1.
squarespace.com/static/5d0ed7795d764000017ccc00/t/5dbb192d3c4c5e7eaef8eec3/1572542772
111/Globalization+and+Nationalism.pdf.
28. For discussion of the evolution of the meaning of the term “fascism,” see Jennifer Szalai,
The Debate over the Word Fascism Takes a New Turn, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020),
www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/books/fascism-debate-donald-trump.html.
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spawns prejudice. My answer bespeaks the bias of a teacher because a key
remedy is education.
To be sure, nationalist sentiments may spring from repeated unpleasant
experiences with the “other.” It may be precisely because one has been
exposed to Muslims and internationalists that one draws perverse inferences
and develops pejorative stereotypes about them. Yet, exposure is a tonic
(i.e., less ignorant); less prejudicial views are more likely when one actually
has come to know the “other.” Thus, for a law teacher, an empathetic ap-
proach is to sponsor experiential learning whereby law students can interact
with Sunni and Shia counterparts, and with constituents served by interna-
tional and nongovernmental organizations. Greater engagement may well
build greater tolerance and respect.
But creating and expanding such opportunities are generally the prov-
ince of externship and internship coordinators, clinicians, and the career
services officer—not the law teacher. Law teachers can (and should) make
available their connection networks to their students, but their primary fo-
cus is on classroom curriculum. For the law teacher, the primary means to
sever the link from ignorance to prejudice, and onward to nationalism, is to
build empathy through curricular adjustments. My suggestion here, how-
ever, is nonexclusive. Diversity, not orthodoxy, is needed, for it would be
ironic indeed to attempt to counter nationalism—a perverse kind of ortho-
doxy—with an intransigent academic ideology manifested in revised
syllabi.
III. CURRICULAR APPROACH TO IRAN’S CONSTITUTION
A. Disclaimer
To be clear at the outset, in no way do I put forth the option of study-
ing Iran’s Constitution to minimize the actual or potential national security
threat that Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program, its ballistic missile
stockpile, and its support for foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) pose to
the United States. (I have chronicled these threats elsewhere.29) Iran’s
breaches of the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),30
albeit calibrated and reversible, are troubling,31 as is its failure to disclose
fully its previous military-related nuclear research.32 Indeed, Iran has the
29. See 2 BHALA TRADE TEXTBOOK, supra note 10, at 515–39; Raj Bhala, Chapter 22, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK (6th ed., forthcoming).
30. The full text of the JCPOA and its five annexes, plus related statements, is posted at Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/
jcpoa/index.htm.
31. See 2 BHALA TRADE TEXTBOOK, supra note 10, at 515–39; Bhala, supra note 29.
32. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran—Report
of the Director General, at ¶¶ 27, 39–45, 52–54, IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65 (Nov. 8, 2011),
www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65.pdf.
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largest stockpile of nonnuclear missiles in the Middle East,33 and in Decem-
ber 2017 I stared from the Golan Heights at some of its missile positions in
Lebanon. They were in the hands of Hezbollah, which America designated
an FTO in October 1997.34
I also do not seek to exaggerate the threats Iran poses. I have made
clear my view—like that of most of America’s defense and diplomatic es-
tablishment—that the May 2018 withdrawal by the United States from the
Iran nuclear deal was an epic mistake.35 There will be regime change,
thanks in part to demography. As Michael Rubin, resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute and senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate
School, explains:
[S]imple demography is as important [as are “the setbacks Iran
has recently suffered—the killing of Qassem Soleimani, the Is-
raeli bombings of its forces and proxies in Syria, popular unrest
and low turnout in February’s election, the coronavirus out-
break”], even though it’s not a sexy subject. When Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini led the Islamic Revolution of 1979, he pro-
moted huge families—a mother, a father and seven children.
Economists warned him that Iran couldn’t take the baby boom
coupled with the disruption of war and revolution. He used to
wave them off, quipping, “We didn’t have a revolution over the
price of a watermelon”—until he began to fear in the late 1980s
that Iran could. He then encouraged smaller families—a mother, a
father and a child. Long story short, Iran’s birth rate is only about
half of what it was in the 1980s. Put another way, during the war
of the 1980s [i.e., 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War], Iran had a quantitative
military edge over Iraq. Iraq had better equipment, but Iran had a
seemingly endless supply of 14- and 15-year-olds which it could
send sweeping across minefields. Today, with an aging popula-
tion and a different demographic profile than many Arab states
that have youth bulges, Iranian leaders seek a qualitative military
edge in order to make up for in technology what they no longer
can in sheer numbers.
. . . .
33. See 2 BHALA TRADE TEXTBOOK, supra note 10, at 515–39; Bhala, supra note 29.
34. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52, 650–51 (Oct. 8,
1997), www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1997-10-08/pdf/97-27030.pdf.
35. See Raj Bhala, Why the U.S. Should Not Go to War with Iran, Yet, BLOOMBERGQUINT
(June 4, 2019), www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/why-the-us-should-not-to-go-war-with-iran-
yet; Raj Bhala, What Trump Can Learn from Nixon About Iran, BLOOMBERGQUINT (May 4,
2018), www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/2018/05/04/what-trump-can-learn-from-nixon-about-
iran; Raj Bhala, Iran: Why This Time Is Different, and What’s Next, BLOOMBERGQUINT (Jan. 9,
2018), www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/2018/01/09/iran-why-this-time-is-different-and-what-
next; Raj Bhala, What America Can Learn from India About Iran, BLOOMBERGQUINT (June 14,
2017), www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/2017/06/14/what-america-can-learn-from-india-about-
iran.
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. . . [R]egime change is coming to Iran and it won’t have
anything to do with the U.S. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is 80
years old, has acknowledged having had cancer, and is partially
paralyzed from a 1981 assassination attempt. A lot of the old
guard have died, and speculation is rampant in Iran about who or
what might come next. . . .
. . . .
This may sound fluffy, especially coming from a conserva-
tive, but I really do think the U.S. has neglected soft power. The
key to any positive change in Iran is to fracture and temper the
Revolutionary Guards. There are a number of nonviolent, soft-
power strategies we could take in order to diminish their strangle-
hold. Supporting independent trade unions would be one. Every
dollar the Revolutionary Guards have to spend on workers’ back
wages or to improve working conditions is one dollar they can’t
invest in a centrifuge or missile.36
Regime change also may come about for economic reasons. America’s
so-called “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions, which the US ap-
plies in a secondary sense (i.e., to third-party countries, mandating that they
do not do business with Iran), has wrecked Iran’s economy. Persistent high
unemployment and inflation rates, as well as endemic corruption, have trig-
gered waves of violent protests.37
But, as of May 2020, two years into this maximum pressure campaign,
the US had won few converts.38 US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
boasted:
Two years ago, President Trump announced the bold deci-
sion to protect the world from Iran’s violence and the nuclear
threats it poses by exiting from the flawed Iran Deal and its
façade of security. Since that time, we have built the strongest
sanctions in history and prevented Iran from funding and equip-
ping terrorists with many billions of dollars. Today, the American
people are safer, and the Middle East is more peaceful than if we
had stayed in the JCPOA.
Seventy-five years ago, the United States and our allies
stood together to rid the world of the Nazis and their hateful ide-
ology. Today, we face a grave challenge to regional peace from
another rogue regime, and we again call on the international com-
munity to join us to stop the world’s leading state sponsor of anti-
Semitism.
36. Tobin Harshaw, The Big Iran Threat Is Nukes, Not Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8,
2020), www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-08/iran-and-coronavirus-nuclear-weapons-
are-the-bigger-threat.
37. See 2 BHALA TRADE TEXTBOOK, supra note 10, at 515–39; Bhala, supra note 29.
38. See Bobby Ghosh, Empty Chest-Thumping Won’t Win U.S. Allies on Iran, BLOOMBERG
(May 13, 2020), www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-05-13/pompeo-s-promise-to-lead-
the-world-against-iran-is-hollow.
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The United States will exercise all diplomatic options to en-
sure the U.N. arms embargo is extended. We will not accept their
status quo level of violence and terror. And we will never allow
Iran to have a nuclear weapon.39
The analogy of Iran and its Islamic republic to Germany and Nazism
was striking, and the reference to anti-Semitism concerning. But is today’s
Iran the same as yesterday’s Germany?
Even by the standards of hyperbole set by the administration
of President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s
contention that the U.S. is “Leading the World Against Iran’s
Threats” is a doozy. That chest-thumper is the title of a statement
[quoted above] issued on the second anniversary of the American
withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal. As an accounting of the
Administration’s strategy to contain the Islamic Republic since
then, the statement completely disregards the cost to relations
with U.S. allies.
There is no gainsaying the claim that Trump’s tough eco-
nomic sanctions have “prevented Iran from funding and equip-
ping terrorists with many billions of dollars.” The region would
have been even more unstable if the regime in Tehran was un-
hindered by the sanctions. The recent belligerence by Iran and its
proxies can be attributed to their growing frustration at being
shackled. So, the contention that “the Middle East is more peace-
ful than if we had stayed [in the deal]” just about passes muster.
But Pompeo can hardly boast of “leading the world” against
Iran when few other nations are inclined to follow. That the U.S.
finds itself standing all but alone against a blood-soaked regime, a
menace to its neighbors and a threat to the world, must rank as
one of the Administration’s—and the Secretary’s—greatest
failures.
Two years after Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action, none of the other signatories—China,
Russia, Germany, France, Britain and the European Unions—has
joined the American “maximum-pressure” campaign against Iran.
On the contrary, they maintain the fiction that the deal is alive,
even though the regime in Tehran is now in breach of its restric-
tions on uranium enrichment.
Worse, Pompeo can’t count on their support for his next
task: making sure the Iranians don’t get their hands on sophisti-
cated new weapons systems. The other JCPOA signatories are re-
sisting the Trump administration’s plan to extend a United
Nations embargo on arms sales to Iran, which is due to expire this
fall, by triggering a “snapback” of pre-deal U.N. sanctions.
39. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Leading the
World Against Iran’s Threats (May 9, 2020), https://ge.usembassy.gov/leading-the-world-against-
irans-threats-may-9 (emphasis added).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST302.txt unknown Seq: 16 18-NOV-21 12:53
536 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:3
Perhaps the other signatories’ lingering resentment over the
peremptory manner in which Trump treated them was inevitable.
The President, plainly obsessed with dismantling the legacy of his
predecessor, tore up the deal with scant consideration for their
objections.40
Why the lack of converts? Why has America not won over its tradi-
tional allies? Arguably, one reason is the US fails to appreciate their under-
standing of how the Islamic Republic works, or does not work, and what
their interests are with respect to Iran. Here, again, a bit of empathy might
help de-escalate tensions—with the allies, and, in turn, Iran.
What will come next, in respect of Iran’s leadership, remains uncer-
tain. The most powerful force in Iran is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC): it dominates the economy, derives revenues from the enter-
prises it controls, and cross-subsidizes activities adverse to America’s inter-
ests. Will the Guards crumble from fissures from within? Will the Iranian
people somehow cast the Guards aside? In turn, will the next regime see the
wisdom of reentering a renegotiated JCPOA?
Squarely addressing these questions is for another time. The focus here
and now is on an issue that underlies all of them: what can legal educators
do to help put students in the best possible position to answer these ques-
tions? This approach certainly is better than what I experienced as a high
school senior at the University School of Milwaukee during the 1978–79
Islamic Revolution and 444-day-long hostage crisis. At no time then or
thereafter—as a college student at Duke, a graduate student at the London
School of Economics and Oxford, or a law student at Harvard—did I ob-
serve systematic curricular shifts to help students understand the cataclysm
that still reverberates across the Middle East. There were episodic courses
or portions of courses about Middle East politics and religion, often taught
by area specialists predisposed to cover recent developments in Iran. Fast
forward to 2010–19, when I was humbled to teach Islamic law at the Com-
mand and General Staff College of Fort Leavenworth to US Special Opera-
tions Forces: these remarkable women and men made clear they had not
been taught the difference between Sunnite and Shiite Islam, nor studied
much about contemporary Iran.
My answer is simple, perhaps simplistic, and probably insufficient.
Yet, it is a start: study the Constitution of Iran. Understanding the structure
and governance of any country starts with understanding its constitution
and doing so in a comparative sense—perhaps in a regular US Constitution
course, not unlike some contracts courses that discuss the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)—is
fruitful in understanding how and why Iran’s Islamic revolutionary regime
thinks and operates. Empathy (as distinct from sympathy) is necessary, but
40. Ghosh, supra note 38.
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not sufficient, to understanding Iran’s past, present, and future; managing
change; and avoiding miscalculations and violent confrontations. Exposure
to Iran’s Constitution is an exercise in empathy—in seeing America
through official Iranian eyes—and thus a step toward conflict reduction.
Consider the alternative: continued demonizing of Iran, as Iran has of
America as the “Great Satan,” which across four decades has gotten both
sides nowhere.
B. Golden Rule Methodology
Particularly with respect to an adversary, it is easy to read the constitu-
tion of another country through the prism of conflict. That is all the more
true when those readers seek regime change, as many American officials
and analysts do, in one way or another, in Iran.41 A specific temptation is to
see hypocrisy in the foundational document of an unfriendly foreign gov-
ernment, that is, to see a disconnect between, on the one hand, noble princi-
ples the document manifests in certain textual provisions and, on the other
hand, dastardly practices the country perpetrates on its own soil and over-
seas. Reading Iran’s Constitution perfectly illustrates this temptation:
The current Iranian government is an Islamic theocracy with
global intentions. Numerous constitutional provisions, particu-
larly Article 4, make all Iranian law subordinate to its Islamic
interpretation, which may explain why despite its constitution
prohibiting torture or upholding civil rights and the dignity of
man, Iran’s human rights record has been described as “abys-
mal” by the [United States] State Department, and also Iran’s
justification for its well-known campaign of assassinating its po-
litical opponents overseas. . . . If Iran sees an Islamic imperative,
its constitution and legislation will be interpreted or superseded
to allow for such actions.
Iran is clear about its global intentions. Its constitution’s pre-
amble states that the constitution “provides the necessary basis for
41. See, e.g., Eric Edelman & Ray Takeyh, The Next Iranian Revolution—Why Washington
Should Seek Regime Change in Tehran, 99 FOREIGN AFFS. 131, 145 (2020) (arguing the U.S.
should seek regime change in Iran, even though it “would not be pretty,” and that America
“should at the very least attempt to empower the Iranian people to get the kind of government they
deserve,” “[o]therwise, Washington is doomed to repeat its past mistakes: pretending that it is
possible to negotiate with the mullahs and blindly expecting that a theocratic revolutionary move-
ment will somehow produce ‘moderates’ willing to steer the regime away from its recklessness—
or naively hoping that a popular revolt will succeed without any support from the outside.”).
For an excellent review of contemporary Iran and where the Islamic Revolution may be
headed, see Dexter Filkins, The Twilight of the Iranian Revolution, NEW YORKER (May 25, 2020),
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/25/the-twilight-of-the-iranian-revolution (arguing that al-
though Iran’s leaders for decades have railed against the United States, the greatest threats to their
regime are from within Iran, in part because of their mismanagement of the economy under pres-
sure from American sanctions, and their failure to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in a
theocracy that is at once deeply unpopular but also incapable of reforming itself to meet the
country’s challenges).
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ensuring the continuation of the [Islamic] Revolution at home and
abroad” and that one of the goals of its army and Revolutionary
Guards is to “fulfill[ing] the ideological mission of jihād in God’s
way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God’s law throughout
the world.”
The constitution also makes clear that Iran is on a mission to
rid the world of foreign domination and oppression. Most dis-
turbing therefore is Article 154 of its constitution: “The Islamic
Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human
society, and considers the attainment of independence, freedom,
and rule of justice and truth to be the right of all people of the
world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from all forms
of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports
the just struggles of the mustad’afun [oppressed] against the mus-
takbirun [tyrants] in every corner of the globe.”
This allows Iran to make its often-repeated claim that it has
never executed an offensive attack on foreign soil—when in fact
it does so through proxies, whether the bombing of the marine
barracks in 1983 or killing Americans today in Iraq.42
Each of these provisions is discussed infra in part IV, but here it is
worth noting that the above-quoted perspective is not unmerited, and from
an American perspective, entirely understandable.
Indeed, this stance underlies a superbly rich and detailed analysis by
Asghar Schirazi of the Free University of Berlin, The Constitution of Iran—
Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic.43 Dr. Schirazi’s analysis
(translated into English from the original German) carefully sifts through
the drafting history of Iran’s Constitution and shows how several of its key
provisions were betrayed in the decade following its implementation. His
core—and compelling—argument is that Iran’s Constitution “is full of con-
tradictions” that “reflect the extraordinary range of political forces involved
in the Iranian revolution and the particular constellation of power that ex-
isted between these forces” from early 1978, when the first draft was pro-
duced in Paris, until November 15, 1979, when the Assembly of Experts
42. Richard Horowitz, A Detailed Analysis of Iran’s Constitution, BROADEN (Oct. 12, 2010),
https://broadenimpact.com/2010/10/a-detailed-analysis-of-irans-constitution (emphasis added)
(citing IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTER, NO SAFE HAVEN: IRAN’S GLOBAL ASSAS-
SINATION CAMPAIGN, MURDER AT MYKONOS: ANATOMY OF A POLITICAL ASSASSINATION (Sep. 1,
2008), https://www.iranrights.org/library/document/2647; IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION
CENTER, CONDEMNED BY LAW: ASSASSINATION OF POLITICAL DISSIDENTS ABROAD (Feb. 3, 2011),
https://iranhrdc.org/condemned-by-law-assassination-of-political-dissidents-abroad/.
43. ASGHAR SCHIRAZI, THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN—POLITICS AND STATE IN THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC 1 (John O’Kane trans., 1997).
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(known in Farsi as the Majles-e Khobregān)44 in Iran approved the final
version.45 Two contradictions are
fundamental and have had a decisive impact on the development
of the Iranian state since the revolution. The first is the contradic-
tion between the Constitution’s Islamic legalist and non-Islamic
secular elements which flows largely from the claim that a state
set up on the basis of Shı̄’ı̄ law and ruled by Islamic jurists
(fukahā’) is capable of offering solutions to all problems, not only
in Iran, but throughout the world, even though the Constitution
itself incorporates many non-Islamic and non-legalist elements.
The second is the contradiction between its democratic and anti-
democratic elements, arising chiefly from the conflict between the
two notions of sovereignty embodied in the document: the sover-
eignty of the people on the one and of the Islamic jurists on the
other, a sovereignty the jurists exercise as God’s deputies.46
Indubitably, there are many events in the period since Dr. Schirazi’s
text was published in 1997 to the present that reinforce his thesis that, in a
sense, the project of a seamlessly smooth, well-integrated Islamic document
was doomed almost since its inception.47
But reinforcing Dr. Schirazi’s thesis is not the point here. Rather, the
point is to reinforce empathy, and hence to fight against the temptation to
read Iran’s Constitution as chock-full of provisions that Iran’s leaders be-
trayed to the chagrin of many (if not most) Iranians and Americans. As
Professor Ramazani put it in 1980,
This is no place to indicate the profound philosophical, his-
torical, political, ideological, social and psychological underpin-
nings of this constitutional debate. But like all such debates in all
God or Man oriented societies, including Iran, the real life of a
constitution unfolds in human experience. . . . The life-experience
of the new Constitution has already begun, and this unique expe-
rience in the world of Islam bears close watching.48
Simply put, the discussion below is “close watching,” not a guerrilla
raid into the Constitution of an adversary to find provisions to attack.
Rather, it is a first reading of the plain meaning of that text and its implica-
tions; thereafter, as necessary, the incongruities between words and actions
44. See Janet Afary, Iranian Revolution (1978–1979), ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution/Aftermath. This Assembly itself—consisting of
approximately seventy-five persons—was elected on August 3–4, 1979; began debating the draft
Constitution on August 19; and approved it by at least two-thirds of its total membership on
November 15. See Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 34 MID-
DLE E. J. 181, 181–82 (1980).
45. SCHIRAZI, supra note 43, at 1.
46. Id.
47. They are chronicled in Raj Bhala, Chapters 20–22, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK (6th ed., forthcoming).
48. Ramazani, supra note 44, at 183.
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can be stressed, and stressed with greater credibility and insight, precisely
because the first reading was as neutral as possible despite over four de-
cades of a fraught Iranian-American relationship.
If the ultimate strategic objective is to bring about consistency—sus-
tained change in foreign governmental behavior to match the best of that
country’s constitutional values—then empathy ought to infuse the initial
inquiry. There ought to be no fear in this inquiry that resisting the tempta-
tion of self-interested, nationalistic bias—and simply reading the text for
what it says—will result in sympathy for malevolent official acts that are,
objectively, at variance with that foreign constitution. To empathize is not
to sympathize. To view Iran’s domestic and foreign policy challenges from
the perspectives of leaders in Tehran and Qom is not to identify with, much
less express compassion for, those perspectives. Rather, it is to seek to un-
derstand what motivates these leaders’ controversial behavior, perhaps with
a view toward altering it in the future. To gain this insight, clear-eyed read-
ing glasses are needed.
Besides, what constitution can withstand the scrutiny of having its no-
ble principles compared to the country’s actions throughout history toward
its people and foreigners? Certainly not that of the United States:
Generations of American school children have memorized
the words of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence. Its evan-
gelical spirit was echoed in Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address and
scores of other presidential addresses. Perhaps partly on that ac-
count, numerous Americans, perhaps especially American law-
yers, have since the 1780s presumed to tell other people how to
govern themselves. . . .
. . . .
Many years before Jefferson wrote the Declaration, the poet
John Milton, reacting to the imperial impulse of his colleagues in
the English Parliament, told them that not words, nor money, nor
arms, but example, was the one effective means to export English
ideas and values to distant peoples. . . . Professor Woodrow Wil-
son observed in 1908 that Americans ought to know that truth
more clearly than anyone as a result of our national experiences in
failed efforts to transform indigenous cultures or to reconstruct
the South after the Civil War. But, as President, the former pro-
fessor Wilson forgot his own insight. His proclamation that “the
world must be made safe for democracy” proved, as many fore-
saw, to be a disservice to the cause it proclaimed.
. . . Milton and Professor Wilson were correct, and President
Wilson was wrong to broadcast the contrary notion that democ-
racy is just waiting to happen if only a benign army would release
it from an oppressive force preventing its emergence. Constitu-
tions work to provide political stability if they reflect the encul-
turated notions of those they govern, but not otherwise. This has,
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as Professor Wilson observed a century ago, been a hard lesson
for Americans to learn.49
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court would have little to do if
American constitutional expressions like equal protection and due process,
and freedom of speech and religion, were enacted by Congress and enforced
by the president without controversy or inconsistency. Debates about ex-
porting American constitutional values would be moot without troubling
United States military interventions in (for example) Central America and
Southeast Asia in the twentieth century, and the Middle East in the twenty-
first century. Simply put, to regard from the outset other constitutions as
defective relative to the US Constitution is an indicium of nationalism—an
exaltation of one country over others that, thanks to its unreflective view of
American history, is hypocritical.
The universal “Golden Rule,” then, ought to be the lens through which
to begin work with a foreign constitution: study Iran’s founding document
as America would wish Iran to study that of the United States.50 To practice
this rule is to be empathetic in constitutional interpretation. Once the princi-
ples and specific articles are carefully considered on their own merits, a
sharp analysis about hypocrisy may be merited, and if so, will be all the
more credible because assault was not the starting point.51 Similarly, what
may be needed is constitutional revision—that is, redrafting selected provi-
sions—or even drafting a new foundational document.52
49. Paul D. Carrington, Writing Other Peoples’ Constitutions, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. 167,
167–69 (2007) (emphasis in original).
50. It is important not to conflate the Golden Rule with the Second Great Commandment
(discussed earlier). The Golden Rule is found in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, as well as in
the Old Testament, in Leviticus, Tobit, and Sirach. See Catholic Study Bible, supra note 13, at
Matthew 7:12, Luke 6:31, Leviticus 19:18, Tobit 4:15, and Sirach 31:15. Of course, the two princi-
ples are related: to treat others as one would wish to be treated (the Golden Rule) is consistent
with loving one’s neighbor as oneself (the Second Great Commandment). However, read literally,
the Golden Rule does not mandate that treatment be loving—that is, it is potentially relativistic in
its self-reference, whereas the Second Great Commandment explicitly sets love as the benchmark.
For an analysis of their relationship, see Keith D. Stanglin, The Historical Connection Between the
Golden Rule and the Second Greatest Love Command, 33 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 357 (2005).
51. Ideally, this Golden Rule methodology is practiced in the large and growing field of
comparative constitutional law. An honest evaluation of similarities and differences among two or
more constitutions is undermined by a predetermined hunt for what constitutes better or worse
principles and provisions. Indeed, that evaluation can lead to discovery of consensus on core
values that might otherwise be overlooked because they are manifested in different ways. See,
e.g., Adeno Addis, Human Dignity in Comparative Constitutional Context: In Search of An Over-
lapping Consensus, 2 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1 (2015) (arguing “the best way to understand the
scope and content of human dignity [and its “prominent place in numerous national constitutions
and international conventions”] is to engage in a bottom-up inquiry, carefully describing the
choices communities make in the name of human dignity,” and finding across dozens of constitu-
tions that “there are in fact patterns of usage that suggest the existence of a consensus on specific
understandings of dignity”).
52. Among the leading scholars on writing constitutions in the Middle East is Haider Ala
Hamoudi, Vice Dean and Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Not only does empa-
thy permeate his scholarship, but also experience, namely, his experience in 2009 in Baghdad
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C. Structure and Preamble
The present-day Constitution of Iran was approved in the aftermath of
the 1978–79 Islamic Revolution.53 On April 1, 1979, the Islamic Republic
of Iran was born.54 On December 2–3, 1979, 98.2 percent of eligible Iranian
voters ratified the new constitution (which, as noted infra in note 55, the
Assembly of Experts had approved the previous month) via a plebiscite.55
Thus ended the reign of the prior constitution, which dated from 1906 and
advising the Constitutional Review Committee of the Iraqi legislature. See, e.g., Haider Ala
Hamoudi, NEGOTIATING IN CIVIL CONFLICT: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND IMPERFECT
BARGAINING IN IRAQ (2013) (analyzing amendments to the Iraqi Constitution with a view to pro-
moting national reconciliation, and also implicating Iraqi laws on antitrust, hydrocarbons, and
revenue management); Haider Ala Hamoudi, Notes in Defense of the Iraqi Constitution, 32 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 1277, 1277 (2011) (arguing “the language used in . . . [Iraq’s Constitution] was wisely
designed to allow some level of flexibility, such that highly divided political forces could find
incremental solutions to the deep rooted sources of division that have plagued Iraqi society since
its inception,” and “[t]hat Iraq has found itself in such dreadful political circumstances since con-
stitutional ratification is therefore not a function of the open ended constitutional bargain, but
rather of the failure of Iraqi legal and political elites to make use of the space that the constitution
provided them to develop such incremental resolutions”).
53. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC RE-
PUBLIC OF IRAN]  1358 [1980], translated in Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution of 1979 with
Amendments Through 1989, CONSTITUTE PROJECT, www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Iran_1989 [hereinafter 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION]. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from
the 1979 Iranian Constitution are from this document. Iran’s Constitution also is available—in
Persian (Farsi) and English—at the Iran Data Portal (Syracuse and Princeton Universities): The
Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Iran, IRAN DATA PORTAL, https://irandataportal.syr.edu/
wp-content/uploads/constitution-english-1368.pdf.
For a version produced shortly after its adoption, which also discusses difficulties in transla-
tion from the original Farsi (Persian), see Ramazani, supra note 44, at 184–204 (reproducing the
Iranian Constitution).
54. See Afary, supra note 44.
55. See 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 1; Aylin Ünver Noi & Hooshang
Amiraahmdi, Arab Spring and Iran, in ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ARAB
SPRING 203, 211 (Aylin Ünver Noi ed., 2013); Ramazani, supra note 44, at 182. Interestingly, the
initial plan, with which Āyatollāh Khomeini agreed, was for approval of the Constitution by a
300-person Constituent Assembly (Majles-i Muasisdān). See Ramazani, supra note 44, at 181.
But:
Government authorities justified the change on the ground that the “provisional, unsta-
ble, and disorderly” conditions of the country did not permit prolonged debate on the
draft constitution by a large assembly, and the “national interest” required rapid termina-
tion of these conditions.
Ramazani, supra note 44, at 181–82 (quoting statements by Iranian governmental ministry offi-
cials in June 1979, and also observing that “[t]he discontent with a hasty election of an assembly
of experts instead of a constituent assembly, as originally envisaged, ranged from mere expression
of dissatisfaction to the boycott of elections”).
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had been amended four times, in 1907, 1925, 1949, and 1956.56 This 1979
constitution has been amended once, in July 1989.57
The 1979 constitution (as amended) contains a preamble and 177 arti-
cles organized into fourteen chapters spanning roughly forty-three pages
(plus a four-page index). There is no doubt the constitution establishes a
“theocracy,”58 as in the lexicographic meaning of this term: “[G]overnment
by divine guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided. In
many theocracies, government leaders are members of the clergy, and the
state’s legal system is based on religious law.”59
56. See Constitutions and Constitutional Debates, IRAN DATA PORTAL, https://
irandataportal.syr.edu/constitutions-and-constitutional-debates [hereinafter Constitutions, IRAN
DATA PORTAL]. For an analysis of the juristic foundations, specifically fatwas (religious edicts)
that religious leaders issued to support the 1905 Constitutional Revolution in Iran, see AMIRHAS-
SAN BOOZARI, SHĪ’Ī JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTION—REVOLUTION IN IRAN (2011). For an
analysis of the 1907 Constitution, see Eric Massie & Janet Afary, Iran’s 1907 Constitution and Its
Sources, 46 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 464 (2019).
57. Constitutions, IRAN DATA PORTAL, supra note 56. On the question of whether opponents
of Iran’s current regime might be successful in pursuing a new constitution, see Ilan Berman, The
Quest for a New Iranian Constitution, NAT’L INT. (Jan. 2, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/
middle-east-watch/quest-new-iranian-constitution-110271.
58. Richard Horowitz summarizes the key constitutional provisions supporting this
conclusion:
The Iranian Constitution established an Islamic theocracy. Article 1 states “The form of
government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic,” while Article 2 explains this to
mean, among other things, “the necessity of submission [to Allāh] and the “fundamental
role” of “divine revelation” in “setting forth the laws.” Iran’s flag must contain the
phrase “Allāhu Akbar” (Article 18) and “Absolute sovereignty over the world and man
belongs to God” (Article 56). Articles 5 and 107 establish the position of Supreme
Leader, . . . whose “duties and power” are enumerated in Article 110. Article 91 estab-
lishes a Guardian Council “in order to examine the compatibility of the legislation
passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly with Islam” and “The authority of the
interpretation of the Constitution is vested with the Guardian Council (Article 98).
Irrespective of the constitution’s ostensibly appropriate provisions—“All civil, pe-
nal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and
regulations must be based on Islamic criteria” (Article 4) and judges “are obliged to
refrain from executing statutes and regulations of the government that are in conflict
with the laws or the norms of Islam” (Article 170).
. . .
Moreover, numerous Constitutional provisions are required to be “in conformity
with Islamic criteria” or not “detrimental to the principles of Islam” – human rights and
equal protection of the law (Article 20); the formation of political and professional as-
sociations (Article 26); public gatherings (Article 27); the right to choose an occupation
(Article 28); the confiscation of property (Article 49); the definition of political offenses
(Article 168); and “the freedom of expression and dissemination thoughts” on Iranian
radio and television (Article 175).
The Constitution allows the press to have freedom of expression “except when it is
detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam” and further delineates that “the de-
tails of this exception will be specified by law” (Article 24).
Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section. Each of the aforementioned articles is discussed
below.
59. Theocracy, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (last updated Apr. 28, 2020),
www.britannica.com/topic/theocracy. See also theocracy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/theocracy (defining “theocracy” as “government of a state by immediate
divine guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided”).
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As to Divine, the constitution cites the Holy Qur’ān fourteen times,60
plus the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) twice.61 As to the ulti-
mate authority of religious law (i.e., sharia (Islamic law)) and the clergy,
there are forty-four pertinent provisions (five in the preamble plus thirty-
nine articles).62 And the constitution references on eleven occasions (four in
the preamble plus in seven articles) the objective of promoting Islam around
60. See Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section. The Qur’ānic references are as
follows:
(1), (2)Preamble (The Form of Government in Islam), and Article 11, 21:92 –
“This your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship me.”
(3)Preamble (The Form of Government in Islam), 7:157 –
“He removes from them their burdens and the fetters that were upon them.”
(4)Preamble (The Form of Government in Islam), 21:105 –
“Verily My righteous servants shall inherit the earth.”
(5)Preamble (The Form of Government in Islam) 3:28 –
“And toward God is the journeying[.]”
(6)Preamble (The Form of Government in Islam), 28:5 –
“And we wish to show favor to those who have been oppressed upon earth, and to makethem
leaders and the inheritors.”
(7)Preamble (An Ideological Army), 8:60 –
“Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and strings of horses, striking
fear into the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them.”
(8)Preamble (The Judiciary in the Constitution), 4:58 –
“When you judge among the people, judge with justice.”
(9)Preamble (Mass Communication Media), 2:143 –
“Thus We made you a median community, that you might be witnesses to all men.”
(10)Chapter I (General Principles), Article 7, 42:38 –
“Their affairs are by consultations among them.”
(11)Chapter I (General Principles), Article 7, 3:159 –
“Consult them in affairs.”
(12)Chapter I (General Principles), Article 11, 21:92 –
“This your community is a single community, and I am our Lord, so worship Me.”
(13)Chapter I (General Principles), Article 14, 60:8 –
“God does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with those who have not fought against
you because of your religion and who have not expelled you from your homes.”
(14)Chapter IX (The Executive Power), Section 3 (The Army and the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps), Article 151, 8:60 –
“Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and horses ready for battle,
striking fear into God’s enemy and your enemy, and others beyond them unknown to you but
known to God.”
1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53.
61. These .Hadı̄th are as follows:
(1)Preamble (The Form of Government in Islam, citing only “S”) –
“Mold yourselves according to the Divine morality.”
(2)Preamble (The Wilayah of the Just Faqih, citing Tuhaf al-’uqul, page 76) –
“The direction of [public] affairs is in the hands of those who are learned concerning God and are
trustworthy in matters pertaining to what He permits and forbids.”
1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53.
62. This estimate is a conservative one based on direct references to Islamic governance. See
1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., The Form of Government in Islam; pmbl.,
The Wilayah of the Just Faqih; pmbl., An Ideological Army; pmbl., The Judiciary in the Constitu-
tion; pmbl., Executive Power; arts. 1–5, 12, 43–44, 56–57, 61, 67, 91, 94, 96, 99–100, 105,
107–12, 115, 121–22, 130–31, 143–44, 150–51, 157, 163, 167, 170, and 175–76. All of these
provisions are discussed below.
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the world (including by championing downtrodden peoples).63 Thus,
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–89) declared that April 1, 1979,
marked not only the end of 2,500 years of monarchy (symbolized by the
“Peacock Throne”64) but also “the first day of a Government of God.”65 He
opened the Assembly of Experts debate about the draft Constitution on Au-
gust 19, 1979, with a clearly theocratic injunction: “the Constitution and
other laws in this Republic must be based 100 percent on Islam.”66
Also indubitable is the embrace of the doctrine of velayet-e-faqih as
developed in Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1970 book Governance of the Jurist.67
Principles of Islamic government (wilāyat al-’amr) mandate a perpetual
leadership (imāmah) by officials (namely, jurists (faqih)) who are qualified,
i.e., who possess “the necessary qualifications” (jami’ al-shara’it), and are
“recognized as leader[s] by the people.”)68 Only such officials can prevent
“deviation” by the government from its “essential Islamic duties.”69 Ayatol-
lah Khomeini developed this doctrine at the height of the shah’s repressive
regime, and Muslims unified around it to overthrow that regime.70 Moreo-
ver, the Constitution expressly states that to fulfill the “mission” (which is
“theomorphic”—that is, progressing toward Allāh by molding oneself ac-
cording to divine morality, as discussed below) of the Revolutionary Is-
63. This estimate is a conservative one based on direct references to support for such causes
(including jihād), particularly overseas. See 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl.,
The Form of Government in Islam; pmbl., An Ideological Army; pmbl., MassCommunication
Media; pmbl., Representatives; arts. 2–3, 11, 147, 150, 152, and 154. All of these provisions are
discussed below.
64. See Peacock Throne, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, www.britannica.com/topic/Peacock-
Throne. For a first-hand, insider account of the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty and end to the
Peacock Throne, see, for example, MINOU REEVES, BEHIND THE PEACOCK THRONE (1986).
65. Ramazani, supra note 44, at 181.
66. Id. at 181–82.
67. ĀYATOLLĀH KHOMEINI, GOVERNANCE OF THE JURIST (1970). The doctrine of velayet-e-
faqih was the most significant substantive issue in the August 19–November 15, 1979 debate in
the Assembly of Experts about the draft Constitution. This issue
centered around the concept of “Vilāyat-i Faqı̄h” and especially the related powers. Al-
though the concept as such was not mentioned in the [draft] Constitution, it was in effect
provided for in Principle 5 [now Article 5], which states that in His absence, the Twelfth
Imām will be represented by a qualified religious leader who enjoys the confidence of
the majority of the people. More strikingly, Principle 110 [now Article 110] placed the
most extensive powers at the disposal of such a leader.
Ramazani, supra note 44, at 182–83 (also noting that a draft Constitution inadvertently published
on June 16, 1979, “represented a very different document as contrasted with the Constitution that
was finally adopted,” because (inter alia) “[i]t provided for an all-powerful legislature and a
strong President,” yet “was criticized by even some lay experts for placing too much power in the
office of the President” and for “its surprising lack of clerical influence”). Manifestly, the negoti-
ating history of the early drafts of Iran’s Constitution with respect to the powers of the supreme
leader relative to those of the conventional branches of government, which involved officials in
Paris, Tehran, and Qom discussing how and the extent to which to implement the velayet-e-faqih
doctrine, is both fascinating and significant.
68. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., The Wilayah of the Just Faqih.
69. Id.
70. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., Islamic Government.
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lamic government, only the “righteous” shall be responsible for governance
and administration, and legislation “will revolve around the Qur’ān and
Sunnah.” In turn, to ensure officials are righteous and legislation comports
with the Qurān and Sunna, “meticulous and earnest supervision” by the al
fukahā’ al ‘udul (the just, pious, and committed scholars of Islamic juris-
prudence) is an “absolute necessity.”71
However, the Constitution leaves open the relative importance and se-
quencing of qualifications and recognition. Must a prospective leader be
recognized, even if that leader has the necessary qualifications? Asked dif-
ferently, does a qualified leader need popular recognition to be legitimate
(evidenced, for example, by turnout and results in a free, fair election)?72 Or
are those qualifications to be recognized per se, and thus are the source of
legitimacy (without democratic ratification)?
Manifestly, the preamble is the key to unlocking—that is, identifying
the themes in—the 1979 Constitution. At first glance, it reads almost like an
angry tirade against the United States, and an uncritical rapture in praise of
Shiite Islam. For instance, it speaks of the “intense rage” of the Iranian
71. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., The Form of Government in
Islam.
72. If legitimacy through the ballot box matters, then so must voter turnout. In the February
2020 elections, voter turnout hit its lowest level since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, just 42.5
percent. Golnar Motevalli, Iran’s Election Turns Back the Clock on Reconciliation with West,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2020), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-23/iran-s-election-
turns-back-the-clock-on-reconciliation-with-west. Iran’s leaders were not pleased with this low
figure. They seemed to sense the threat to the legitimacy of their favored (i.e., hardliner) candi-
dates from the low numbers of Iranians who actually showed up to the polls. See Parisa Hafezi,
Hardline Guards Make Early Gains in Restricted Iran Election, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2020),
www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election/hardline-guards-make-early-gains-in-restricted-iran-
election-idUSKCN20G08A [hereinafter Hardline Guards].
Alas, with the Guardian Council striking moderate candidates (discussed infra), reform-
minded citizens protested by staying home from the polls. In contrast, “[t]urnout in the 2016
election, which was dominated by reformers and moderates who supported [President Hassan]
Rouhani and the [July 2015] nuclear deal [i.e., JCPOA] with global powers, was almost 62%.”
Arsalan Shahla & Golnar Motevalli, Iran’s Hardliners Win Election by Large Margin, Mehr Says,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2020), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-23/iran-s-hardliners-
win-election-with-large-majority-mehr-says [hereinafter Iran’s Hardliners Win].
Scrambling to explain the low turnout, the Āyatollāh, who said voting was “a religious duty,”
blamed Iran’s enemies (presumably including the U.S.) for spreading fake news about the severity
of the coronavirus, which thereby discouraged voters from going to polling stations. See Parisa
Hafezi, Iran Announces Low Poll Turnout, Blames Coronavirus “Propaganda,” REUTERS (Feb.
23, 2020), www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-khamenei/iran-announces-low-poll-turnout-
blames-coronavirus-propaganda-idUSKCN20H09Z (“‘The turnout across the country was
42.57% . . . In Tehran, it was around 25%. Across Iran, over 24 million people voted,’ Interior
Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli told a televised news conference. Turnout was 62% in the 2016
parliamentary vote and 66% of voters cast ballots in 2012.”) [hereinafter Iran Announces Low
Poll]; Iran Elections: Record Low Turnout but Hardliners Set for Win, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23,
2020), www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51605942 (noting that “[t]he poll is the first since
the US renewed sanctions over Iran’s nuclear programme, battering its economy”). Whether citi-
zens accepted that explanation was unclear. The coronavirus had spread to Iran and infected and
killed scores, yet the government allegedly underreported the true health statistics.
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people “caused by the constantly increasing repression” of the shah’s re-
gime exposed by the “ulema and militant students.”73 It recalls the water-
shed events of January 7, 1978, when publication by the shah’s regime of
an “outrageous” article against the ulema and Imam Khomeini accelerated
the revolution. The regime’s violent crackdown “to quell the volcano of the
people’s anger” spilled the “blood” of “martyrs,” thus turning the protests
into a “popular movement . . . to overthrow the tyrannical regime.”74
But that would be a misreading. History matters in this struggle every
bit as much as it matters to Americans who recall their revolution. The
fourteen sections of the Iranian preamble are broad and deep in their cover-
age of topics that, taken together, explain how the Islamic Republic came
into being, and where it—and the rest of the world—is headed.
The first five sections of the preamble chronicle the history of the
1978–79 Islamic Revolution. The sense of injustice perpetrated by the pre-
vious monarchical regime of the shah, founded on tyranny and foreign
domination, is palpable. The White Revolution (January 1963 through No-
vember 1979) was an “American conspiracy”: under the guise of moderni-
zation (e.g., land reform), the shah of Iran reinforced his “despotic rule” and
the cultural, economic, and political dependence of Iran on “world imperial-
ism,” and the shah gave American advisers legal immunity for their nefari-
ous activities.75 The regime tried to suppress the Islamic movement—led by
73. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., Islamic Government.
74. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., The Wrath of the People. The
crackdown indeed was violent, and the legacy of repression grim. Interestingly, in 2020, a Finan-
cial Times journalist, Jamil Anderlini, reported on the unrepentant nature of one of the shah’s
officials associated with that legacy, and the inference the Chinese Communist Party drew from it:
A couple of years ago I interviewed a former leader of the Savak—the Shah of Iran’s feared secret
police—in the US, where he still lives in hiding at an undisclosed location, with a price on his
head. He remains certain that if the Shah had taken his advice and resolutely crushed the 1978
uprising in its early stages, the Iranian revolution would not have succeeded. Mr. Xi [i.e., China’s
President Xi Jinping] seems to have taken that lesson to heart: whatever else you say about him,
he cannot be accused of being irresolute on quashing dissent.
Jamil Anderlini, China’s Communist Party Will Survive COVID-19, FIN. TIMES (May 21, 2020),
www.ft.com/content/6075d728-99ae-11ea-8b5b-63f7c5c86bef?shareTypeNongift.
75. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., The Dawn of the Movement. The
White Revolution was a series of modernization initiatives, particularly land reform, whereby the
Shah sought to cultivate the support of peasants and working class, weaken the power of landlords
and city-based aristocrats, and offset hostility from the rising middle class. Other initiatives in-
cluded large-scale infrastructure projects (e.g., air, rail, and road networks; dams and irrigation),
education and public health improvements (including literacy promotion and malaria eradication),
privatization of state-owned enterprises and support for market-based industrialization with profit-
sharing schemes for workers, empowerment of women (e.g., enfranchisement), and environmental
protection (e.g., nationalizing forests). See James A. Bill, Modernization and Reform from Above:
The Case of Iran, 32 J. POL. 19, 33 (1970); Talinn Grigor, Tehran: A Revolution in Making, in
POLITICAL LANDSCAPES OF CAPITAL CITIES 347, 360 (Jessica Joyce Christi et al. eds., 2016).
However, this bloodless Revolution (hence the color adjective, “White”) did not include sig-
nificant political liberalization, and it sparked social tensions (as between newly independent
farmers and landed elites, who opposed land redistribution). The ulema, too, opposed this Revolu-
tion. Thus, ironically, though “[t]he White Revolution had been designed to pre-empt a Red [i.e.,
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Imam Khomeini and “the strongholds of the mosques, centers of religious
teaching, and universities”—with “barbaric attacks” on those institutions
and “the most savage and brutal measures,” including “firing squads” and
“medieval tortures.”76 Though the “revolutionary and fertile teachings pre-
vailed”77 and the Islamic Republic of Iran was established, the price of free-
dom, independence, and an authentically Islamic government included sixty
thousand martyrs.78
Arguably the most important term of art in these sections is taghuti,
which means unjust, in the sense of worshipping false gods rather than the
one true God, Allāh. That regime was a taghuti order. The revolution swept
it away, and the people overwhelmingly approved its replacement with an
Islamic republic and a new Constitution.79
Also, arguably the most important point in these early sections of the
preamble is how different the Islamic Revolution was from previous strug-
gles against tyranny. The Constitution is the foundation for the cultural,
economic, political, and social institution of Iran. Its bases are “Islamic
principles and norms, which represent the earnest aspiration of the Islamic
Ummah.”80 The “basic characteristic” of the revolution that led to the Con-
stitution “is its ideological and Islamic nature.”81 To be sure, there were
previous efforts that were “anti-despotic constitutional . . . and anti-colo-
nialist,” most notably under Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was prime minis-
ter from 1951 to 1953.82 Yet his efforts “centered on the nationalization of
the oil industry,” and he was toppled in a coup d’état backed by the Central
Intelligence Agency and Britain’s MI6.83 The underlying cause of this fail-
ure (and others) was the lack of an “ideological basis” for the struggle.84
That void was filled by the “eminent” marja ‘at-taqlı̄d (reference point for,
or source of, emulation) that was Ayatollah Imam Khomeini.85 Beginning
in 1962, he “awakened [the] conscience of the nation” by “pursuing an au-
thentically Islamic and ideological line” in leading the struggle against the
shah’s regime.86
Soviet-backed Communist] Revolution, . . . “it paved the way for an Islamic Revolution.” ERVAND
ABRAHAMIAN, A HISTORY OF MODERN IRAN 140 (1st ed. 2008).
76. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., The Dawn of the Movement.
77. Id.
78. Id. at pmbl., The Price the Nation Paid.
79. Id. at art. 1.
80. Id. at pmbl.
81. Id.
82. See Homa Katouzian, Mossaddeq’s Government in Iranian History: Arbitrary Rule, De-
mocracy, and the 1953 Coup, in MOHAMMAD MOSADDEQ AND THE 1953 COUP IN IRAN 1, 2 (Mark
J. Gasiorowski & Malcolm Byrne eds., 2004).
83. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl. See also ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN,
THE COUP: 1953, THE CIA, AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN IRAN (2013) (discussing oil nationaliza-
tion, Anglo-Iranian negotiations, the coup, and its legacy).
84. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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These early sections connect directly to the last sentence of the pream-
ble, which expresses “the hope that this century will witness the establish-
ment of a universal government of the mustad’afun [oppressed] and
downfall of all the mustakbirun [oppressors].”87 This expression reflects
directly a statement of Ayatollah Khomeini early in Governance of the Ju-
rist (1970) that “one of the responsibilities of the jurist who governs is to
‘foreshorten the arms of the transgressors who would encroach on the rights
of the oppressed’”88 and what he wrote at the start of the closing paragraph
of the book: “O God, foreshorten the arms of the oppressors that are
stretched out against the lands of the Muslims.”89 One inference to draw
from the end of the preamble is that Iran cannot “be dealt with as if it
functions according to Western norms.”90
The preamble identifies three separate branches of government—exec-
utive, judicial, and legislative—but shows there is no separation of these
powers from the power of God. All three branches are to focus on the ulti-
mate goal of life, which is true religious worship, not secular.91 They are to
build an ideal Islamic society governed by Islamic law that reflects the in-
terests of mustai’afun (the downtrodden) and is a model for the world.92
Officials must be mu’min (believing). Likewise, the military, and especially
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), must promote Jihad world-
wide.93 In contrast, the US and other western democracies are taghuti forms
of government: they are oriented to the worship of false gods. Also, these
democracies are, and are run by, mustakbirun (tyrants, oppressors).94 Ac-
cordingly, the media are not an independent check on government but
rather an instrument of government in service of creating a perfect Islamic
society that bears witness to all people.95
The purpose of Iran’s Revolutionary government, as an authentically
Islamic one, is laid out in terms akin to a conflict of good versus evil. Five
of the fourteen quotations from the Holy Qur’ān are found in the four
preambular paragraphs on the form of government. The Constitution thus
plants itself squarely on the side of Allāh, and against the ungodly, oppres-
sive, corrupt, and foreign-influenced past regimes. The government’s “mis-
sion” is to liberate people so they can evolve in a society based on Islamic
norms and thereby proceed “towards the final goal,” which is “movement
87. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., Representatives (translations
added).
88. KHOMEINI, supra note 67, at 27.
89. Id. at 94.
90. Horowitz, supra note 42, at Implications (quoting Ayatollah Khomeini).
91. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., Islamic Government, The Form of
Government in Islam, The Judiciary and the Constitution, Executive Power, Representatives.
92. Id. at pmbl., Representatives.
93. Id. at pmbl., An Ideological Army.
94. Id. at pmbl., Executive Power, Representatives.
95. Id. at pmbl., MassCommunication Media.
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towards Allāh.”96 Simply put, that “mission” is to help people realize God,
and it extends overseas. The Constitution is the basis for continuing the
Islamic Revolution overseas, striving with other Muslim and popular move-
ments toward a “single world community,” an ummah.97
The choice of candidates for governmental office, specifically their
vetting by the Guardian Council to ensure each is a mu’min (believer, faith-
ful Muslim),98 has generated controversy. That is because the council—in
the view of its reformist critics—routinely strikes moderate candidates.99 At
issue is whether the council conflates religious devoutness with political
support for the ayatollah, and if so, whether this overlap and its effect on
ruling in, or out, individual candidates is in keeping with a true application
of the velayet e faqih principle (as distinct from personal loyalties).
In its economic discussion, the preamble makes clear that Islam offers
a third way, neither capitalist nor communist. Both mistakenly are material-
ist, viewing the economy as an end in itself, and putting men and women in
service of the economy. Islam holds that people have a more profound ulti-
mate goal than to maximize profit and aggregate wealth, namely, to do their
best to discern and submit to the will of Allāh. Thus, it is the obligation of
Iran’s government to provide “all citizens with equal and appropriate op-
portunities” so they can meet their material needs and, in turn, achieve their
religious purpose.100 In this indirect sense, the preamble deals with the con-
troversial topic of religious minorities.
Another controversial topic in contemporary Iranian society under its
1979 Constitution concerns women. The preamble proclaims that Islam ac-
96. Id. at pmbl., The Form of Government in Islam.
97. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., The Form of Government in
Islam.
98. Id. at pmbl., MassCommunication Media.
99. See Iran’s Hardliners Win, supra note 72 (reporting that approximately “7,200 candi-
dates vied for seats”; “[a]bout 75 current lawmakers were barred from running again by the pow-
erful Guardian Council, tipping the field heavily in favor of conservatives wedded to the
theocratic ideals of Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution”; “more than 220 out of 290 members of parlia-
ment will be hardliners and conservatives”; “[h]ard-liners and conservatives won all 30 seats in
Tehran, the largest and most influential constituency”; and “[t]hey also dominated in Esfahan,
Khuzestan, Mazandaran and several other provinces”); Hardline Guards, supra note 72 (reporting
that “[t]he Guardian Council, a hardline vetting body, disqualified 6,850 hopefuls out of 14,000,
ranging from moderates to conservatives, from contesting parliament polls”); Iran Announces Low
Poll, supra note 72 (reporting that “[t]he hardline Guardian Council, which must approve candi-
dates, removed thousands of moderates and leading conservatives from the race by barring about
6,850 hopefuls from [sic] in favor of hardliners from among 14,000 applicants”); Iran Elections:
Hardliners Set to Sweep Parliamentary Polls, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2020), www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-51570725 (reporting somewhat different figures, but nonetheless that
“[t]housands of moderate would-be candidates were barred from running for not meeting strict
election criteria,” and “[m]ore than 16,000 contenders—including 90 mostly reformist members
of the current Majlis—were disqualified from standing by the Guardian Council, a vetting com-
mittee loyal to Mr[.] [Āyatollāh] Khamenei”).
100. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at pmbl., The Economy Is a Means Not an
End.
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cords women “great value and nobility,”101 whereas they were oppressed
and commercially exploited under the shah’s regime and are so in non-
Islamic countries, and Islam protects all of the world’s religions.102 The
preamble specifically highlights “the essential and decisive role” women
played in the struggle against the shah’s regime.103
D. Thematic Examination
It is helpful to take an empathetic, Golden Rule approach to the Con-
stitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, by understanding it in terms of the
themes it embodies. The preamble (discussed above) identifies them, and
the subsequent fourteen chapters and 177 articles elaborate on them. Put
differently, because of the considerable number of provisions (several with
subsections), organizing them thematically facilitates an analysis, at both
macro and micro levels, of the document, whereas plodding through each
provision seriatim risks missing the linkages between these levels, and be-
tween them and the overall project that the Islamic Revolution sought to
accomplish through this Constitution.
Nine themes may be identified, though by no means is there a “cor-
rect” number; different appraisals may find in the Constitution more, or
fewer, themes than those discussed below. But, regardless of how the docu-
ment is viewed thematically, there are three points upon which most readers
would agree.
First, Iran’s Constitution contains passages that are vague (i.e., where
more than one inference may be drawn from its terms) or ambiguous (i.e.,
where no single inference may be drawn). That is not a flaw (if it is a
“flaw” at all) unique to Iran’s Constitution. Rather, it “afflicts” most consti-
tutive documents. A constitution is not a statute, which, if well crafted,
defines its terms with precision. America’s Constitution speaks of “equal
protection,” but does not define this term. It is for the federal legislature and
judiciary to identify the boundaries of the term. So too it is with Iran’s
Constitution: the Majlis (i.e., parliament) and Islamic courts are called upon
to decide what vague or ambiguous terms mean.
Second, despite all its theology, which makes it radically different
from the US or Chinese Constitution, Iran’s Constitution shares some simi-
larities with most other constitutive frameworks. The foundational docu-
ment of any country, if the document is to have any practical value, must
address some of the following questions: What is the relationship of the
individual to the government—that is, what duties does the individual owe
to the government? Conversely, what is the relationship of the government
to the individual—that is, what duties does the government owe to the indi-
101. Id. at pmbl., Woman in the Constitution.
102. Id.
103. Id. at pmbl., The Wrath of the People.
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vidual? How is the government to be selected—that is, by what means are
leaders chosen? How is the government to be structured—that is, in terms
of branches? Indeed, the list of such questions is longer than suggested
above. India’s Constitution (originally with 395 articles, the longest in the
world, and thirty times longer than America’s104) is proof positive of a ba-
sic document that addresses a vast number of topics.
Third, as discussed earlier in the context of Dr. Schirazi’s 1997 study,
Iran’s Constitution contains inherent inconsistencies. For example, provi-
sions that exalt human dignity and freedom may not easily be squared with
those that assert the primacy of Islam itself. It may be vouchsafed that
human dignity and freedom reach their fullest expression within the frame-
work of Islam. It may be objected that freedom without the right to dissent
(for example, through agnosticism or atheism) is inauthentic. Here too
Iran’s Constitution is not alone. Potential contradictions are explicit or im-
plicit in many foundational documents. The Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China permits freedom of worship.105 Yet it accords to the
Chinese Communist Party a monopoly on all aspects of life. Again, the
legislative and judicial branches are to work out contradictions, particularly
with a view to minimizing trade-offs and maximizing the realization of as
many constitutional values as possible.
IV. THEMES FOR CURRICULAR STUDY OF IRAN’S CONSTITUTION
A. Theme 1:Islamicization
• Sharia Governance
Iran is governed by the Sharia. Chapter I of the Constitution plainly
lays out the theological foundations of the Islamic Republic. Article
2(1)–(3) identifies the core principles of faith—monotheism (tawhid),
God’s intervention in human history (i.e., divine revelation (wahy) to pro-
vide sacred law), and Day of Judgment (Resurrection) with a view to re-
turning to God. The Constitution, then, is squarely in the natural law
tradition: law comes from God. God holds “exclusive sovereignty,” and
only He has the “right to legislate;”106 “He set[s] forth the laws”107 so that
through “submission to His commands,”108 people can “return to God in the
104. Ananya Bhattacharya, India’s Constitution Is 30 Times Longer than America’s—and Still
Growing, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 2, 2019), www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/10/india-constitution-
over-30-times-long-us. Owing to 100 amendments, India’s Constitution now has 448 articles, and
whereas India has amended its Constitution 103 times, the U.S. has done so on just 27 occasions.
See id.
105. See Raj Bhala, China At 70: The Chinese Communist Party’s Ideological Contradictions,
BLOOMBERGQUINT (India) (Sept. 9, 2019), www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/china-at-70-the-chi
nese-communist-partys-ideological-contradictions.
106. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 2(1).
107. Id. at art. 2(2).
108. Id. at art. 2(1).
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Hereafter.”109 These points are symbolically represented in Iran’s flag. Arti-
cle 18 declares that the “official” flag is green, white, and red, with the
“special emblem of the Islamic Republic” and “the motto Allāhu Akbar”
(God is greatest).
Thus, the Islamic Republic is based on “the justice of God in creation
and legislation.”110 Article 4 states as an “absolute[ ] and general[ ]” princi-
ple that all of Iran’s laws and regulations (administrative, civil, cultural,
economic, financial, military, political, and otherwise), and the Constitution
itself, “must be based on Islamic criteria.”111 This principle is immutable.
The final provision of the Constitution, Article 177, mandates that the Is-
lamic nature of Iran’s Constitution not be changed:
The contents of the . . . Constitution related to the Islamic charac-
ter of the political system; the basis of all the rules and regula-
tions [being] according to Islamic criteria; the religious footing;
the objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the democratic
character of the government; the wilāyat al ‘amr (Shı̄’ı̄te princi-
ples of governance); the Imāmate of [the] Ummah; and the ad-
ministration of the country based on national referenda, official
religion of Iran (Islam), and the School (Twelver Ja’farı̄), are
unalterable.
To be sure, Article 177 creates the exclusive mechanism (discussed
below, under Theme 2) for amending the Constitution in all other respects,
“whenever needed by the circumstances.” But with respect to Sharia gov-
ernance, as it emanates from the Divine, from Allāh, it is only He who can
make alterations.
Consider, then, one author’s criticism of Iran’s Constitution:
[T]he essence of Constitutional rights is that they are not
subordinate to legislation or theology; Iran’s Constitutional pro-
visions purporting to protect civil rights however are subject to
three qualifications. First, numerous articles require them to be
“in conformity” with or not “detrimental to the principles of Is-
lam” or state they apply “except in cases provided by law.” Sec-
109. Id. at art. 2(3).
110. Id. at art. 2(4).
111. Id. at art. 4 (emphasis added). Notably, Article 4 of Iran’s Constitution has found its way
into the annals of American jurisprudence:
A federal district court in Missouri in 1984 dealt with a dispute between The McDonnell
Douglas Corporation and Iran regarding a contract that was signed in 1975, during the
time of the Shah. Iran argued that this matter should be adjudicated in its courts. In
concluding that “the Islamic revolution and[ ] subsequent rise to power of clerics in Iran
has so thoroughly affected” Iran’s legal system that it would be “unreasonable” to re-
quire McDonnell Douglas to stand before an Iranian court, the U.S. court, among other
evidence, specifically cited Article 4 of the Iranian Constitution, that all Iranian law
must be based on Islamic standards (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Islamic Republic of Iran
Air Force).
Horowitz, supra note 42, at The Iranian Constitution in U.S. Courts.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST302.txt unknown Seq: 34 18-NOV-21 12:53
554 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:3
ond, Article 4 states that all laws must be based on Islamic
criteria, and third, the constitutionally established Guardian Coun-
cil “examines the compatibility” of parliamentary legislation with
Iran’s Islamic standards.112
That proposition presumes the Constitution is grounded on secular
principles and serves as the framework for a secular legal system. It is ap-
plicable to the constitutions of America and India—but not of Iran. And it is
born of a bias manifest in comparative constitutional law, namely, to focus
on secular, western-inspired founding documents.113 The underlying philos-
ophy of Iran’s Constitution is theology; the relationship of government to
the people is about the relationship of both to God.
The obvious next two questions are (1) what are the specific sources of
Islamic criteria, and (2) who judges whether a law, regulation, or constitu-
tional provision conforms with them? The Constitution addresses both top-
ics. Article 2(a) lists the top two sources of Islamic law—the Qur’ān and
Sunnah—plus a secondary source, all of which are distinctly Shiite. Article
16 bespeaks the importance of the Qur’ān. Article 16 mandates that Arabic
be taught at the elementary and secondary school levels, in all fields, be-
cause it is the language of the Qur’ān (and because it “permeate[s]” Persian
literature). Article 17 intimates the importance of the Sunna. It declares as
the “official” calendar of Iran the lunar (A.H.) Islamic calendar, which com-
mences with the Hijra of the Prophet Muhammad.
Significant is the reference to the Sunna in Article 2(a) to that “of the
Ma’.sūmun” (infallible), with the follow-on respectful blessing “upon all of
whom be peace.” This reference is pluralized; hence it encompasses not
only the Prophet Muhammad himself but also all prophets who are secure
from error. It further conjures up the tradition of Alı̄ and perhaps all Twelve
Imāms.114 This broad reference bespeaks a Shiite view of legitimate Islamic
tradition. Even more emblematic of the Shiite perspective is the express
reference in Article 2(a) to key supplementary sources of Islamic law,
namely, the “continuous ijtihād of the fukahā’.” This source stands against
any and all claims, characteristic in (parts of) the Sunnite world, that the
door (or gate) to ijtihād was closed around 900–1000 A.D. (as a separate
chapter discusses).
112. Horowitz, supra note 42, at Implications (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., S.E. FINER ET AL., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS (S.E. Finer et al. eds., 1995).
Most of the work by these Oxford scholars reprints the texts of the constitutions of the U.S.,
Germany, France, and the Russian Federation (102–295); part of it reprints European Conventions
and Treaties (296–369); some of it discusses the unwritten British Constitution (40–101); a bit of
it discusses whether constitutions matter (1–5); but none of it—not even the portion on the vari-
eties of constitutions (6–39)—mentions the constitutions in sacred legal traditions, such as that of
Iran.
114. See generally 1 MAHMOUD M. AYOUB, THE QUR’ĀN AND ITS INTERPRETERS 185 (1984)
(concerning interpretation of Surah al-Baqarah, the second and longest chapter of the Qur’ān,
ayah 177, which was revealed, according to Shı̄’ı̄te commentators, with reference to Alı̄, the first
Imām, and its reference to prophets who are protected from error).
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The legalization of the Islamic character of Iran is manifest in several
provisions of its Constitution. For example, the way in which the Constitu-
tion frames the branches of government (discussed in Theme 9) is a re-
minder of the sacred nature of Iran’s legal system. Article 56 affirms that
“[a]bsolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God,” and that
God “made man master of his own social destiny.” Man enjoys the exercise
of this “Divine right” to forge his destiny, ideally with a view toward God.
This right is inalienable. No person can deprive man of it, and it cannot be
“subordinat[ed] . . . to the vested interests of a particular individual or
group.”
As another illustration, Article 72 charges the Guardian Council (dis-
cussed below and in Theme 9) with the responsibility of discerning whether
the Islamic Consultative Assembly (discussed in Theme 9) has enacted a
law “contrary to the u.sūl [roots, as in u.sūl al-fiqh, of the jurisprudence] and
a .hkam [Islamic commandments] of the official religion of the country
[which, as explained in Theme 3, is Twelver Shiism] or to the Constitu-
tion.” The plain, unequivocal language in the duties to which the president
and members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly take an oath, set forth
in Articles 67 and 121 (discussed below under Theme 9), respectively, is a
further example of Islamicization.
Not surprisingly, Islamicization is manifest in eligibility for elected
office. With respect to the presidency, for example, Article 115 states that
to qualify for the presidency, a person must (1) be a “religious” or “politi-
cal” person of Iranian origin and nationality, (2) be administratively re-
sourceful, (3) have a good past record, (4) be trustworthy and pious, and (5)
hold a “convinced belief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran and the official madhhab [school of Islamic jurisprudence] of
the country [namely, the Twelver Ja’farı̄ school of Shiism].” Plainly, the
fifth criterion (and arguably the fourth, too, because of its reference to
piety) is a religious test to become Iran’s president.115
Islamicization also is apparent in several constitutional provisions
about the judiciary. Under Article 157, the supreme leader is charged with
selecting the head of the judicial power (discussed below, under Theme 9).
This head must be a “just mujtahid”—an educated Muslim who is compe-
tent to interpret Islamic law in practical contexts, possibly through the use
of ijtihād (independent reasoning), and arrive at rulings that are binding—
“well versed in judiciary affairs and possessing prudence and administrative
115. See Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section (also observing that “while Article 6
of the U.S. Constitution states, ‘no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States,’ the Iranian Constitution requires its president to
swear that he will ‘dedicate [himself] to the propagation of religion and morality’ (Article 121)
and requires the members of Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly [Parliament] to swear ‘to pro-
tect the sanctity of Islam’ (Article 67)”). The Article 67 and 121 oaths are discussed below.
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abilities.”116 Likewise, the Supreme Court is led by a chief judge who under
Article 162 must be a “just mujtahid well versed in judicial matters.”117 The
prosecutor-general, the senior-most prosecuting official, also must meet this
qualification.118 And the criteria for qualification as a judge in any of Iran’s
courts must derive from the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).119 All the judges
are bound to apply “the codified law,”120 i.e., Iran’s civil code, which (of
course) comports with the Sharia.121 If no provision of that code resolves
the legal issue at hand, then the judge must “deliver his judgment on the
basis of authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwa.”122 And every
judge must “refrain from executing statutes and regulations of the govern-
ment that are in conflict with the laws or . . . norms of Islam.”123 In effect,
other than the supreme leader, it is the judiciary that is the final line of
defense against un-Islamic secularization of Iran’s legal system.
Sharia governance also is apparent in the unique system of subcentral
governance through councils that Chapter VII (Articles 100–06) estab-
lishes. Below the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and military,
and of course under the supreme leader, Iran is structured—that is, divided,
in descending order—into provinces, municipalities, cities, divisions, and
villages. So, Article 100 establishes provincial councils, municipal councils,
city councils, division councils, and village councils. The councils are to
expedite the cultural, economic, educational, and social development of
Iran, and promote its public health and welfare. Article 103 obliges provin-
cial governors, city governors, and divisional governors to “abide by all
decisions taken by the Councils within their jurisdictions.”
To oversee all these councils, Article 101 establishes a Supreme Coun-
cil of the Provinces. This Supreme Council is charged with ensuring there is
no discrimination in favor of, or against, certain councils; coordinating the
implementation of programs for the development and welfare of the prov-
inces; and securing the cooperation of the people in such programs. This
apex council, per Article 102, is empowered to draft and present (directly,
or through the executive branch) bills to the Islamic Consultative Assembly,
which must examine any such proposals.
The council system manifests Islamic law in three respects. First, Arti-
cle 105 requires that “[d]ecisions taken by the Councils must not be con-
trary to the criteria of Islam.”124 Because the councils operate horizontally
across the country, and vertically from the provincial to the village level,
116. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 157.
117. Id. at art. 162.
118. Id.
119. Id. at art. 163.
120. Id. at art. 167.
121. An analysis of Iran’s Civil Code is beyond the scope of the present work.
122. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 167.
123. Id. at art. 170.
124. Id. at art. 105.
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they can infuse Sharia concepts broadly and deeply in Iran. Moreover, Arti-
cle 106 allows for the dissolution of councils if they “deviate from their
legal duties.”125 Put bluntly, governance in accordance with Islamic law is
not left to remote officials in Tehran, but rather brought into every part of
the country through the councils, and the Supreme Council of the Provinces
is the institutional coordinating link.
Second, under Article 100, council members are chosen through elec-
tions by the people in the locality of the council. Qualifications for candi-
dates to the councils, as well as the mode of election, functions, powers, and
jurisdiction of the council, and the hierarchy among the councils, are “deter-
mined by law” in accordance with “the system of the Islamic Republic,”
and in a way that preserves the national unity and territorial integrity of
Iran, and the sovereignty of the central government.126 Reference to “the
system of the Islamic Republic” surely is to Islamic legal principles.
Third, councils can promote consultation and consensus-based deci-
sion-making. Indeed, Article 104 specifically invokes “Islamic equity and
cooperation” and calls for “harmonious progress of all units of production.”
This provision establishes councils of workers, peasants, and managers
across the industrial and agricultural sectors, at the level of administrative,
educational, and service units. Their formation, operation, scope, and func-
tions are unmentioned, but left to specification in law. But the impulse to
reduce socioeconomic stratification within the ummah, as all are equal in
the eyes of God, is apparent.
Distinct from, and even more powerful than, the president’s Council of
Ministers from Article 87, or the thirty-one-member Supreme Council of
the Provinces established under Article 101, is the Supreme Council for
National Security, created under Article 176.127 It is charged not only with
protecting Iran’s “national interests, . . . territorial integrity, and national
sovereignty” but also with “preserving the Islamic Revolution.”128 The
125. Id. at art. 106.
126. Id. at art. 100.
127. This Supreme Council is not (at least per the text of the Iranian Constitution) more pow-
erful than either the twelve-member Guardian Council (under Article 91) or the Nation’s Exigency
Council (Expediency Council) (under the 1989 amendments to the Constitution). These other
councils are discussed above.
128. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 176. The importance of the Supreme
Council for National Security is evident from its record:
Among its key foreign policy decisions, the Council was pivotal throughout the
2013–2015 negotiations with the world’s six major powers that produced the 2015 nu-
clear deal. On domestic policy, the SNSC [Supreme Council for National Security]
demonstrated its influence in December 2017 by blocking several foreign websites and
apps, including Telegram and Instagram, during nationwide protests fueled by economic
grievances. In April 2018, the SNSC responded to the U.S. designation of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization by labeling U.S. Central
Command forces as terrorists and the U.S. as a “sponsor of terrorism.”
Supreme National Security Council of Iran, U.S. INST. OF PEACE: THE IRAN PRIMER (updated July
15, 2020), https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/apr/01/supreme-national-security-council-iran
[hereinafter Supreme National Security Council, U.S. INST. OF PEACE: THE IRAN PRIMER].
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composition of the Supreme Council for National Security bespeaks its im-
portance in safeguarding Iran’s Islamic character:
• Two representatives selected by the supreme leader
• President
• Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
• Head of the judiciary
• Minister of foreign affairs
• Minister of the interior
• Minister of information
• Senior-most government official in charge of budget and planning
• Chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces
• Highest ranking official from the armed forces
• Highest ranking official from the IRGC129
And in addition to these twelve members, a thirteenth membership po-
sition may “be filled by a minister relevant to a topic under debate,” i.e.,
one with a portfolio relevant to national security in relation to the topic at
hand.130 Simply put, the top officials in all the branches of Iran’s govern-
ment, and all the services in its military, sit on this council, two of whom
are agents of the supreme leader.131
Another notable feature of this composition is pertinent to its role in
Islamicization—namely, its blend of formal and informal voices with the
loudest being traditional in respect of Islamic values. The Supreme Council
“has both clerics and lay politicians from across Iran’s limited political
spectrum. It has reformists, centrists, and hardliners, sometimes intention-
ally designed to reflect diverse trends. . . . The balance is held by conserva-
tives with ties to both the centrist and the hardliner camps.”132 In other
words, although “Iran’s national security policymaking is an opaque pro-
cess involving both official branches of government and informal influence
networks,” the council is “[t]he one formal body that brings most of those
influencers together.”133
• Role of Military
129. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 176.
130. Supreme National Security Council, U.S. INST. OF PEACE: THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note
128.
131. Id. Though this council is a veritable “who’s who of top national security decision-mak-
ers, . . . several senior officials are not included.” Id. Most notably, Qassem Soleimani, the Com-
mander of the IRGC Quds Force who was assassinated on January 3, 2020, by an American drone
strike, was not on the council. Yet, because his influence was so broad and deep across Iran and
the Middle East, and because he was so close to Āyatollāh Alı̄ Khamenei, a seat on the council for
him was unnecessary. See Holly Dagres, The Qasem Soleimani assassination feels like ages ago—
but Iran hasn’t forgotten, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
blogs/iransource/the-qasem-soleimani-assassination-feels-like-ages-ago-but-iran-hasnt-forgotten/.
132. Supreme National Security Council, U.S. INST. OF PEACE: THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note
128 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST302.txt unknown Seq: 39 18-NOV-21 12:53
2021] COMBATTING NATIONALISM 559
The Islamic legal character of Iran is evident from five provisions in
the Constitution concerning the military. They are testament to the ideologi-
cal nature of Iran’s army and IRGC. Of course, it is to be expected that a
nation’s military support and defend the Constitution under which it is or-
ganized. These provisions, however, make plain that the military is part of
Iran’s theocracy. It is the practical force behind religious governance.
First, Article 143 assigns to the army more than just the customarily
expected role of “guarding the independence and territorial integrity of the
country.” Article 143 also put the army in charge of protecting “the order of
the Islamic Republic.” Read expansively, “order” connotes not only law
and order (i.e., quelling civil unrest) but also the Islamic Revolutionary
character of the republic.
This expansive interpretation is reinforced by a second and third provi-
sion. The second, Article 144, demands that the army “be an Islamic
Army.”134 Recruits must be persons “who have faith in the objectives of the
Islamic Revolution and are devoted to . . . realizing its goals.”135 The third
provision, Article 147, sets the agenda for the army during peacetime.
While “fully observing the criteria of Islamic justice,” and without under-
mining “combat-readiness,” the government must utilize the army for “re-
lief operations, . . . educational and productive ends, and the Construction
Jihād.”136 This Jihad (struggle) appears to refer to participation in infra-
structure development for the benefit of the ummah.
A fourth constitutional provision that adduces the prominent role of
the army in Islamicization, Article 151, is about mandatory service. It calls
for universal male military training “in accordance with Islamic criteria,” so
that “all citizens will always be able to engage in the armed defence [sic] of
the Islamic Republic.”137 This mandate is based on surah 8, ayah 60 of the
Qur’ān, which Article 151 expressly invokes: “Prepare against them
whatever force you are able to muster, and horses ready for battle, striking
fear into God’s enemy and your enemy, and others beyond them unknown
to you but known to God.”138
Finally, the fifth constitutional provision that intertwines the military
and Sharia governance is Article 150, which pertains to the IRGC. As Arti-
134. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 176. This article also complements
the provision of the preamble that makes the army and IRGC “responsible . . . for fulfilling the
ideological mission of jihād in God’s way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God’s
law throughout the world,” in accordance with surah 8, ayah 60 of the Qurān (“Prepare against
them whatever force you are able to muster, and strings of horses, striking fear into the enemy of
God and your enemy, and others besides them.”) (alteration in original). See Horowitz, supra note
42, at introductory section.
135. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 144.
136. Id. at art. 147.
137. Id. at art. 151.
138. There is no right to bear arms; to the contrary, Article 151 conditions the “possession of
arms” on “permission by the competent authorities.” Id.
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cle 150 recounts, the IRGC was established “in the early days of the tri-
umph of the Revolution.” Article 150 enshrines this institution in the
Constitution, declaring the IRGC shall be “maintained so that it may con-
tinue in its role of guarding the Revolution and its achievements.” Signifi-
cantly, the article does not delineate with precision the scope and nature of
the IRGC’s duties in fulfillment of this role. They are left to “be determined
by law, with emphasis on brotherly cooperation and harmony among them.”
To be sure, there is a check on IRGC behavior (and that of the army, Gen-
darmerie, i.e., a military force with law enforcement responsibilities, and
police), namely Article 172. This provision states that military courts are
responsible for investigating crimes allegedly committed by individuals in
the IRGC (or other military or law enforcement entities).139 However, in
practice, because of the special relationship the IRGC has to the supreme
leader—it is answerable (in practice if not in theory) directly to him140—
these duties are as expansive as the leader wishes.
• Consensus
As Article 104 (discussed above) intimates, Islamicization is about
more than the substantive nature of rules. It concerns the process by which
those rules are formed. Consensus-based decision-making is essential. In
that respect, and in ways unfamiliar to contemporary western constitutional
cultures that view Islamic legal systems as inherently authoritarian, Islamic
governance can—at least in theory—be democratic.141 Indeed, legitimacy
in the eyes of the ummah is undermined if it is wholly undemocratic.
Requirements to seek consensus are found in various, sometimes tech-
nically detailed, provisions of the Constitution. For example, Article 85
says the assembly cannot delegate its power to legislate to any one individ-
ual or committee. That prohibition is a rule against one person, or a cabal,
effectively dominating the legislative process and undermining Islamic con-
sensus-based governance. Per Article 85, in a “necessary” circumstance, the
assembly can delegate its legislative power to a committee in accordance
with Article 72, though any law passed by such a committee will be imple-
mented on a temporary basis, and final approval remains with the full as-
sembly. The assembly also may delegate to a committee the responsibility
to approve articles of association for a company, organization, or govern-
ment institution.142 But such approvals “must not be inconsistent with the
139. If the offense is a common crime, then it is tried in a public court. See 1979 IRANIAN
CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 172. By implication, military court proceedings may be held
in secret. Also, military courts and the Office of the Military Prosecutor are part of, and subject to
the same rules as, the judiciary. See id.
140. See FREDERIC WEHREY ET AL., The IRGC in Politics, in THE RISE OF THE PASDARAN:
ASSESSING THE DOMESTIC ROLES OF IRAN’S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS 77, 77
(2009), www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg821osd.13?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
141. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO & JOHN O. VOLL, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY (1996).
142. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 85.
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principles and commandments of the official religion” of Iran.143 Whether
they are is a matter ultimately to be decided by the Guardian Council in
accordance with Article 96.144 And the Speaker of the Assembly must
“study and indicat[e]” whether such approvals satisfy these principles and
commandments.145
Another illustration of the expression of the voice of the assembly as
representative of the public lies in Article 87. This provision develops the
relationship between two distinct branches of Iran’s government, the execu-
tive and legislative (both discussed below). The president of Iran must ob-
tain a “vote of confidence from the Assembly” for his “Council of
Ministers.”146 This approval must be obtained after the president forms his
council, but before it begins its work.147 And during his term, the president
can seek from the assembly “a vote of confidence” for his council “on im-
portant and controversial issues.”148
• Guardian Council
The most obvious institutional expression of Islamicization, save for
the office of the supreme leader, is the Guardian Council. It plays two major
roles: supervisory and juridical. As to the first, under Article 99, the council
is responsible for overseeing Iranian democracy. The council supervises
elections for (1) the Assembly of Experts, which picks the supreme leader
(discussed in Theme 2, below), (2) the president (discussed under Theme 9,
below), (3) the Islamic Consultative Assembly (i.e., the legislature, dis-
cussed under Theme 9, below), and (4) popular referenda (i.e., “direct re-
course to popular opinion,” discussed under Theme 6, below).149
As to the second, the council is akin to a constitutional court. Article
91 establishes the Guardian Council and its mandate—namely, “to safe-
guard the Islamic ordinances and the Constitution . . . [and] examine the
compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assem-
bly with Islam.” The council consists of twelve individuals, six ‘adl
fukahā’, who are “conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day,”
plus six Muslim jurists who specialize in different legal fields.150 The six
‘adl fukahā’ are chosen by the supreme leader.151 The six jurists are nomi-




146. Id. at art. 87.
147. Id.
148. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 87.
149. Id. at art. 99.
150. Id. at art. 91.
151. Id.
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and elected by the assembly.152 Article 92 specifies that all twelve serve for
a six-year period.153
The Constitution does not spell out the distinction between the two
types of Guardian Council members. Based on Shı̄’ı̄te tradition, it would
appear that the six ‘adl fukahā’ are considered “mujtahid mutlaq” (un-
restricted jurist-scholars)—that is, Islamic legal scholars who have satisfied
all the conditions for independent reasoning (ijtihād) and, therefore, are
among the most prominent of scholars.154 The other six jurists, while no
doubt highly respected, might be among the “mujtahid muqayyad” (re-
stricted jurist-scholars), meaning they have mastered the methodology of a
particular school of law (madhhab) and can apply it to reach the traditional
rulings of that school, and to pass new rulings within that school or within
their area of legal specialty.
The assembly derives its constitutional authority from the Guardian
Council. Article 93 states that without the council, the assembly has no
legal status other than to approve the credentials of the council members
and select the six jurists. Pursuant to Article 94, all legislation the assembly
passes—not merely one piece selected for constitutional challenge by an
interested party, but rather every legislative enactment—must be sent to,
and reviewed by, the council within ten days. If ten days are “inadequate”
to finish the review and provide a “definite opinion,” then the assembly can
grant an extension under Article 95. In studying every assembly enactment
as required by Article 94, the council must check to “ensure[ ] its compati-
bility with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution.” Only compatible leg-
islation is enforceable.155 The council must return any incompatible
legislation to the “Assembly for review.”156
Read literally, this language would allow for the assembly to “review”
an enactment yet insist on its legislative position or, in other words, disa-
gree with the council’s view that the enactment violated Islamic legal prin-
ciples or the Constitution. If the assembly exercises this power, a crisis
could ensue. But, subject to the supreme leader, the ultimate say rests with
the council. Article 96 highlights the distinction between the two types of
council members. To decide whether legislation is compatible with “the
laws of Islam,” a majority vote of the fukahā’ is taken.157 The other six
members are not sufficiently qualified to make this determination.158 How-
ever, to determine whether legislation is compatible with the Constitution,
152. Id.
153. Half of the first Guardian Council changed over by lots after three years. See 1979 IRA-
NIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 92.
154. See RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARĪ’A) 1298, 1334 (2d ed. 2016)
[hereinafter BHALA ISLAMIC LAW TEXTBOOK].
155. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 94.
156. Id.
157. Id. at art. 96.
158. Id.
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all twelve members vote, with affirmance requiring a majority thereof.159
Similarly, Article 98 “vest[s]” the authority to interpret the Constitution
with the council, which exercises interpretative authority by “consent of
three-fourths of its members.” So, hypothetically, a majority of council
members could determine that legislation passed by the assembly is uncon-
stitutional and then, by a three-fourths majority, could render an interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. To assist in their work, council members per
Article 97 can listen in person to the assembly and must do so and “make
their views known” if a proposed bill is “urgent.”
It is worth commenting that the Article 96 and 98 voting rules do not
undermine the sacred character of Iran’s legal system in the way that it
might appear to legal realists, critical legal studies adherents, and jurists
opposed to natural law, such as American Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. Justice Holmes avowed that the law is whatever a ma-
jority says it is.160 He refused to accept law as divinely sourced and put
down those who did with the aphorism “[c]ertitude is not the test of cer-
tainty.”161 Holmes and his modern-day devotees might think majority and
three-fourths voting under Articles 96 and 98 are tantamount to a confes-
sion that there are no absolutes. “To the contrary,” Iranian legal scholars
and practitioners would say. They do not necessarily claim 100 percent cer-
tainty on all points. There are absolutes, but the scholars and practitioners
may not know for sure what, exactly, they are. So, the Guardian Council
voting rules adduce that jurists are to strive to learn, understand, interpret,
and apply the will of God, and that in this struggle (Jihad), reasonable
minds may differ.
B. Theme 2: Velayet-e-Faqih and Reappearance of Walı̄ al ‘A.sr
• Guardianship and Leadership
Under the velayat-e-faqih doctrine Ayatollah Khomeini promulgates in
his 1970 book Governance of the Jurist, “[i]t is the jurist, or Islamic
scholar[,] who should rule an Islamic state; this is the source for Iran’s
Supreme Leader.”162 Thus, he writes:
“Islam proclaims monarchy and hereditary succession wrong and
invalid.” (p. 10) . . . [“]After the death of the Most Noble Messen-
ger, the obstinate enemies of the faith, the Umayyads (God’s
curses be upon them), did not permit the Islamic state to attain
stability with the rule of Alı̄ . . . The form of government of the
Umayyads and the Abbasids, the political and administrative poli-
159. Id.
160. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, in 2 THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL TRADI-
TION: 1865 TO THE PRESENT 211, 212 (David A. Hollinger & Charles Capper eds., 7th ed. 2017).
161. Id.
162. Horowitz, supra note 42, at The Iranian Constitution and Ayatollah Khomeini (citing
IMAM KHOMEINI, VELAYAT-E FAQEEH [GOVERNANCE OF THE JURIST]  (Hamid Algar trans., 2005)).
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cies they pursued, were anti-Islamic. The form of government
was thoroughly perverted by being transformed into a monarchy,
like those of the kings of Iran, the emperors of Rome, and the
pharaohs of Egypt” (p. 23).
. . . “This slogan of the separation of religion from politics and the
demand that Islamic scholars should not intervene in social and
political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the im-
perialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. Were religion
and politics separate in the time of the Prophet?” (p. 16).163
The essential logic is that separating mosque from state is un-Islamic.
To be authentically Islamic is to reject the secularist western separation of
God from law.
So, as explored above, Article 4 entrusts the fukahā’ of the Guardian
Council with the vital function of ensuring that Iran’s legal system is, in-
deed, authentically Islamic. They are the “judges” in all questions concern-
ing whether any law or regulation, or any article of the Constitution, is
“based on Islamic criteria.”164 Here, then, is a clear manifestation of the
velayet e-faqih doctrine.165 Article 5 states the guardianship (wilāyah) and
leadership of the Muslim community (ummah) “devolve[s] upon the just
[‘adl] and pious [muttaqi] faqı̄h.” Per Article 5, this individual—the su-
preme leader—is “aware of the circumstances” of their times, “coura-
geous,” “resourceful,” and administratively skilled.
In their role to ensure the Islamic quality of Iran’s legal system, the
fukahā’ of the Guardian Council, the council itself, and the supreme
leader—indeed, all of Iran—are mindful of an axiom of Twelver Shiite
belief: the doctrine of the Hidden Imam. Article 5 expressly invokes it,
saying the responsibilities of the supreme leader laid out in Article 107 (as
discussed below) are pertinent “[d]uring the Occulation of the Walı̄ al
‘A.sr”
166—that is, the Māhdı̄, the Twelfth Imam, who entered the mystical
sequestration in 940 AD.167 Article 5 expresses the desire for his return:
“may Allāh hasten his reappearance.”
“Walı̄” means “guardian.”168 But the “Walı̄ al ‘A.sr” is no ordinary
guardian. The meaning of “al-‘a.sr” is profound, and profoundly important
163. Id. (quoting Ayatollah Khomeini). For a treatment of the Umayyad and the Abbasid Ca-
liphates, which lasted from 661 to 750 A.D. and 750 to 1258 A.D., see BHALA ISLAMIC LAW
TEXTBOOK, supra note 154, at 123–52 (chs. 5–6).
164. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 4.
165. This expression is Farsi (Persian); the Arabic version is “wilāyat al-faqih.” See BHALA
ISLAMIC LAW TEXTBOOK, supra note 154, at 1358.
166. ISLAHAT VA TAQYYRATI VA TATMIMAH QANUNI ASSASSI [AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION]  1368 [1989] art. 5, translated in Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution of 1979 with
Amendments Through 1989, CONSTITUTE PROJECT, www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Iran_1989 [hereinafter 1989 AMENDMENT TO THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION].
167. See BHALA ISLAMIC LAW TEXTBOOK, supra note 154, at 169–214 (chs. 8–9).
168. Id. at 1357.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST302.txt unknown Seq: 45 18-NOV-21 12:53
2021] COMBATTING NATIONALISM 565
to understand this title. Literally, “al-‘a.sr” means to press or squeeze.
169
Metaphorically, it refers to time, as in the period from the creation of the
world until the Day of Judgment, or the period during the life of the Prophet
Muhammad, or the period of the day of the late afternoon (as in the last
hour of the afternoon).170 The period nearing the end of day, in turn, sym-
bolizes the drawing to a close of time itself—the nearing of the end of time
and the approaching of the Day of Judgment.171 That is when the return
(emergence from Occulation) of the Walı̄ al ‘A.sr is expected. When it oc-
curs, the Walı̄ al ‘A.sr will establish a period of peace and justice, plus win
the conversion of humankind to Islam.172
• Supreme Leader and Assembly of Experts
Perhaps no aspect of Iran’s Islamic Republic is more fascinating, and
vexing, to outside observers than the concept, institution, and persona of the
“supreme leader.” Not only does he “run” Iran as the ultimate governmental
authority and is he perched atop the media (by virtue of his power to ap-
point and dismiss, under Article 175, the head of the radio and television
network),173 but he also, under Article 177, catalyzes constitutional amend-
ments and has a comparatively outsized and final say in them.174 Moreover,
and far more importantly, the supreme leader is responsible for Islamic gov-
169. See 20 AL ISLAM.ORG, Surah Asr, Chapter 103, in AN ENLIGHTENING COMMENTARY
INTO THE LIGHT OF THE HOLY QUR’ĀN, www.al-islam.org/enlightening-commentary-light-holy-
quran-vol-20/surah-asr-chapter-103.
170. See Abu Abdis Salaam, Benefits from Surah al-’A.sr, ISLAMWAY (Jan. 6, 2014), https://
en.islamway.net/article/20359/benefits-from-surah-al-asr; 11 Different English Tafsir’s of Surah
al-Asr (The Declining Day), MEDIUM (Feb. 9, 2018), https://medium.com/adventure-of-the-quran/
tafsir-of-surah-al-asr-the-declining-day-d8035335c3c8.
171. See Tafsir: Surah Al-Asr, HIZB UT-TAHRIR BRITAIN (Jan. 1, 2018), www.hizb.org.uk/
islamic-culture/tafsir-surah-al-asr.
172. See BHALA ISLAMIC LAW TEXTBOOK, supra note 154, at 169–214 (chs. 8–9).
173. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 175.
174. As per Article 177, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran may be revised
(albeit not as to its Islamic character, as discussed in Theme 1) “whenever needed by the circum-
stances.” Id. at art. 177.
The following procedures must be used for such changes:
(1) The supreme leader consults with the nation’s Exigency Council (Expediency Council)
about a constitutional amendment.
(2) The supreme leader “issues an edict to the President” about the amendment.
(3) The amendment is prepared by the Council for the Revision of the Constitution. This
council consists of the following:
—All twelve members of the Guardian Council.
—President
—Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
—Head of the judiciary
—Permanent members of the nation’s Exigency Council (Expediency Council)
—Five members from the Assembly of Experts
—Ten representatives selected by the supreme leader
—Three representatives from the Council of Ministers
—Three representatives from the judiciary
—Ten representatives from the Islamic Consultative Assembly
—Three university professors
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ernance until the return of the Walı̄ al ‘A.sr (discussed above). In short, the
occupant of this office is more than an economic, political, judicial, and
military leader. He is also a religious leader—the religious leader, until the
reemergence of the Hidden Imām.
The first supreme leader was, of course, Āyatollāh Ruhollah
Khomeini.175 Upon his death in 1989, Āyatollāh Alı̄ Khameini (1939–pre-
sent) succeeded him. That Āyatollāh Khomeini would be the first one never
was in doubt. Article 107 identifies him as “the eminent marjı̄ ‘al-taqlı̄d and
great leader of the universal Islamic Revolution, and founder of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, . . . who was recognized and accepted as marjı̄ and leader
by a decisive majority of the people.”176 That Āyatollāh Khameini would
succeed him was not automatic. Rather, the “demise” of Āyatollāh
Khomeini was foreseen in Article 107. Hence, Article 107 establishes an
institutional mechanism for succession of Iran’s most important office.
That institution is the Assembly of Experts. Article 107 creates it for
“the task of appointing” the successor to Imām Khomeini.177 This assembly
consists of “experts elected by the people,” though their electoral process is
not specified.178 To select the new supreme leader (and all subsequent
ones), the Assembly of Experts must “review and consult among them-
selves” to see if there are any fukahā’ who possess the qualifications that
Articles 5 and 109 specify.179
With respect to points (1)–(3), note there are, in total, forty-nine members of this Council for the
Revision of the Constitution, excluding the Expediency Council officials.
(4) The supreme leader confirms (and signs) any decision taken by the Council for the Revi-
sion of the Constitution.
(5) No Council decision confirmed (and signed) by the supreme leader is “valid” unless
“approved by an absolute majority vote in a national referendum.” (The Article 59 rule that the
Islamic Consultative Assembly must approve by two-thirds majority any “direct recourse to public
opinion” does not apply to an Article 177 Revision of the Constitution vote.) Id.
The fifth point also is noteworthy. It is, perhaps, the only instance in the Constitution in
which the supreme leader’s will might be subject to a different authority—the people. This point
seems to reflect the need to balance top-down hierarchical authority against bottom-up decentral-
ized legitimacy. Put directly, the word “Āyatollāh” literally means “sign of God”—not tyrannical
dictator. That sign is put on a person whose virtues allow him to be a guide for the ummah, until
the return of the Hidden Imām. See BHALA ISLAMIC LAW TEXTBOOK, supra note 154 at 1303.
175. For a superb, brief account of his life, see Richard Pearson, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini: The Mullah Who Transformed Iran, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 5, 1989),
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/06/05/ayatollah-ruhollah-khomeini-the-mullah-
who-transformed-iran/6aaea9ff-84bd-406c-a0d9-8d8b4851e3bf.
176. 1989 AMENDMENT TO THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 166, at art. 107.
177. Id.
178. Article 108 charged the fukahā’ members of the first Guardian Council with setting out
the number and qualifications of the experts in the Assembly of Experts, as well as the mode of
their election and their code of procedure, all based on a majority vote of these members, and
“approved by the Leader of the Revolution [i.e., Āyatollāh Khomeini].” Thereafter, the power to
modify their rules is vested in themselves. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art.
108.
179. 1989 AMENDMENT TO THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 166, at art. 107.
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Under Article 107, if the assembly finds one such fukahā’ “better
versed in Islamic regulations, the subjects of the fiqh [jurisprudence], or in
political and social issues, or possessing general popularity or special prom-
inence” with respect to any of the credentials Article 109 lists, then the
assembly “shall elect him as the Leader.”180 If there is no such superior
candidate from among the fukahā’, then, per Article 107, the Assembly of
Experts “shall elect and declare one of them as the Leader.”181 That is, the
assembly shall pick one of its own assembly members as the leader. Also,
under Article 107, the new leader “shall assume all the powers of the [wi-
lāyat al ‘amr principles of governance] and all the responsibilities arising
therefrom.”182 However, Article 107 makes clear that “the Leader is equal
with the rest of the people . . . in the eyes of the law.”183
There are three “essential qualifications and conditions” to be supreme
leader, which Article 109 sets out:
(1) [S]cholarship, as required for performing the functions of
muftı̄ [i.e., an Islamic law specialist accredited, by virtue of out-
standing scholarly reputation, personal piety, governmental au-
thority, or all three, to issue an authoritative legal opinion] in
different fields of fiqh.
(2) Justice and piety, as required for leadership of the Islamic
Ummah.
(3) [Right] political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage,
administrative facilities, and adequate capability for leadership.184
If more than one person fulfils these criteria, then the individual who
possesses “the better jurisprudential and political perspicacity [i.e., criteria
(1) and (3)] will be given preference” to be the new leader.185 In other
words, a sense of justice and personal piety are relegated to scholarship and
political savviness.
The “duties and powers” of the supreme leader are enormous. Article
110 lists eleven of them, which encompass all aspects of Iranian life. The
supreme leader is responsible for the following:
(1) Delineating “the general policies of the Islamic Republic,” in
“consultation with” the nation’s Exigency Council (i.e., Expedi-
ency Council)
(2) Supervising the “proper execution of the general policies”
(3) Issuing a decree for a national referendum
(4) Assuming supreme command of the armed forces





184. Id. at art. 109.
185. 1989 AMENDMENT TO THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 166, at art. 109.
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(6) Appointing and dismissing (a) the fukahā’ on the Guardian
Council, (b) the supreme judicial authority, (c) the head of the
radio and TV network, (d) the Chief of the Joint Staff, (e) the
IRGC chief commander, and (f) the supreme commanders of the
armed forces
(7) Resolving differences among the army, navy, and air force
(8) Resolving a problem that “cannot be solved by conventional
methods” by recourse to the nation’s Exigency Council
(9) Signing a decree for the election of the president, after the
Guardian Council has confirmed the “suitability of candidates for
the Presidency”
(10) Dismissing the president, after (as per Article 89) the Is-
lamic Consultative Assembly has voted that he is incompetent, or
the Supreme Court has found him guilty of violating his constitu-
tional duties
(11) Pardoning or reducing the sentence of a convict, “within the
framework of Islamic criteria,” upon a recommendation from the
head of the judiciary186
Only the eleventh duty and power may be delegated by the supreme
leader “to another person.”187 Even this list is understated. For instance,
Article 131 (discussed below) empowers the supreme leader to make deci-
sions about the first deputy to the president.
Save for Article 111, these responsibilities are essentially unchecked.
Article 111 contemplates the possibilities that the supreme leader may be-
come incapable of fulfilling his duties under Article 110, he may lose one
of the qualifications under Articles 5 and 109, or it may become known he
never possessed one or more of the qualifications.188 In that case, the As-
sembly of Experts, which is authorized to determine that one of these even-
tualities has, in fact, occurred, will dismiss the leader. Article 111 is clear:
“he will be dismissed.”189 Of course, the prospect of the assembly that
chose the leader dismissing him is foreseeably dim except in the most egre-
gious of circumstances.
• Supreme Leader, Nation’s Exigency Council, and Supreme
Council for National Security
What happens if the Assembly of Experts dismisses the supreme
leader, or if he dies or resigns? Then, following Article 111, the assembly
“shall take steps within the shortest possible time for the appointment of the
new Leader.”190 Until a new leader is appointed, and following a decision
of the nation’s Exigency Council (i.e., the Expediency Council), a three-
186. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 110.
187. Id.
188. 1989 AMENDMENT TO THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 166, at art. 111.
189. Id.
190. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST302.txt unknown Seq: 49 18-NOV-21 12:53
2021] COMBATTING NATIONALISM 569
person transitional council shall be constituted to take over his duties.191
This council shall consist of the president, the head of the judiciary, and one
faqı̄h from the Guardian Council.192 With the approval of three-fourths of
the members of the nation’s Exigency Council, the three-person transitional
council “shall take action” on the duties and powers identified in Article
110(1), (3), (5), (6) (but only with respect to the military officials, i.e.,
Chief of the Joint Staff, IRGC chief commander, and supreme commanders
of the armed forces), and (10).193 If the supreme leader is temporarily inca-
pacitated, due to illness “or any other incident,” then the three-person tran-
sitional council “shall assume his duties.”194
Manifestly, the nation’s Exigency Council plays an important role as a
body with which the supreme leader must consult under Article 110(1), and
in directing and managing a transition from one such leader to his successor
under Article 111. As to its origins and roles:
[T]he Expediency Council . . . was established in 1988 by decree
of Āyatollāh Khomeini, the Supreme Leader at the time. When
the Constitution was changed in 1989, the Council was integrated
into the Constitution. It has two functions: first, it functions as an
expert council advising the Supreme Leader in all policy areas;
. . . [the second function is discussed below].195
Note, then, that the Constitution is murky as to how the Exigency
Council is selected. By inference from its origins as a creation of the
Ayatollah Khomeini, and its first function as an advisory body to the su-
preme leader, the leader picks its members. Presumably, it also is up to the
leader to decide the number of council members, whether they are term-
limited (and if so, for how long), and whether to dismiss a member.196 Put
in colloquial American English terms, the council is the “cabinet” of the
supreme leader.
The role of the Expediency Council is equally vital in preserving Iran’s
Islamic character. Under Article 112, this council meets “upon the order of
the Leader” whenever “the Guardian Council judges a proposed bill of the
Islamic Consultative Assembly to be against the principles of Sharı̄’a . . .
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. As to the officials identified in Article 110(a)–(c), that is, the fukahā’ on the Guardian
Council, the supreme judicial authority, and the head of the radio and TV network, the transitional
Council is not empowered to take action. Presumably, then, the nation’s Exigency Council would
be in control of appointments and dismissals to these offices. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra
note 53, at art. 110.
194. 1989 AMENDMENT TO THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 166, at art. 111.
195. The Expediency Council, IRAN DATA PORTAL, https://irandataportal.syr.edu/political-in-
stitutions/the-expediency-council [hereinafter The Expediency Council, IRAN DATA PORTAL].
196. Reference in Article 177 to “permanent” members of the nation’s Exigency Council indi-
cates there are term-limited ones. As Article 177 indicates, only the permanent members of that
council serve on the Council for Revision of the Constitution. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra
note 53, at art. 177.
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and the Assembly is unable to meet the expectations of the Guardian Coun-
cil.”197 In such instances, the council performs the second of its two
functions:
[I]t may function as a legislative body in the following manner:
after the Guardian Council (which screens all legislation with re-
gard to its constitutionality and its congruence with Islamic law
per Art. 4) has vetoed a piece of legislation, the Parliament
(Majles) may decide with a 2/3 majority to send the legislative
draft to the Expediency Council. The Council may then decide to
pass the law in the version as forwarded by the Majles, or with
the changes demanded by the Guardian Council, or in yet another
version.198
In effect, Article 112 envisions the possibility of a constitutional crisis
whereby the assembly, perhaps backed by popular demand, insists a pro-
posed piece of legislation complies with Islamic law, whereas the Guardian
Council steadfastly disagrees. Who has final say?
Article 112 does not give the final say to the Supreme Court, or even
to the fukahā’ on the Guardian Council. Rather, this provision gives final
say over whether a bill is, or is not, in keeping with the Sharia to the Exi-
gency Council. Yet, in practice, that means final say is with the supreme
leader. The reason is the tight nexus between the supreme leader and the
nation’s Exigency Council. Article 112 empowers the leader with ap-
pointing the members of this council (some of whom are permanent, and
others of whom are changeable), and has final say over the rules of the
council that its members formulate.199
Finally, the extent to which power and influence is centralized under
the velayat e faqih doctrine in the persona of the supreme leader is apparent
from three features of Article 176. First, this provision makes clear that of
the twelve permanent members of the Supreme Council for National Secur-
ity, ten are from governmental or military positions, but two are the “repre-
sentatives” of the supreme leader, whom he “nominate[s].”200 Second, by
custom, one of the leader’s two representatives serves as “Secretary” for the
council.201 Third, no decision of the Supreme Council takes effect until it is
confirmed by the supreme leader.202
• Religious Development
Supplementary sources of Islamic law, specifically, independent rea-
soning in the hands of jurists, are guided from the top by the supreme
197. Id. at art. 112.
198. The Expediency Council, IRAN DATA PORTAL, supra note 195.
199. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 112.
200. Id. at art. 176.
201. Supreme National Security Council, U.S. INST. OF PEACE: THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note
128.
202. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 176.
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leader.203 Such guidance raises two questions. What are the powers of the
supreme leader? And to what end is the supreme leader to exercise those
powers? The first question is discussed above (Theme 1).
As to the second question, how the supreme leader must use his pow-
ers, in the most basic sense, the answer is for the religious development of
the people. That development is a, if not the, core constitutional value:
[The Constitution] makes clear its objective to promote Islam
worldwide. Its Preamble states that “the mission of the Constitu-
tion” is “to create conditions conducive to the development of
man in accordance with the noble and universal values of Islam”
and that “the aim of government is to foster the growth of man in
such a way that he progresses towards the establishment of a Di-
vine order (in accordance with the Qurānic phrase ’And toward
God is the journeying’ [3:28]).”204
With the supreme leader, the preeminent duty of Iran’s government,
listed in Article 3(1), is to “creat[e] a favorable environment for the growth
of moral virtues based on faith and piety and the struggle against all forms
of vice and corruption.”205
C. Theme 3: Bounded Religious Freedom
  • “Official” Religion
From the first three constitutional themes, a fourth one may be in-
ferred: religious freedom in the Islamic Republic is circumscribed. Chapter
I, Articles 11–14 confirm this inference. They aggregate to discrimination
in favor of the Twelver (Ja’farı̄) school of Shiism, and against all other
faiths, in the following rank order (from least to most discrimination) after
the Twelvers:
(1) The four Sunnite schools, .Hanafı̄, Mālikı̄, Shāfi’ı̄, and .Hanbalı̄,
and Fiver Shiites, the Zaydı̄ school206
(2) Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism207
(3) All other religions (e.g., Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism),
plus agnosticism and atheism
Is this ordering incongruous with the Article 19 declaration of “equal
rights” for “[a]ll” people of Iran?208
203. See BHALA ISLAMIC LAW TEXTBOOK, supra note 154, at 169–214 (chs. 8–9).
204. Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section.
205. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 3(1).
206. Id. at art. 12.
207. Id. at art. 13.
208. Horowitz suggests Articles 12 and 19 are inconsistent. Horowitz, supra note 42, at intro-
ductory section (“Still, while the Constitution states it protects the equal rights of ‘All people of
Iran,’—’Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities’
(Article 13).”).
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On the one hand, the conflict between (1) the ordering of religious
groups that Articles 11–14 create and (2) the equal protection Article 19
guarantees seems prima facie. A hierarchy of groups that enjoy equal status
under law is not a legal hierarchy in any meaningful sense.
On the other hand, a scrupulous textual analysis suggests there is no
conflict between the ordering of religious groups via Articles 11–14 and the
equal protection guarantee in Article 19. The first clause of Article 19 does
not specifically list religious groups among the cohorts. It lists—“equal
rights” applies regardless of “the ethnic group or tribe”—and the second
clause, says “the color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any
privilege.” Thus, even if “and the like” were read to refer to religious
groups, under the principle of ejusdem generis (of the same kind), that list-
ing is relevant to “privileges,” not “equal rights.” It might be ventured that
not bestowing “privileges” is essentially the same as affording “equal
rights.” But that interpretation would treat one of those two terms as redun-
dant and thereby conflate the two clauses. Presumably, the drafters of Iran’s
Constitution used different terms with a reason and sought to avoid
superfluities.
Additionally, recourse to Article 57 indicates there is no conflict. Arti-
cle 57 relegates the three branches of Iran’s government that otherwise
would protect every citizen’s legal rights to a theocratic power. This provi-
sion states that the legislature, judiciary, and executive are to “function[]
under the supervision of the absolute wilāyat al ‘amr [i.e., supreme leader]
and the leadership of the Ummah.”209 Put crudely, the Article 19 declara-
tion about equality is not an overarching secular leveling of Iranian society;
rather, principles held to be sacred allow for discrimination within Iran’s
diverse population.
Further evidence that Article 19 takes subject to, and is not inconsis-
tent with, the hierarchical ordering of religions comes from Article 12. Arti-
cle 12 declares as Iran’s “official religion . . . Islam and the Twelver
(Ja’farı̄) school [of Shiism]” with respect to u.sūl al-Dı̄n (roots of faith,
theology) and fiqh (jurisprudence) “and [that] this principle will remain
eternally immutable.”210 There are five roots of Twelver Shiism:211
(1) Oneness of God (Allāh), monotheism (tawhid)
(2) Prophethood of Muhammad (i.e., Nubuwwat)
(3) Resurrection (i.e., Day of Judgment)
(4) Justice of God (‘adl)
(5) The Imāmate
209. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 57.
210. Id. at art. 12.
211. BHALA ISLAMIC LAW TEXTBOOK, supra note 154, at 73–114 (ch. 3), 169–214 (chs. 8–9).
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The first three roots are common to all Muslims, while the latter two
are foundations of Twelver Shiism.212 Because Sunnis (i.e., .Hanafı̄s,
Mālikı̄s, Shāfi’ı̄s, and .Hanbalı̄s) do not adhere to the fourth and fifth roots,
and because Fiver Shiites believe in a different Imāmate line subsequent to
the fifth Imam,213 these schools of Islam are not accorded the highest con-
stitutional status.
Yet, because the four Sunnite schools and Fiver Shiites share with
Twelvers a common faith in the first three roots, they have “official status”
in two areas: (1) religious education and (2) one fiqh dimension—namely,
personal status law (which encompasses family law, wills, and inheritance
law).214 And wherever one of the Sunnite schools, or the Fivers, are demo-
graphically predominant in Iran, local regulations are to be consistent with
that school.215 But in no instance may those regulations derogate from the
local council (which, presumably, adheres to a Twelver line, or may be
obliged to do so), nor may they infringe on the rights of any other school
(which, of course, includes Twelvers).216
• “Recognized” Religions
Next come Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians. They lack “official sta-
tus,” as per Article 13, but are “recognized.”217 They must behave “within
the limits of the law”218—surely meaning the Sharia as interpreted accord-
ing to the Twelver (Ja’farı̄) Shiite school. Within that boundary, they can
proceed with their ceremonies and practice their teachings with respect to
religious education and personal status. In effect, they are protected persons
(dhimmı̄s) who have been conquered and operate under a treaty of
surrender.
• No Status
What about the world’s roughly 1.1 billion Hindus, 0.5 billion Bud-
dhists, millions of Sikhs, and 1.2 billion unaffiliated persons?219 For pur-
poses of Article 13, they do not exist. That is, they receive no constitutional
recognition. However, the government of Iran, and all Muslims, are obli-
gated to treat all non-Muslims in an ethical manner, in accordance with “the
principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human
212. Id. at 169–214 (chs. 8–9), 257–316 (chs. 12–14).
213. Id.
214. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 12.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at art. 13.
218. Id.
219. See Conrad Hackett & David McClendon, Christians Remain World’s Largest Religious
Group, but They Are Declining in Europe, PEW RSCH. FOUND.: FACTTANK (Apr. 5, 2017),
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/05/christians-remain-worlds-largest-religious-group-but-
they-are-declining-in-europe (for all categories except Sikhs, 2015 data); Amber Pariona, Coun-
tries with the Largest Sikh Populations, WORLD ATLAS (Mar. 23, 2018), https://
www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-largest-sikh-populations.html (for Sikhs, 2018
data).
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rights.”220 However, this duty applies only to those non-Muslims “who re-
frain from engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic
Republic of Iran.”221
In sum, read from a nontheological perspective—in particular, a
deconstructionist interpretative perspective222—Articles 11–14 are at war
with themselves. They give, but they take away. They speak of religious
freedom, but they bless only certain among the devout.
D. Theme 4: Bounded Civil Rights
• Harm Principle Boundary
Chapter III (Articles 19–42) contains a list of socioeconomic and pro-
cedural civil liberties, and human rights, the government must guarantee to
each citizen.223 These civil liberties and rights are subject to certain in-built
limitations—that is, they are circumscribed by textual words and phrases.
They also are subject to the general Article 40 rule, which is redolent of the
utilitarian “harm principle” of John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) that no person
may exercise a right in a way that injures another or is detrimental to the
public interest.224
• Equal Rights
Most notably, as with respect to religious freedom (Theme 3), in re-
spect of civil liberties, the pertinent constitutional provisions lay out rights
within an Islamic framework. No right is unbounded; each right must con-
form with Islamic criteria. Thus, again, from a nontheological perspective,
the text is at war with itself: it promises freedom, but then subordinates
liberty to religion. Article 22 sets this incongruous framework. It declares
ambitiously the “dignity, life, property, rights, residence, and occupation of
the individual” to be “inviolate,” but then cuts back on this promise with an
exception that potentially destroys the ambition: “except in cases sanctioned
by law.”225 Nothing, then, is inalienable; all civil liberties, and human dig-
nity and life themselves, are contingent.
220. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 14. This duty is based in the Holy
Qur’ān, surah 60, ayah 8.
221. Id.
222. On deconstructionism and other literary schools of textual interpretation, see Bhala &
Witmer, supra note 2, at 58–126.
223. Articles 41–42 address eligibility for Iranian citizenship by birth and naturalization, re-
spectively, as well as its loss. Article 41 states that “Iranian citizenship is the indisputable right of
every Iranian.” The government cannot withdraw citizenship unless the citizen so requests (i.e.,
renounces citizenship), or the citizen acquires the citizenship of another country (i.e., dual nation-
ality is not permitted). Article 42 holds that a foreign national may obtain Iranian citizenship as
prescribed by law, but such citizenship may be withdrawn upon request, or if that national ac-
quires the citizenship of another state. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at arts. 41–42.
224. See David Brink, Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(Aug. 21, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political.
225. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 22.
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Article 19 is “laudable”226 in its guarantee that “[a]ll people of Iran . . .
enjoy equal rights.”227 But this guarantee is restricted by ethnicity, tribal
status, “color, race, language, and the like.”228 Notwithstanding the word
“all” at the start of Article 19, the subsequently listed categories do not
appear to cover women, disabled individuals, or LGBTQ+ persons. Argua-
bly, they would come within the phrase “and the like.” But, if this phrase is
interpreted according to the statutory canon of ejusdem generis (of the same
kind), then query whether that phrase indeed would include them.
Likewise, Article 20 contains an ambitious guarantee: “All citizens,
. . . both men and women, enjoy the protection of the law, and enjoy all
human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.”229 However, this
enjoyment—akin to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution230—must be “in conformity with
Islamic criteria.”231 Thus, to the extent the Sharia is interpreted as permit-
ting, even requiring, disparate treatment for certain persons, men or women,
derogations from equal protection may occur.
This same boundary is set in Article 21, which is dedicated to the
rights of women. This provision identifies five rights the government of
Iran “must ensure . . . and accomplish,” but only in “conformity with Is-
lamic criteria”:232
(1) [C]reate a favorable environment for the growth of [each]
woman’s personality . . . both . . . material and intellectual[ ]
(2) [P]rotect [] . . . mothers, particularly during pregnancy and
childrearing[ ]
(3) [E]stablish[ ] competent courts to protect . . . the family[ ]
(4) [Provide] special insurance for widows, and aged women
(5) [A]ward[ ] guardianship to worthy mothers . . . to protect the
interests of children[ ]233
Of these five rights, the third, fourth, and fifth are about the family,
widows and the aged, and children—not about women per se. The second
right focuses on the traditional role of women as child bearers. Most disap-
pointingly, the first right treats the growth of women as somehow different
from that of other persons and fails to guarantee their rights in economic
and political realms, where they can—if given the opportunity—compete
effectively with men. Overall, it might be said that Article 21 singles out
women in the most traditional, unimaginative way imaginable.
• Freedom of Conscience and Speech
226. Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section.
227. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 19.
228. Id.
229. Id. at art. 20.
230. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
231. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 20.
232. Id. at art. 21.
233. Id.
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Articles 23–25 address arguably the most fundamental of all freedoms:
freedom of conscience (i.e., belief, opinion, and thought) and speech (i.e.,
expression). Without freedom of conscience, the good life (as Socrates de-
fines it) cannot be lived, and the individual is confined to adhere to
whatever an extrinsic and potentially heinous authority decides is Truth.
Without freedom of speech, freedom of conscience is impossible (because
to hold a belief, opinion, or thought about something is to express oneself in
verbal and nonverbal ways), and the individual is rendered a slave to a
monstrous authority. Like Article 21, Articles 23–25 articulate impressive
civil liberty guarantees. Article 23 is “laudable”234 in forbidding the investi-
gation of the beliefs of an individual, and the “molest[ation] . . . or tak[ing]
to task” of anyone “simply for holding a certain belief.”235 Yet the word
“simply” presents a worrisome limitation on freedom of conscience: impos-
ing a restriction on a “certain belief” under the guise of the purported effect
of that belief. For instance, might a person be detained for regarding Islamic
legal rules about drinking alcohol, as more flexible than the classical theory
of the Sharia says, thereby arousing fear among authorities that Islamic mo-
rality will be undermined?
The limitations on freedom of expression are even more obvious. Arti-
cle 24 guarantees that “publications and the press have freedom of expres-
sion, except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or
the rights of the public.”236 Article 25 promises that “all forms of covert
investigation are forbidden,” including inspecting or failing to deliver let-
ters, recording or disclosing telephone conversations, disclosing telex com-
munications, and eavesdropping, “except as provided by law.”237 The
“except” clauses in these articles are an invitation for authorities to cut back
or snuff out any expression they deem a threat to any interest they judge
important.
Similarly, Article 84 declares each member of the Islamic Consultative
Assembly “has the right to express his views on all internal and external
affairs of the country.”238 Article 86 grants immunity to legislators: mem-
bers “are completely free in expressing their views and casting their votes
. . . and cannot be prosecuted or arrested for opinions expressed in the As-
sembly or votes cast.”239 However, Article 84 reminds all members they are
“responsible to the entire nation.”240 That could be interpreted as a refer-
ence to the basic Islamic principles on which Iran’s Constitution is pre-
mised, i.e., they must not cast doubt on, nor vote against those principles.
234. Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section.
235. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 23.
236. Id. at art. 24.
237. Id. at art. 25.
238. Id. at art. 84.
239. Id. at art. 86.
240. Id. at art. 84.
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Thus, the specter looms that the reminder potentially negates the plain
meaning of the text, whereby free speech is chilled.
Expression often occurs in groups outside the assembly (i.e., non-par-
liamentarians), and Articles 25–26 address that context. Article 25 guaran-
tees freedom of association, including the right to join trade unions and
political parties, and prohibits either preventing or compelling participation
in them.241 But Article 25 contains two large limits. First, no such group
can “violate the . . . independence, freedom, national unity, criteria of Islam,
or the basis of the Islamic Republic.”242 Second, with respect to “religious
societies,” the freedom is only for those faith-based groups that are “Islamic
or pertaining to one of the recognized religious minorities.”243 Non-recog-
nized faiths, because they lack status (as discussed above), have no right to
organize. As for the Article 27 enshrinement of freedom of assembly, there
also are two limitations: public gatherings and marches are forbidden if
“arms” are “carried,” or if they are “detrimental to the fundamental princi-
ples of Islam.”244 Would an iPhone be a “weapon” if used to record a dem-
onstration against official corruption, from which the video clip could be
uploaded to social media and undermine a fundamental Islamic precept,
such as in the Imāmate (or, more poignantly, the Imāmate projected by
Iran’s government)?
Finally, Article 175 makes plain that freedom of speech is bounded. It
states that “freedom of expression and dissemination of thoughts” through
Iran’s radio and television network “must be guaranteed,” but then adds that
this freedom “must be . . . in keeping with . . . Islamic criteria and the best
interests of the country.”245 So, any expression deemed un-Islamic or con-
trary to the nation is suppressible. Moreover, the network hardly is free
from political interference. The supreme leader chooses the network’s head,
and the network is supervised by a council, consisting of two representa-
tives each from the president, Islamic Consultative Assembly, and judici-
ary.246 Thus, the path to curtail freedom of the press is wide.
• Right to Shelter
Iranians have a right to shelter. Article 31 affords each Iranian “indi-
vidual and family” the “right . . . to possess housing commensurate with his
needs.”247 That qualification leaves considerable room as to the type of
housing and does not guarantee ownership. Yet, even if read narrowly, it
would create a perhaps impossible burden on the government. Thus, Article
31—though obliging the government to make land available to individuals
241. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 25.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at art. 27.
245. Id. at art. 175.
246. Id.
247. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 31.
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and families so they can realize this right, authorizes the government to
prioritize persons with the greatest needs. Those persons are “the rural pop-
ulation and the workers.”248 Article 33 complements the right to shelter
with freedom of choice as to the location of shelter: no person may be
banished from his place of residence, prevented from residing in his place
of choice, or compelled to reside in a locality, “except in cases provided by
law.”249
• Civil Liberties and Human Rights
Articles 32 and 34–37 speak to rights associated with criminal and
civil cases. Article 32 protects Iranians from unjustified restraint. No one
may be arrested without an “order.”250 In the event of arrest, the accused
must be presented in writing, and without delay, the charges and reasons for
them.251 A “provisional dossier” must be sent to the competent judicial au-
thority “within a maximum of twenty-four [24] hours” of the arrest so that
preliminary arrangements for trial are made “as swiftly as possible.”252
Failure to comply with these guarantees is itself a punishable offense.
Article 34 opens the courthouse doors, as it were, to every Iranian. It is
the “indisputable right” of every citizen “to seek justice by recourse to” a
competent court; every citizen has a right of access to the judiciary.253 This
“right” is “familiar”254 across constitutions. Article 35 offers another “fa-
miliar”255 guarantee: each citizen has the right to counsel of one’s choice
(not unlike the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to
America’s Constitution256), and (presumably for those unable to afford an
attorney) the article obliges the government to provide a lawyer (albeit with
no specification as to the quality of representation).257 Article 36 forbids
punishment except by a “competent court and in accordance with law.”258
And, as per Article 37, an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty
by a competent court259—another “familiar”260 right.
Articles 38 and 39 provide three human rights guarantees against cruel
treatment. They, too, are “familiar”261 in diverse constitutional contexts.
248. Id.
249. Id. at art. 33.
250. Id. at art. 32.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 34.
254. Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section.
255. Id.
256. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
257. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 35.
258. Id. at art. 36.
259. Id. at art. 37.
260. Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section.
261. Id.
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(1) Under Article 38, cruel treatment, including “[a]ll forms of
torture for the purposes of extracting a confession or acquiring
information,” is “forbidden.”262
(2) Also, under Article 38, compulsion of testimony, confessions,
or oaths is impermissible. Any confession, testimony, or oath
“obtained under duress is devoid of value and credence.”263
(3) Under Article 39, any affront to the “dignity and repute of [a]
person[ ] arrested, detained, imprisoned, or banished in accor-
dance with the law” is “forbidden.” Failure to comply with this
additional prohibition against cruel treatment is itself a punishable
offense.264
According to international human rights organizations, these guaran-
tees are breached in Iran.265 Notably, such breaches (specifically, those of
Article 38) are themselves punishable offenses.
Yet, under the velayet-e-faqih doctrine (discussed above), Ayatollah
Khomeini steadfastly defends a criminal law scheme that attracts condem-
nation for operating at variance with Articles 38 and 39:
Having established the Qurānic and ideological basis for govern-
ance by a jurist, Khomeini indicates how this governance will be
applied.
“But when Islam wishes to prevent the consumption of alco-
hol—one of the major evils—stipulating that the drinker should
receive eighty lashes, or sexual vice, decreeing that the fornicator
be given one hundred lashes (and the married man or woman be
stoned), then they start wailing and lamenting: ‘What a harsh law
that is, reflecting the harshness of the Arabs.’ Why should it be
regarded as harsh if Islam stipulates that an offender must be pub-
licly flogged in order to protect the younger generation from cor-
ruption?” (p. 12 [of Governance of the Jurist]).
Khomeini was also a proponent of amputations: “After the
Commander of the Faithful [Ali] had cut off the hands of two
thieves, he showed such love and concern in treating them and
attending to their needs that they became his enthusiastic support-
ers” (p. 53). The Islamic jurist as ruler must be able to say “‘If
you do not pay back this loan, you will be the first woman of the
Bani Hāshim [tribe] to have her hand cut off.’ That is the kind of
ruler and leader we want, a leader who will put the law into prac-
tice instead of his personal desires and inclinations . . . who will
place his own family on an equal footing with the rest of the peo-
262. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 38.
263. Id.
264. Id. at art. 39.
265. See, e.g., Iran, AMNESTY INT’L, www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-
africa/iran; Iran 2020, AMNESTY INT’L, www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-af
rica/iran/report-iran (both chronicling news, commentary, and research about human rights issues
in Iran).
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ple; who will cut off the hand of his own son if he commits a
theft; who will execute his own brother and sister if they sell her-
oin” (p. 80).266
In effect, the constitutional theory that justifies harshness is God’s law:
.haqq Allāh (claims of God) offenses require .hadd (limit) punishments.
267
E. Theme 5: Rejection of Foreign Oppression
• Global Commitment to Support the Oppressed
Iran’s Constitution is unabashed about worldwide religious
evangelization:
Article 11 states[,] “All Muslims form a single nation,” [and] the
Preamble states that the constitution “provides the necessary basis
for ensuring the continuation of the Revolution at home and
abroad” [emphasis added] and “will strive with other Islamic and
popular movements to prepare the way for the formation of a sin-
gle world community (in accordance with the Qurānic verse ‘This
your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so
worship Me’ [21:92]).”268
The constitutional promotion of, specifically, Twelver Shiism is inex-
tricably linked to the constitutional provisions concerning Iran’s prerevolu-
tionary history with the shah and western colonialism.
Chapter I, Article 2(c), of the Constitution pits the Islamic Republic
against “all forms of oppression . . . and . . . dominance.”269 Article 3(5)
demands the “complete elimination of imperialism and . . . prevention of
foreign influence.”270 This revolution is conducted in solidarity with the
worldwide ummah. Article 3(15) commits Iran’s government to the “expan-
sion and strengthening of Islamic brotherhood.”271 Even more importantly,
Article 3(16) requires it to frame a foreign policy “on the basis of Islamic
criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the
mustad’afun of the world.”272 The first two clauses, along with the preced-
ing provision, invoke Islam. The third clause puts Iran on the side of the
oppressed.
Article 11 reinforces these provisions. All Muslims form one ummah.
The government of Iran is duty-bound to cultivate the cultural, economic,
and political unity of Muslims around the world.273 This duty is grounded
in the Qur’ān, surah 60, ayah 8, which Article 11 invokes. Yet, the most
266. Horowitz, supra note 42, at The Iranian Constitution and Ayatollah Khomeini (citing
IMAM KHOMEINI, VELAYAT-E FAQEEH [GOVERNANCE OF THE JURIST]  (Hamid Algar trans., 2005)).
267. See BHALA ISLAMIC LAW TEXTBOOK, supra note 154, at 1075–190 (chs. 43–46).
268. Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section.
269. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 2(c).
270. Id. at art. 3(5).
271. Id. at art. 3(15).
272. Id. at art. 3(16).
273. Id. at art. 11.
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obvious textual manifestation of Iran’s unbounded commitment to fight for
the underdog, as it were, is in Articles 152 and 153.
Article 152 declares as a pillar of Iranian foreign policy “the defence
of the rights of all Muslims.”274 Note here the lack of a qualification in
favor of Twelver Shiite Muslims, even though there is a long-standing Shi-
ite narrative that Shia have been oppressed by Sunni since nearly the earli-
est days of Islam.275 The Article 152 commitment envisions a global
ummah.
Article 154 is (from a deconstructionist interpretative perspective276) a
text at war with itself. On the one hand, Article 154 posits as the “ideal” of
Iran’s Islamic Republic “human felicity throughout human society.”277 In
this sense, the provision affirms the international legal principle of the right
of every nation to self-determination. Article 154 identifies “the attainment
of independence, freedom, and [the] rule of justice and truth” as “the right
of all people in the world.”278 Therefore, in its foreign policy, Iran “scrupu-
lously refrain[s] from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other
nations.”279
On the other hand, Article 154 commits Iran to “support[ing] the just
struggles of the mustad’afun [downtrodden persons] against the mus-
takbirun [oppressors] in every corner of the globe.”280 This commitment is
potentially unbounded. If Iran identifies a “struggle” as “just” and deter-
mines the claimant is oppressed by a tyrant, then Iran will “support” that
claimant. The text creates plenty of space for Iran to pick and choose whom
to support, and to decide what kind of “support” to offer. Its foreign policy
across the Middle East, providing armed assistance to fighters in Lebanon,
Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, is—from Iran’s perspective281—entirely consistent
with Article 154. From America’s standpoint, however, Iran has allowed
this part of Article 154 to swallow the general tenor of the rest of the text,
274. Id. at art. 152.
275. See BHALA ISLAMIC LAW TEXTBOOK, supra note 154, at 169–90 (ch. 8).
276. On this methodology of textual interpretation, see Bhala & Witmer, supra note 2, at
58–126.




281. See also Daniel L. Byman, How Terrorism Helps—and Hurts—Iran, THE BROOKINGS
INST. (Jan. 6, 2020), www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/06/how-terrorism-helps-
and-hurts-iran (arguing that “[s]upport for such groups has been an important part of Iran’s for-
eign policy since the 1979 Islamic Revolution,” and that “[s]uch relationships have advanced
numerous Iranian interests, undermined its enemies, helped Iran deter adversaries and made the
country a global player”). But, for a treatment of Iran’s expansionist networks from the perspec-
tive of the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy at West Point, see
Colin Clarke & Phillip Smyth, The Implications of Iran’s Expanding Shi’a Foreign Fighter Net-
work, CTC SENTINEL, Nov. 2017, at 14, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-implications-of-irans-expanding-
shia-foreign-fighter-network.
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and that of Article 152, which eschews expansionism and embraces
nonalignment and nonintervention.
• International Respect for Iran
Article 78 forbids any change to the boundaries of Iran. The exception
it allows is indicative of how the Constitution embeds a desire for interna-
tional respect. A boundary amendment is permissible, but only if it is in
“the interests of the country,” is “not unilateral,” does not “encroach” on
Iran’s “independence and territorial integrity,” and receives the approval of
four-fifths of the total membership of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.282
Put differently, there can be no capitulation to, no humiliation at the hands
of, a foreign power with respect to boundaries. Note, too, the supermajority
required for such change, and more generally the requirement under Article
77 that any international treaty or other agreement must be ratified by the
assembly.
Similarly, the Islamic Consultative Assembly must approve under Ar-
ticle 80 any sovereign debt incurred by Iran (such as a bailout loan from the
International Monetary Fund, which Iran sought in April 2020 in the
amount of US $5 billion amid the COVID-19 pandemic283) and any em-
ployment of foreign experts (which “is forbidden, except in cases of neces-
sity,” per Article 82). Significantly, and almost assuredly because of Iran’s
sense of exploitation in the early and mid-twentieth century by the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company,284 “granting of concessions to foreigners for the for-
mation of companies or institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agri-
culture, services, or mineral extraction is absolutely forbidden.”285 This bar,
in Article 81, allows no exception.286
The same concern about foreign dominance lurks in Article 139. This
provision states that settlement of claims involving public or state property
and referral of such claims to arbitration require approval of the Council of
Ministers, which must inform the Islamic Consultative Assembly.287 But if
a foreigner is a party to the dispute (or if the claim is “important”), then the
282. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 78.
283. See Coronavirus: Iran Appeals for $5bn IMF Loan as Deaths Near 4,000, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 9, 2020), www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-52217600.
284. On that history, see, for example, Stephen Kinzer, BP and Iran: The Forgotten History,
CBS NEWS (June 20, 2010), www.cbsnews.com/news/bp-and-iran-the-forgotten-history (observ-
ing that “[f]rom the 1920s into the 1940s, Britain’s standard of living was supported by oil from
Iran,” but that “[i]n Iran, nationalism meant one thing: we’ve got to take back our oil,” so
“[d]riven by this passion, Parliament voted on April 28, 1951, to choose its most passionate cham-
pion of oil nationalization, Mohammad Mossadegh, as prime minister,” and “[d]ays later, it unani-
mously approved his bill nationalizing the oil company”; further observing that “Mossadegh
promised that, henceforth, oil profits would be used to develop Iran, not enrich Britain”).
285. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 81.
286. In like fashion, Article 83 prohibits the transfer of Iran’s national heritage, specifically,
government buildings and properties, as well as “irreplaceable treasures.” Id. at art. 83. However,
the Assembly can approve such transfers.
287. Id. at art. 139.
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assembly must approve any settlement or referral to arbitration.288 Thus, for
instance, claims by American or other non-Iranian businesses for expropria-
tion or nationalization, or even recourse of them to an arbitral panel, require
legislative consent.
In an obvious manner, two constitutional provisions concerning the
military manifest Iran’s determination to avoid foreign domination. Article
145 forbids any foreigner from serving in the army.289 And, because Arti-
cles 41 and 42 prohibit dual citizenship, only “pure” Iranian citizens may
engage in military service. Article 146 strictly prohibits the establishment of
any foreign military base, even for peaceful purposes, within Iran.290
Likewise, two other constitutional provisions concerning Iran’s foreign
policy reject foreign domination. Article 152 sets the foundation of Iran’s
foreign policy as “the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion
of it and submission to it,” preserving the country’s independence and terri-
torial integrity, “non-alignment with respect to the hegemonist superpow-
ers,” and “peaceful relations with all non-belligerent states.”291 Article 153
forbids any “foreign control” over Iran’s “natural resources,” as well as
over its “economy,” “army,” or “culture.”292 It works in tandem with Arti-
cle 81 (discussed above), which forbids granting concessions to foreigners
to form any kind of commercial entity, including for minerals extraction.293
Aside from the supreme leader himself, the ultimate authority charged
with securing Iran’s international respect is the Supreme Council for Na-
tional Security. That is, another example of the constitutional emphasis on
keeping Iran free from foreign domination, either directly or through inter-
nal agents of foreign powers, is evident from the work Article 176 assigns
to this Supreme Council. In its mission to protect Iran’s borders and pre-
serve its sovereignty, this council must (1) set Iran’s “defense and national
security policies within the framework of general policies determined by
the [Supreme] Leader,” (2) coordinate Iran’s cultural, economic, intelli-
gence, political, and social activities with a view to “general defense and
security policies,” and (3) synthesize Iran’s material and intellectual re-
sources to “fac[e] . . . internal and external threats.”294 The fact that the
council consists (as discussed under Theme 2) of Iran’s top ten government
288. Id.
289. Id. at art. 145.
290. Id. at art. 146.
291. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 152.
292. Id. at art. 153. Indirectly, Article 155 suggests Iran is a possible home to persons resisting
foreign domination. See Id. at art. 155. This provision empowers the government to grant political
asylum (unless it regards the individual concerned as a traitor or saboteur).
293. Id. at art. 81.
294. Article 176 envisions the creation of subcouncils: “Commensurate with its duties, the
Supreme Council for National Security shall form sub councils such as Defense Sub-council and
National Security Sub-council. Each Sub council will be presided over by the President or a
member of the Supreme Council for National Security appointed by the President.” Id. at art. 176.
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officials, plus two representatives of the supreme leader, in itself further
testifies to the importance Iran places on self-determination.
F. Theme 6: Rejection of Despotism
• Martial Law
One obvious instance of the constitutional theme to break with the
despotism of the shah’s regime lies in Article 79. This provision forbids the
government of the Islamic Republic from declaring martial law.295 The ex-
ception allowed is narrow. The government can make such a declaration,
but only in the case of “war or emergency conditions akin to war.”296 Even
if the government were to interpret the latter phrase (concerning warlike
conditions) broadly, its declaration must be temporary, and in no case
longer than thirty days, and the restrictions must be “necessary.”297 Most
importantly, there is a check against unilateral action by the executive
branch: a declaration of martial law would be invalid without the “agree-
ment” of the assembly, and likewise, if the government seeks an extension
of a declaration beyond thirty days, it must obtain a “new authorization”
from the assembly.298
Another instance in which Iran’s Constitution evinces a concern about
despotism, or more specifically, conflicts of interest that could lead to in-
sider dealing and other corrupt behavior, is in Article 141. This article pro-
hibits the president, deputies, ministers, and government employees from
holding more than one government position simultaneously. They are en-
joined from being a representative in the Islamic Consultative Assembly,
practicing law, or working in a public institution or institution all or part of
the capital of which belongs to the state.299 They also are banned from
serving as president, managing director, or as a board of directors member
of any private company (though they may hold these posts in a cooperative
company affiliated with the government).300 Interestingly, there is no bar on
them holding a teaching position in a university or research institution.
Still another example of constitutional concern relating to despotism—
namely, that a senior-most government official might abuse his power for
personal gain—is in Article 142. This provision mandates that the head of
the judiciary “examine” the assets of the supreme leader, president, depu-
ties, and ministers, and “their spouses and offspring, . . . before and after
their term of office . . . to ensure [the assets] have not increased in a fashion
contrary to law.”301 Read in common-sense terms, Article 142 demands a
295. Id. at art. 79.
296. Id.
297. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 79.
298. Id.
299. Id. at art. 141.
300. Id.
301. Id. at art. 142.
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complete financial accounting of the assets and liabilities of all top officials,
even the supreme leader, and their immediate family members, to ensure
none of them have profited from high office. To be sure, in a practical
sense, Article 142 could be circumvented if the head of the judiciary is
himself not serious about its enforcement, perhaps because he is beholden
to the supreme leader, or one of the executive branch officials, and thus
either does not check carefully their before-and-after asset position or turns
a blind eye to any increase that occurred through illegal means.
There also are checks against abuse of power by the judiciary. For
example, Article 171 considers instances in which, because of “a default or
error of” a judge, a person “suffers moral or material loss;” in this case, the
judge at fault must “stand surety for the reparation of that loss in accor-
dance with Islamic criteria.”302 As a surety, the judge, along with the gov-
ernment, would be primarily liable for providing compensation; in instances
where the judge is not at fault, the government will provide compensa-
tion.303 In all cases, “the repute and good standing of the accused will be
restored.”304
Finally, constitutional provisions concerning the military also address
the matter of despotic hierarchies within the armed services. Article 148
forbids personal use of military equipment, including vehicles, and of army
personnel, such as servants or chauffeurs.305 Article 149 mandates that pro-
motions be “in accordance with the law.”306 In essence, the military is sup-
posed to be a professional organization, not one in service of the personal
preferences of active-duty commanders.
• Public Opinion Counts
Chapter I, Article 3(6), of the Constitution obliges Iran’s government
to “eliminat[e] . . . all forms of despotism and autocracy” and “all attempts
to monopolize power.”307 Accordingly, public opinion, consultation, and
reciprocal right-duty correlations between the government and people mat-
ter. Governance must be legitimate—that is, it must be acknowledged, ac-
cepted, and approved by the people as genuine, proper, and true. That is
clear from two Qur’ānic provisions quoted in Article 7, namely, surah 42,
ayah 38 (which calls for managing affairs through consultations) and surah
3, ayah 159 (which calls on leaders to consult people on governance).308
Accordingly, the legitimacy of administration of affairs in the Islamic
Republic, as per Article 6, is through elections in which public opinion is
expressed. Elections must be held for the president and members of the
302. Id. at art. 171.
303. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 171.
304. Id.
305. Id. at art. 148.
306. Id. at art. 149.
307. Id. at art. 3(6).
308. See id. at art. 7.
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Consultative Assembly (Majlis, or Parliament) and councils.309 Note, how-
ever, that the supreme leader is not subject to popular election, nor to a
referendum (which, in certain instances, is contemplated by the Constitu-
tion). Also, in respect of legitimacy, the decision-making and administrative
organs of government, with progressively decentralized jurisdiction, are the
Islamic Consultative Assembly and provincial, city, regional, district, and
village councils.310
Article 90 presents another illustration of the importance of public
opinion in Iran’s constitutional structure. “Whoever” has a complaint about
the “work of the Assembly, . . . Executive power, or . . . Judicial power”
may forward a written complaint to the assembly.311 Read literally, the arti-
cle means that the complaining party could be any individual or group
(though presumably not a noncitizen, in view of other provisions addressing
historical asymmetries of foreign influence and dominance). The assembly
must “investigate” the complaint and provide a “satisfactory reply,” includ-
ing an “adequate explanation” from the executive or judiciary if the com-
plaint pertains to these branches.312 Results of the investigation must be
announced “within a reasonable time,” and if the complaint is “of public
interest,” then “the reply [i.e., from the assembly, executive, or judiciary]
must be made public.”313
• Media Regulation
The duty of Iran’s government to eradicate these evils, however, is
incongruous with another duty—namely, the duty under Article 3(2) to ele-
vate the “level of public awareness in all areas” by the “proper use of the
press, mass media, and other means.”314 These phrases are invitations to
infringe on press freedoms and abuse the media as a tool for government
propaganda. And Article 9 exacerbates such concerns.
Understandably, Article 9 declares as the “duty” of the government of
Iran, and each citizen, to preserve the “freedom, independence, unity, and
territorial integrity” of Iran. Yet, on the one hand, this provision says “no
authority has the right to abrogate legitimate freedoms . . . under the pretext
of preserving” Iran’s independence in these respects.315 On the other hand,
“[n]o individual . . . has the right to infringe in the slightest way” on the
“political, cultural, economic, and military independence, or the territorial
integrity, of Iran under the pretext of exercising freedom.”316 These
sentences are not easily reconciled, except to say that despotism is not
309. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 6.
310. Id. at art. 7.
311. Id. at art. 90.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at art. 3(2).
315. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 9.
316. Id.
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firmly rejected. If despotism is necessary to avoid the “slightest infringe-
ment,” then so be it—the “legitimate freedoms” of the individual are sus-
ceptible to sacrifice.
G. Theme 7: Human and Social Capital Development
• Human Dignity
Though the Constitution nowhere uses the neoclassical economic
terms “human capital” or “social capital,” it speaks of them often. Chapter
I, Article 2(6), affirms the “exalted dignity and value of man,” and Article
2(1) call for securing “equity and justice,” “national solidarity,” and “politi-
cal, economic, social, and cultural independence” through recourse to the
“most advanced results of human experience” in “sciences and arts.”317 Ar-
ticle 3(3) tasks the government with providing “free education[ ] and physi-
cal training” and “expan[ding] higher education” for all persons, and Article
3(7) tasks it with “ensuring political and social freedoms.”318 This Article
also charges the government with “strengthening the spirit of inquiry” in all
forms of endeavor—“science, technology, and culture, as well as Islamic
studies.”319 Indeed, Article 3(4) directs the government to “establish[ ] re-
search centers and encourage[ ] researchers.”320
More generally, as Article 3(8) indicates, “the entire people” are to
enjoy “participation . . . in determining their political, social, and cultural
destiny.”321 Iran’s government is tasked under Article 3(9) with “the aboli-
tion of all forms of undesirable discrimination” and providing “equitable
opportunities for all, in both . . . material and intellectual spheres.”322 Wo-
men are included in these lofty provisions. Article 3(14) expressly assigns
to Iran’s government the goal of “securing the multifarious rights of all
citizens, both women and men,” and ensuring they enjoy “legal protection
. . . and equality before the law.”323
• Freedom Under God
Promotion of human and social capital is within an Islamic framework,
which—depending on administration by the government, and the perspec-
tive of the individual—may be liberating or constraining. The “freedom”
that people have is “coupled with responsibility before God.”324 Moreover,
while Article 3(7) obligates Iran’s government to “ensur[e] political and
social freedoms,” these freedoms must be “within the framework of the
317. Id. at art. 2.
318. Id. at art. 3.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 3.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at art. 2(6).
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law.”325 Thus, tensions are inevitable in this framework. Article 3(1) com-
mits Iran’s government to promoting faith-based moral virtues and combat-
ting vice.
What, then, if top-notch scientific or artistic inquiries prove politically,
economically, or socially polarizing, thus undermining national solidarity?
Are educational opportunities contingent on one’s theological disposition?
Are scientific or cultural investigations and innovations permissible if they
challenge, even ostensibly, Islamic morality? Likewise, with respect to Ar-
ticle 3(7) (also quoted above), legal strictures may ringfence sociopolitical
liberation, and even be concocted to do so with a view to maintaining a
monopoly on power (in contravention, ironically, of Articles 2(c) and 3(6),
quoted above).
• Traditional Family Unit and Occupational Choices
Article 10 intimates that “the entire people” means traditional heter-
osexuals. This provision declares the “family” is the “fundamental unit of
Islamic society.” Thus, “all laws” must support family “formation,” “safe-
guarding its sanctity . . . and stability . . . on the basis of the law and ethics
of Islam.”326 For “LGBTQ+” individuals, these words spell doom. That is,
the traditional (monstrous) .hadd punishments for what the classical theory
of the Sharia regards as .haqq Allāh offense for unlawful sexual intercourse
(zinā) apply in “modern” Iran.
The interventionist nature of Iran’s government in the economy
(Theme 8, below) is foretold by two socioeconomic provisions that appear
in Chapter III. Article 28 suggests that Iran’s labor market is free, in that
each citizen has the right to choose an occupation.327 But that freedom is
regulated: the occupation must not be “contrary to Islam” or “the public
interests,” or an “infringe[ment] [on] the rights of others.”328 Thus, bartend-
ing or sex work is unlawful, as contrary to the Sharia. So, too, would be
work involving narcotics—growing poppy seed for opium production and
distribution, for example. (These occupations would also violate Islamic
criminal law, discussed in separate chapters.) Article 28 also commits the
government to a full-employment economy; that is, the government has the
obligation to provide “every citizen with the opportunity to work, and to
create equal conditions for obtaining it.”329 Consequently, the government
is supposed to use fiscal and monetary policies to generate work for its
citizens—not leave employment levels to the mercy of private markets.
• Health Care and Education as Universal Rights
Health care is “a universal right” as per Article 29. The government of
Iran has the duty of providing and funding it, as well as providing and
325. Id. at art. 3(7).
326. Id. at art. 10.
327. See 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 28.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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funding social security for retirement, and benefits in the event of unem-
ployment, disability, or accidents, for every citizen, by “drawing, in accor-
dance with the law, on the national revenues and funds through public
contributions.”330 These Article 29 obligations essentially forbid the gov-
ernment from leaving it to the private sector to supply a broad-based social
safety net. They also preclude citizens from choosing, based on price, qual-
ity, need, and desire, what level of protection to obtain. Rather, the govern-
ment is the market: it supplies to all citizens these social services and it uses
“national revenues and funds obtained through public contributions,”331
which (presumably) include, respectively, oil export revenues and tax
collections.
Similarly, though not declared as such in Article 30, free education up
to—but not explicitly including—secondary education, is a universal right.
The government must provide it, and also must “expand free higher educa-
tion,” to help Iran “attain[ ] self-sufficiency.”332 The emphasis on “self-suf-
ficiency” is curious in two respects. First, it is not knowledge per se that
matters; rather, it is developing human capital to be free of dependence on
foreign scholars that matters. Second, query whether that goal—intellectual
autarky—is achievable, by any country in any era. Is it not through interac-
tion with foreign teachers and researchers that higher education is
enhanced?
H. Theme 8: Mixed Economy
• Rejection of Capitalism and Socialism
Chapter I, Article 2(c), states that the Islamic Republic is based on
negating “all forms of oppression . . . and dominance,” which encompasses
economic control from abroad.333 Article 3(13) creates a duty for the gov-
ernment to “attain[ ] self-sufficiency in scientific, technological, industrial,
agricultural, and military domains, and other similar spheres.”334 And Arti-
cle 3(12) obliges the government with “planning . . . a correct and just
economic system, in accordance with Islamic criteria,” so as to meet spe-
cific goals—namely, to “create welfare, eliminate poverty, and abolish all
forms of deprivation with respect to food, housing, work, health care, and
. . . social insurance.”335 It also, per Article 3(10), is to eliminate “superflu-
ous government organizations.”336
These provisions manifest a confusion about economic structure and
policy. What do these provisions amount to? They reject both capitalist and
330. Id. at art. 29.
331. Id.
332. Id. at art. 30.
333. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 2(c).
334. Id. at art. 3(13).
335. Id. at art. 3(12).
336. Id. at art. 3(10).
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socialist models of economic growth: the Islamic Republic is not to create
laissez-faire American-style free markets, nor regulate all factors of produc-
tion (land, labor, human capital, physical capital, and technology), as occurs
under socialism. These provisions call for implementation of Islamic eco-
nomic principles. But what are those principles? That is, how are they evi-
dent, not in the abstract, but in the day-to-day realities of negotiating and
implementing business deals and generating transactional activity?
Those Islamic principles (as manifest in property, contract, and busi-
ness associations law, discussed in separate chapters) are decidedly nonin-
terventionist, and rather free market in orientation. Even when they appear
unique (as in banking law, with rules against gharar and riba), in pursuit of
justice, the difference (with respect to risk-taking and interest) from con-
ventional non-Muslim finance may be less pronounced than sometimes
thought. Worse yet, the specific economic policy targets are incoherent, im-
possible, or both.
• Self-Sufficiency and Other Unachievable Policy Targets
Article 3(13) essentially calls for autarky, when in reality no nation
can be self-sufficient in all walks of life. Since 1979, Iran has had the op-
portunity to be self-sufficient under the broadest, deepest sanctions regimes
in human history—namely, those led by the United States to block Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon.337 Iran has failed to do so. That is, the
calls from Āyatollāh Ali Khameini, successor to Āyatollāh Imām Khomeini,
for a “resistance economy” have been unsuccessful. And they have pointed
up the inherent contradiction in the economic provisions of Iran’s Constitu-
tion: Resistance economics means greater reliance on China, Russia, and
countries other than the United States or those of the European Union. It
does not mean self-sufficiency.
Likewise, the economic policy targets in Article 3(12) range from the
woolly headed to the unachievable. Read literally, that article says that the
Iranian government is to “create welfare,”338 whereas Islamic economic
principles would call more precisely for wealth generation to benefit the
ummah. As for eliminating poverty and abolishing all forms of deprivation,
that is impossible for none other than conceptual reasons. Poverty and dep-
rivation are relative concepts—one is poor and deprived, or rich and ful-
filled, only in comparison to another. Only in a perfectly communist system
of complete equality would relative differences shrink to de minimis levels.
Yet, where that has been tried—in current times, North Korea—the results
speak for themselves: there exist privileged elites with a monopoly on
power that oppress the majority of people, inflicting on them shortages of
food, housing, work, and health care. Those results, and the means by
which they are achieved, are orthogonal to Article 3(12).
337. See 2 BHALA TRADE TEXTBOOK, supra note 10, at 439–518.
338. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 3(12).
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• Four Goals and Nine Metrics
Chapter IV (Articles 43–55) of the Constitution contains the core pro-
visions concerning Iran’s economy. The starting point—Article 43—lays
out Iran’s four economic goals:
(1) “[A]chiev[e] economic independence,” i.e., self-
sufficiency
(2) “[U]proot[ ] poverty and deprivation,” i.e., poverty
alleviation
(3) “[F]ulfil[ ] human needs in the process of development,”
i.e., human development
(4) Preserve “human liberty,” i.e., freedom339
The first aim implicates at least some degree of self-sufficiency. “Inde-
pendence” does not mean “autarky,” but the intention appears to be to mini-
mize reliance on importation and foreign direct investment. That intention
conflicts with Iran’s need to export that in which it holds a comparative
advantage—hydrocarbons. This first aim seems to suggest Iran ought to
export oil and natural gas, invest its export earnings so as to diversify its
economy, and thus be free of the need to import most merchandise. Yet is it
realistic to suggest Iran can achieve self-sufficiency in large civil aircraft or
pharmaceuticals?
The second goal, though laudable, cannot be read in a literal sense.
That is because poverty is a relative concept.340 Regardless of Iran’s per
capita gross domestic product, and unless its Gini coefficient were zero
(i.e., perfect equality), there would be segments of the citizenry who would
be worse off compared to others at higher rungs. The third goal, though
vague, is imbued with content when read in conjunction with the socioeco-
nomic and legal rights set out in Chapter III (Articles 19–42, discussed
above). The fourth goal again bespeaks how the Constitution is a text at war
with itself: human liberty is to be preserved, yet, as per Article 44 et seq.,
the government—not to mention the IRGC—is highly interventionist.
Article 43 does more than articulate four economic aims. It also estab-
lishes nine metrics by which the Islamic Republic must judge its success,
and therefore by which it may be judged by Iranians and non-Iranians alike.
These metrics, called “criteria,” are what Iran’s economy is “based on.”341
In effect, they are a combination of duties incumbent on the government,
corresponding rights for the people, and guiding principles for the country:
(1) Right to Basic Necessities:
The government must provide basic necessities for all citi-
zens—namely, food, clothing, housing, education, health (hy-
339. Id. at art. 43.
340. See 4 BHALA TRADE TEXTBOOK, supra note 10, at 283–98.
341. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 43.
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giene and medical treatment), and “the necessary facilities for the
establishment of a family.”342
(2) Right to Work:
The government’s economic planning must ensure employ-
ment opportunities for all citizens, “with a view to full employ-
ment,” including for individuals who are able to work “but lack
the means,” through (a) “cooperatives,” (b) “granting interest-free
loans,” or (c) any other “legitimate means” that neither leads to
the concentration of wealth nor to the government becoming “a
major absolute employer,” while preserving the role of the gov-
ernment in “general economic planning.”343
(3) Economic Planning and Development:
The government’s economic planning also must provide for
the all-around development of every individual, and thus must en-
sure that for each individual, the “form, content, and hours of
work . . . allow for sufficient leisure and energy to engage, be-
yond . . . professional endeavor[s], in intellectual, political, and
social activities, . . . improve . . . skills, and . . . make full use of
. . . creativity,” and engage in the affairs of Iran.344
(4) Right to Choose Occupation:
Every citizen has the right to choose freely that person’s oc-
cupation, no one is to be compelled to work, and no one is permit-
ted to exploit the work of another person.345
(5) Evil Practices:
“[T]he . . . infliction of harm and loss upon others, monop-
oly, hoarding, usury, and other illegitimate and evil practices” are
forbidden. The scope of this prohibition is unclear, i.e., as written,
the prohibition could be a duty incumbent on the government as
well as each citizen.346
(6) Waste:
“[E]xtravagance and wastefulness” in the economy, includ-
ing consumption, production, investment, and distribution, are
forbidden. Here, too, the scope is undefined—read literally, it
could apply to both the government and citizens.347
(7) Science and Technology:
Science and technology, including the training of “skilled
personnel,” must be in accordance with the “developmental
needs” of Iran’s economy.348
342. Id. at art. 43(1).
343. Id. at art. 43(2).
344. Id. at art. 43(3).
345. Id. at art. 43(4).
346. Id. at art. 43(5).
347. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 43(6).
348. Id. at art. 43(7).
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(8) Foreign economic domination of Iran’s economy must
be prevented.349
(9) Agricultural (crops and livestock) output and industrial
production must not only “satisfy public needs” but also “make
the country self-sufficient and free from dependence.”350
Among the confusing aspects of these metrics is that they are not ex-
pressly linked to the aforementioned four goals. Article 43 fails to spell out
the relationships between economic aims and ways to measure their
achievement. Some metrics may relate to two or more goals, and vice versa.
That said, by inference from the text, metrics (8) and (9) appear related to
the first goal, self-sufficiency. The second and third goals, poverty allevia-
tion and human development, may be measured by metrics (1), (2), (3), (6),
and (7). The fourth goal, concerning freedom, is manifest in metrics (4) and
(5).
• State, Cooperatives, and Private Sectors, but State First
Article 44 is perhaps the most revealing provision about the confusion
as to Iran’s economic model. The provision identifies three sectors that
compose the economy:
(1) State:
The “state” refers not only to the government but also to the
entities it administers that are publicly owned.351 The length and
breadth of the illustrative list is remarkable: aviation, banking,
dams and irrigation, foreign trade, insurance, major minerals,
post, power generation, radio and TV, railroads, roads, shipping,
and telegraph and telephone.352 In all these “large scale and
mother industries,”353 producers and exporters of goods and ser-
vices are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or state trading enter-
prises (STEs).
(2) Cooperative:
This rubric would seem to pertain to joint state-private enti-
ties, but that familiar sense of the word “cooperative” is mislead-
ing. Rather, and in a circular fashion, Article 44 defines
“cooperative” as including urban or rural “cooperative companies
and enterprises concerned with production and distribution . . . in
accordance with Islamic criteria.”354 Those criteria appear to refer
to certain Islamic partnerships.
(3) Private:
This sector is not scripted to be the dominant one. Rather, it
covers agriculture (including animal husbandry), industry, trade,
349. Id. at art. 43(8).
350. Id. at art. 43(9).
351. Id. at art. 44.
352. Id.
353. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 44.
354. Id.
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and services “that supplement the economic activities of the state
and cooperative sectors.”355
One contradiction follows immediately from this ranking: the econ-
omy “is to be based on systematic and sound planning.”356 Planning, of
course, is the province of the state, whereas market-based supply and de-
mand forces determine equilibrium outcomes in the private sector. Article
44, then, elevates central planning over those forces. Concomitantly, Article
48 demands that there be “no discrimination among the various provinces”
in respect of distributing economic activities, exploiting natural resources,
or utilizing public revenues.357 Every region must have access to “the nec-
essary capital and facilities” for “its needs and capacity for growth.”358
Only with considerable state intervention could this nondiscrimination man-
date be fulfilled. Left to market forces, inequities likely would arise.
• Contradictions of Statist Economy
The dominance of the public sector is confirmed by the daunting,
nonexclusive list of SOEs and STEs, and the characterization of the private
businesses as mere supplements to the state and cooperative sectors. Simply
put, Iran’s economy is not capitalist, driven by the private sector, nor social-
ist, driven by worker-run cooperatives. It is statist—the government domi-
nates all the factors of production (labor, land, physical capital, human
capital, and technology) in all but small- and medium-sized areas, such as
small stores and restaurants. To be sure, Article 46 states that each person is
“the owner of the fruits of his legitimate business and labor.”359 Yet, the
asymmetry among the sectors is further confirmed in Article 45. It provides
that public wealth and property (e.g., abandoned or uncultivated land, for-
ests, lakes, rivers, seas, marshlands, mineral deposits, mountains and val-
leys, rivers, and unenclosed pastures, as well as legacies without heirs and
property recovered or of undetermined ownership or recovered from usurp-
ers) are “at the disposal of the Islamic government for it to utilize in accor-
dance with the public interest.”360 Thus, for example, Iran’s enormous
hydrocarbon and gem endowments (as “mineral deposits”361) are for the
government to direct.
The statist economy implies three more innate contradictions in Article
44. First, ownership is said to be protected under the laws of the Islamic
Republic, “in so far as ownership . . . does not go beyond the bounds of
Islamic law.”362 This provision, along with Article 47, aims to safeguard
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at art. 48.
358. Id.
359. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 46.
360. Id. at art. 45.
361. Id.
362. Id. at art. 44.
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owners against expropriation.363 Yet, the Sharia holds tremendous respect
for private enterprise. Second, ownership must “contribute[ ] to the eco-
nomic growth and progress of the country.”364 Yet, in practice, SOEs and
STEs are dominated by vested interests, such as the IRGC, which direct
resources into these entities, and steer revenues from them, for their own
purposes. The result of this pattern of ownership is the third contradiction:
decrepit macroeconomic performance, which cannot be blamed (at least not
entirely) on American or multilateral sanctions under which Iran has la-
bored for decades.
Simply put, the Constitution does not identify with precision what con-
stitutes a just, authentically Islamic economy, nor the means to achieve one.
In rejecting capitalism and socialism, and choosing to make the state sector
dominant, the Constitution ironically veers toward socialism. But that can-
not be, because the Islamic Republic (as per Themes 1 and 2, above) plainly
is a theocracy. The structural economic weakness at the core of the Consti-
tution is the failure, beyond generic references to Islam, to chart out a theo-
economy.
• Irony of Environmental Protection and Economic
Diversification
Article 50 could not be followed in its literal sense without a radical
transformation in Iran’s economy. Its first sentence reflects a basic principle
of the Sharia: “the preservation of the environment” for “present as well as
the future generations” is an authentic, noble “public duty,” which this sen-
tence rightly ascribes to “the Islamic Republic”—presumably the entire
country.365 Its second sentence, applied to the Iranian context, demands di-
versification beyond hydrocarbons. This sentence says, “Economic and
other activities that inevitably involve pollution of the environment, or
cause irreparable damage to it, are . . . forbidden.”366 The obvious rationale
for this prohibition is that environmental degradation violates the obligation
of environmental protection. And yet Iran is overwhelmingly dependent on
oil and natural gas exploration, drilling, piping, production, consumption,
and (notwithstanding sanctions) exports.367 To adhere to the first sentence
363. In accordance with Islamic property law (discussed in separate chapters), Article 49
charges the government with the responsibility to confiscate wealth acquired by illicit means, or
from illicit sources, and restore it to its legitimate owner–as distinct from expropriation. Among
the illicit acquisitions are bribery, corruption, embezzlement, gambling, misuse of endowment or
government contracts, sale of publicly owned lands or resources, usurpation, and usury. If the
government cannot identity the rightful owner, then it must deposit the wealth in the public trea-
sury. See id. at art. 49.
364. Id. at art. 44.
365. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 50.
366. Id.
367. Mohsen Tavakol, Iran’s Crude Oil Exports: What Minimum is Enough to Stay Afloat?,
ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Jul. 16, 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-s-crude-
oil-exports-what-minimum-is-enough-to-stay-afloat/.
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would require diversification away from reliance on hydrocarbons, which
the Islamic Republic has not achieved.
There is a second irony to Article 50. One way in which Iran could
diversify its energy base would be through the development of peaceful
nuclear power. Setting aside matters of safe nuclear waste disposal, nuclear
energy would be a cleaner, greener alternative than oil and natural gas. Yet
the collapse of the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
and subsequent reimposition of sanctions by the United States put this pros-
pect far away on the horizon.368
I. Theme 9: Three (or Four?) Branches of Government
• Separation of Powers
Article 57 establishes the three parts of government conventionally
found in the foundational documents of many countries: executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches. Article 57’s declaration that “[t]he powers of
government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judici-
ary, and the executive powers”369 is a “familiar”370 feature of governance in
other constitutions. Article 57 also says that these branches are “indepen-
dent of each other,”371 indicating that separation of powers exists. For ex-
ample, Article 156 expressly declares that the judiciary “is an independent
power, the protector of the rights of the individual and society, [and] re-
sponsible for the implementation of justice.”372 As another illustration,
under Article 141 (discussed below), executive branch officials cannot
serve in the legislature.373
Separation of powers also is evident with respect to the president and
his Council of Ministers, on the one hand, and the Islamic Consultative
Assembly, on the other hand. Article 134 makes clear the president is the
head of the Council of Ministers.374 He supervises and coordinates its work
and—with the cooperation of the ministers—sets the agenda and policies
for the government.375 Decisions of the council, other than those interpret-
ing or modifying the laws, are “binding” in instances of “discrepancies or
interferences in the constitutional duties of the government agencies.”376
Yet (as per Article 134), the president “is responsible to the Islamic Con-
sultative Assembly for the actions of the Council.”377
368. See 2 BHALA TRADE TEXTBOOK, supra note 10, at 471–518.
369. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 57.
370. Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section.
371. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 57.
372. Id. at art. 156.
373. Id. at art. 141.
374. Id. at art. 134.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 134.
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Similarly, ministers continue in office unless they are dismissed, and
the Islamic Consultative Assembly passes a vote of no confidence in them
(including as a result of their interpellation)—meaning the assembly can put
an end to the tenure of a minister. Resignation of any individual minister, or
the entire council, must be submitted to the president. The president can
appoint a caretaker minister for the relevant ministry, but only for up to
three months under Article 135.378 And, as Article 136 provides, if the pres-
ident seeks to dismiss a minister, then he must get a vote of confidence
from the assembly for the new minister whom he appoints.379 If the presi-
dent changes half (or more) of the Council of Ministers, then he must obtain
a “fresh vote of confidence [in the council] from the Assembly.”380 Article
137 spells out that each minister “is responsible for his duties to the Presi-
dent and the Assembly.”381 This responsibility is a kind of joint and several
liability, because under Article 137, each minister “is also responsible for
the actions of the others” on a matter the council approves.382 In brief, the
assembly plays a significant role in the life of what is commonly called
(including in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India) the “cabi-
net” of the president, and each minister serving in his cabinet.
Article 170 also evinces separation of power between the judicial and
executive branches. Judges “are obliged to refrain from executing statutes
and regulations of the government that . . . lie outside the competence of the
Executive power.”383 In other words, it is the judiciary that has final say
(aside from the supreme leader) over the boundaries of presidential power.
Similarly, Article 172 created a Court of Administrative Justice, supervised
by the head of the judiciary, and charged it with investigating “complaints,
grievances, and objections of the people” against government entities or
officials.384 Article 173 established the National General Inspectorate, also
supervised by the head, to ensure the proper conduct of affairs and imple-
mentation of laws by the “administrative organs of the government.”385
• Notable Exceptions
The constitutional separation of powers in Iran is not perfect (as it is
not, perhaps, in any country). There are three major exceptions to the inde-
pendent branch structure that are not common in most constitutions. First,
378. Id. at art. 135.
379. Id. at art. 136.
380. Id.
381. Id. at art. 137. Further, while Article 138 empowers ministers to make rules, regulations,
and procedures and issue circulars, on matters within their jurisdiction, they must do so consistent
with the “letter” and “spirit of the law,” and must bring such measures to the Speaker of the
Islamic Consultative Assembly to ensure they are not contrary to law; if they are, then the Speaker
may send them back to the Council for its reconsideration. See id. at art. 138.
382. Id. at art. 137.
383. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 170.
384. Id. at art. 172.
385. Id. at art. 173.
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Article 57 states that the executive, legislative, and judicial branch powers
“function[ ] under the supervision of the absolute wilāyat al ‘amr, and the
Leadership of the Ummah.”386 This reference to Shiite principles of govern-
ance and “Leadership” of the Muslim community is to the supreme leader.
In other words, while the three branches are separate powers, independent
of one another, they are dependent on, and subordinate to, the supreme
leader (e.g., Ayatollah Khomeini, Āyatollāh Khameini, and their succes-
sors), who, exercising “absolute” supervision, has final say in all matters
conducted by these three branches.
Article 122 elaborates on this hierarchical scheme, stating that the
president is “responsible to the people, the [Supreme] Leader, and the Is-
lamic Consultative Assembly.”387 He is responsible to the people through
the ballot box. And he is responsible to the assembly in respect of submit-
ting draft legislation;388 likewise, per Article 125, his authorization to sign
treaties and other international agreements with foreign governments and
international organizations presumes the Islamic Consultative Assembly has
approved those documents.389 Yet, most noteworthy is the responsibility of
the president to the supreme leader. The president is subordinate to this first
most powerful and influential figure in Iran.390 Indeed, should the president
resign, under Article 130 the president submits his resignation letter to that
leader.391
A second clear example of theocratic primacy—that is, the top-most
role of the supreme leader—is Article 157. It states that the supreme leader
appoints the head of the judicial power. But for the leader, the head is the
“highest judicial authority.”392 The Constitution does not oblige the su-
preme leader to seek the consent of the president, Islamic Consultative As-
sembly, extant head, Supreme Court, prosecutor-general, or any other part
of the judiciary. In turn, under Article 158, the head of the judiciary is
responsible for the following:
(1) The organizational structure of the judiciary branch
(2) “Drafting judiciary bills appropriate for the Islamic
Republic”
(3) Employing (appointing) “just and worthy judges,” as
well as dismissing, transferring, and promoting judges.393
The head of the judiciary, per Article 162, also selects the chief judge and
prosecutor-general, in consultation with the Supreme Court judges, for five-
386. Id. at art. 57 (emphasis added).
387. Id. at art. 122.
388. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 122.
389. Id. at art. 125.
390. Id.
391. Id. at art. 130.
392. Id. at art. 157.
393. Id. at art. 158.
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year terms.394 Thus, put bluntly, in Iran’s theocracy, it is the top theocrat
who picks the senior-most judicial figure, who in turn runs the judiciary.
That is, the supreme leader is constitutionally authorized to affect the judi-
ciary through the head whom he selects.
Third, the relationship between the minister of justice and the judiciary
blurs the line between the executive and judicial branches. Article 160 iden-
tifies the minister of justice as being responsible for the relationship be-
tween the executive and judicial branches. The minister is to be “elected
from among the individuals proposed to the President by the Head” of the
judiciary.395 That head may delegate full authority to the minister with re-
spect to administrative and financial matters, and the appointment of offi-
cials other than judges.396 Thus, the president does not have a free hand in
selecting the justice minister, and the head can delegate work to this
minister.
Fourth, Article 3(11) intimates that the military is a de facto fourth
branch. That is because the military is tasked under this provision with
more than protecting Iran’s “independence” and “territorial integrity.”397
The military also must “safeguard[ ] . . . the Islamic order of the coun-
try.”398 Indeed, “universal military training” is conducted partly to secure
this end.399
• Executive Branch
Executive branch authority is, according to Article 60, “exercised by
the President and his Ministers.”400 But that authority does not extend to
“matters that are directly placed under the jurisdiction of the Leadership by
the Constitution.”401 In other words, the supreme leader preempts the presi-
dent in essentially all respects.
Otherwise, the presidency is the second most powerful and influential
office in Iran. Indeed, under Article 125, the foreign affairs representative
of Iran—the person authorized to sign treaties and other international agree-
ments with foreign governments, and international organizations—is the
president (not the supreme leader).402 Likewise, under Article 126, the pres-
ident (not the leader) “is responsible for national planning,” including
“budget and state employment affairs”—in effect, for the macroeconomic
fiscal and employment policy.403 He also decides under Article 128 who
394. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 162.
395. Id. at art. 160.
396. Id.
397. Id. at art. 3(11).
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 60.
401. Id.
402. The Islamic Consultative Assembly must first approve these treaties and agreements. See
id. at art. 125.
403. Id. at art. 126.
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Iran’s ambassadors will be, and whether to accept the credentials of ambas-
sadors to Iran proposed by foreign countries.404 And he bestows state
awards per Article 129.405
Interestingly, though, the president has no veto power. Article 123
makes clear he must sign legislation the Islamic Consultative Assembly ap-
proves (as well as any referendum results).406
The election of the president is supervised by the Guardian Council
under Article 118.407 Per Article 119, such elections must occur no later
than one month before the expiry of the term of the existing president.408
Once elected, the president under Article 124 may appoint deputies, includ-
ing a first deputy to administer the work of the Council of Ministers.409
Even the technical details of the office of the first deputy illustrate a broad
theme—namely, Islamicization (Theme 1). Article 131 provides that if the
president dies, resigns, is ill for longer than two months, or is dismissed,
then his first deputy assumes presidential “powers and functions”—but only
“with the approval of the [Supreme] Leader.”410 In this circumstance, a
council, composed of the first deputy, Speaker of the Islamic Consultative
Assembly, and head of the judiciary, must arrange for the election of a new
president within fifty days.411 If the first deputy dies, then recourse is to the
supreme leader: he must, under Article 131, “appoint another person in his
place.”412
It is common across countries for their chief executive, upon selection,
to take an oath of office. Iran is no exception. Article 121 contains that oath.
A new president must say it and affix his signature to it, at a session of the
Islamic Consultative Assembly, with the Guardian Council and head of the
judiciary present:
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful, I, as Presi-
dent, swear, in the presence of the Noble Qur’ān and the people
of Iran, by God, the Exalted and Almighty, [1] that I will guard
the official religion of the country, the order of the Islamic Re-
404. Id. at art. 128.
405. Id. at art. 129.
406. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 123.
407. Id. at art. 118.
408. Article 120 addresses the procedure for handling elections if a candidate dies. In the
event a candidate whom the Guardian Council has approved as suitable based on the Article 115
qualifications dies within ten days of the election day, then voting is postponed for two weeks. If,
in the scenario of a run-off, one of the candidates securing the highest number of votes dies in the
intervening period between the first and second round, then the second round is postponed for two
weeks. Though this article does not explicitly say so, presumably it would be for the Guardian
Council to approve any replacement candidate. See id. at art. 120.
409. Under Article 127, “[i]n special circumstances,” and “subject to the approval of the
Council of Ministers,” the president may appoint a special representative with “specific powers.”
See id. at art. 127.
410. Id. at art. 131.
411. Id.
412. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 131.
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public, and the Constitution of the country; [2] that I will devote
all my capacities and abilities to the fulfilment of the responsibili-
ties that I have assumed; [3] that I will dedicate myself to the
service of the people, the honor of the country, the propagation of
religion and morality, and the support of truth and justice, re-
fraining from every kind of arbitrary behavior; [4] that I will pro-
tect the freedom and dignity of all citizens and the rights that the
Constitution has accorded the people; [5] that, in guarding the
frontiers and the political, economic, and cultural independence
of the country, I will not shirk from any measure; [6] that seeking
help from God, and following the Prophet of Islam and the infalli-
ble Imāms (peace be upon them), I will guard, as a pious and
selfless trustee, the authority vested in me by the people as a sa-
cred trust, and transfer it to whomever the people may elect after
me.413
As the italicized language indicates, the oath bespeaks the Islamic na-
ture of Iran’s Republic (Theme 1).
This oath invokes Allāh (mentioning God thrice), the Prophet Muham-
mad, the Qur’ān, and the Shiite Imams. The first of six duties is to protect
Twelver Shiism and Iran’s Sharia-based system. Accordingly, the fourth
duty is bounded by Islamic law. The president must protect the “freedom
and dignity” of Iran’s citizens, but within the context of the Constitution,414
which, of course, is Islamicized. The second duty commits the president to
spreading that religion and its morality, with no explicit limitation to Iran’s
domestic territory. The italicized language also manifests Iran’s stance
against foreign intervention (Theme 5) and—read literally—obliges the
president to take “any” action to do so (second duty).
• Legislative Branch
Article 58 manifests the legislative function in the Islamic Consultative
Assembly, which consists of “elected representatives of the people.”415 Ar-
ticle 71 identifies the subject matter jurisdiction of the assembly— namely,
to legislate “on all matters, within the limits of its competence as laid down
in the Constitution.”416 And as explained above, Article 72 forbids any un-
Islamic legislation and enthrones the Guardian Council to judge compliance
with this limit. The assembly, under Article 73, also has the “competence”
to “interpret[ ] . . . ordinary laws,” along with “interpretations that judges
may make” in appropriate courts.417 The assembly may receive proposed
legislation in one of two ways specified in Article 74. First, the government
(i.e., executive branch) may present a bill to the assembly after its Council
413. Id. at art. 121 (emphasis added).
414. Id.
415. Id. at art. 58.
416. Id. at art. 71.
417. Id. at art. 73.
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of Ministers has approved that proposal.418 Second, members of the assem-
bly may sponsor a proposal, so long as at least fifteen members sponsor
it.419 And under Article 76—a provision that, read literally, confers enor-
mous power on the legislative branch—the assembly “has the right to in-
vestigate and examine all the affairs of the country.”420
Notably (especially in view of the economic hardship in Iran associ-
ated with sanctions421), any bill (including new legislation or an amendment
to an existing law) that would either reduce government income or increase
government expenditure must be accompanied by a compensatory propo-
sal—that is, an idea to boost income, cut expenditures, or both.422 Though
Article 75 does not spell out the rationale, surely it is fiscal responsibility
and avoidance of adding to government deficits of the national debt. There
is an ironic similarity with the “Contract with America.”423 In 1994, then
leader of the House Republican Conference and soon-to-be Speaker of the
US House of Representatives Newt Gingrich (Republican-Georgia) called
for balanced budgets and no new spending bills without a way to fund
them.424
Once the assembly approves legislation, under Article 58, it communi-
cates the new law to the executive for implementation and the judiciary for
enforcement.425 However, as per Article 59, in an “extremely important ec-
onomic, political, social, . . . [or] cultural matter[ ],” the assembly may ex-
ercise its legislative function by “direct recourse to public opinion.”426 A
proposal for a referendum must be approved by two-thirds of the assembly
members before the matter is put to the public for a vote.
The nature and operation of the legislature is in some ways unremark-
able, yet in others remarkable. Article 62 states that the Islamic Consulta-
tive Assembly consists of “representatives of the people elected directly and
by secret ballot.”427 However, “[t]he qualifications of voters and candi-
dates” and “the nature of the election” are “specified by law.”428 This pro-
viso allows for disenfranchisement of voters and disqualification of
candidates, phenomena which have occurred repeatedly in Iran’s
elections.429
418. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 74.
419. Id.
420. Id. at art. 76 (emphasis added).
421. See 2 BHALA TRADE TEXTBOOK, supra note 10, at 493–518.
422. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 75.
423. See generally NEWT GINGRICH & DICK ARMEY, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD
PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE
NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
424. Id.
425. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 58.
426. Id. at art. 59.
427. Id. at art. 62.
428. Id.
429. See id. at art. 62.
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Assembly representatives serve a term of four years, as per Article 63,
and elections must take place before their terms end “so that the country is
never without an Assembly.”430 Article 64 sets the number of seats in the
assembly at 270.431 It allows for growth by not more than twenty seats for
each ten-year period (measured from the date of a national referendum in
1949) to accommodate geographic, political, and human factors—without
defining precisely such factors and their relationship to the number of new
seats.432 Consistent with a hierarchy among religions (Theme 3), there are
quotas for recognized minorities. Jews and Zoroastrians each elect one rep-
resentative.433 Armenian Christians in the north, and in the south, each elect
one representative.434 Assyrian and Chaldean Christians jointly elect one
representative.435 These quotas appear to be minimum reservations, not
maximum caps. There is no obvious mechanism for expanding the seats of
religious minorities as the country grows. Thus, the prospect of them being
an ever-dwindling proportion of the assembly (even if their constituencies
were to increase demographically) exists.
Across countries, it is customary for representatives to take an oath
upon their election or reelection to a legislative body, as it is for the presi-
dent (discussed above). The oath set forth in Article 67 is an example. But,
as with the president’s oath in Article 121, the oath for legislators in Article
67 clearly manifests the Islamic nature of Iran’s government (Theme 1),
exhibits resistance to foreign domination (Theme 5), and intimates bounda-
ries on free speech (Theme 4):
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful:
In the presence of the Glorious Qur’ān, I swear by God, the
Exalted and Almighty, and undertake . . . to protect the sanctity of
Islam and guard the accomplishments of the Islamic Revolution of
the Iranian people and the foundations of the Islamic Republic; to
430. Id. at art. 63.
431. See 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 64. Article 65 defines two-thirds
of the total number of members (i.e., 180 out of 270) as comprising a quorum in the assembly, and
thus as the number needed to approve legislation. See id. at art. 65. Drafts and bills are to be
considered in accordance with the assembly’s Code of Procedure. Two-thirds of members present
are necessary to approve this Code. See id. Article 66 provides that the election and terms of the
Speaker and Presiding Board of the assembly, along with the number of committees in the assem-
bly and disciplinary matters concerning the assembly, are set by the Code of Procedure. See id. at
art. 66.
Article 68 addresses the functioning of the assembly during wartime or occupation. In the
event of war, or if all or part of Iran is occupied by a foreign military power, then elections to the
assembly may be delayed across the country, or in the occupied portion thereof, if the president
proposes a delay, and the delay is approved by three-fourths of the assembly and endorsed by the
Guardian Council. See id. at art. 68. The extant assembly continues to function until a new one can
be formed. See id.
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protect . . . the honor bestowed upon me by the people, to observe
piety in fulfilling my duties as people’s representative; to remain
always committed to the independence and honor of the country;
to fulfill my duties towards the nation and the service of the peo-
ple; to defend the Constitution; and to bear in mind, both in
speech and writing and in the expression of my views, the inde-
pendence of the country, the freedom of the people, and the secur-
ity of their interests.436
All assembly representatives must swear this oath and affix their sig-
nature to it, although members of religious minorities “will swear by their
own sacred books.”437 That is less an accommodation than a measure of the
seriousness of the oath. As a general matter, it is assumed that a person is
more likely to view as a solemn duty an oath sworn on his own holy book
than that of another faith. Thus, for instance, a Christian representative in
the assembly would swear on the Bible—“to protect the sanctity of Islam.”
Several provisions in Chapter VI address transparency. Article 69
mandates all assembly deliberations “be open, and full minutes of them [be]
made available to the public by the radio and the official gazette.”438 Like-
wise, under Article 70, the president, as well as his deputies and ministers,
has the right to participate in open sessions of the assembly, along with
their advisers.439 If members deem it necessary, then they may opt to com-
pel ministers to attend an open session.440
However, Article 69 also carves out an exception for “emergency con-
ditions, . . . if required for national security.”441 Upon request by the presi-
dent, one of the ministers, or ten members of the assembly, the assembly
may meet in closed session.442 Yet, even then, legislation the assembly con-
siders during closed session is invalid unless “approved by [a supermajority
of] three-fourths [rather than the normal majority] of the members in the
presence of the Guardian Council.”443 Literally, the “presence” of that
council means physical presence of the council’s participants—presumably,
each one of them—at the assembly’s closed session. The role of the council
at these sessions is unspecified, but presumably it is to cast a watchful eye
over the extraordinary meetings. Once emergency conditions are lifted, the
minutes of closed sessions, and the text of any approved legislation, “must
be made available to the public.”444 Oddly, however, the wording of this
text allows for closed-session legislation to enter into force before the pub-
436. Id. at art. 67 (emphasis added).
437. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 67.
438. Id. at art. 69.
439. Id. at art. 70.
440. See id.
441. Id. at art. 69.
442. Id.
443. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 69.
444. Id.
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lic actually sees the content of the legislation. The council, then, would be
the safeguard against legislative overreach, whereby (for example) the as-
sembly enacted a rule that grossly infringed on the Islamic character of the
country or civil liberties of the people.
• Judicial Branch
Article 61 entrusts the courts, as distinct from the Guardian Council
(discussed above, under Theme 1), with judicial functions—that is, the ad-
ministration of justice, “in accordance with the criteria of Islam.”445 Article
61 reflects the velayet-e faqih doctrine Ayatollah Khomieni promulgates in
Guardian of the Jurist:
Khomeini was against “superfluous bureaucracies and the system
of file-keeping and paper-shuffling that is enforced in them, all of
which are totally alien to Islam.” His proposal: “When the juridi-
cal methods of Islam were applied, the Sharı̄’ah judge in each
town, assisted only by two bailiffs and with only a pen and inkpot
at his disposal, would swiftly resolve disputes among people and
send them about their business” (p. 31).446
In brief, an authentically Islamic judicial administration is not bureau-
cratic, because bureaucracy results from taghuti (worship of false gods)
governance, which is not Islamic.
Article 61 singles out four such functions: (1) “examin[ing] and
settl[ing] lawsuits”; (2) “protect[ing] the rights of the public”; (3) “dis-
pens[ing] and enact[ing] justice”; and (4) “implement[ing] the Divine limits
(al .hudūd al-llahiyyah).”
447 The first three functions are common to sacred
and secular legal systems alike, but the fourth one is unique to the Sharia. It
refers to ‘uqūbāt (criminal, or penal, law), specifically the .haqq Allāh
(claim of God) offenses and .hadd (limit) punishments for them.
The judiciary plays several vital roles in the Islamic Republic, each of
which manifests at least some degree of separation of powers. For instance,
Article 140 requires that any allegation of criminal conduct by the presi-
dent, deputies, or ministers be investigated by common courts.448 In doing
so, the courts must keep the Islamic Consultative Assembly informed.449
In general, the courts are the “official bodies” with jurisdiction to hear
“all grievances and complaints.”450 Article 156 identifies five duties for the
judiciary:
(1) Investigate and render judgments on complaints, resolve liti-
gation, settle disputes, and administer probate (wills) matters
445. Id. at art. 61.
446. Horowitz, supra note 42, at The Iranian Constitution and Ayatollah Khomeini (citing
IMAM KHOMEINI, VELAYAT-E FAQEEH [GOVERNANCE OF THE JURIST]  (Hamid Algar trans., 2005)).
447. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 61.
448. See id. at art. 140.
449. See id.
450. Id. at art. 159.
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(2) “[R]estor[e] public rights,” and“promot[e] justice, and “legiti-
mate freedoms”
(3) Supervise the “proper enforcement of laws”
(4) “[U]ncover crimes,” “prosecut[e], punish[ ], and “chastis[e]
criminals,” and “enact[ ] the penalties and provisions of the Is-
lamic Penal Code”
(5) Implement “suitable measures to prevent the occurence of
crime and . . . reform criminals”451
As in most countries, Iran’s courts are structured in a hierarchical fash-
ion. The Supreme Court is the highest court and, per Article 161, is respon-
sible for “supervising the correct implementation of the laws by the [lower]
courts, [and] ensuring uniformity of judicial procedure.”452 Per Article 162,
the head of the judiciary selects the chief judge and prosecutor-general, in
consultation with the Supreme Court judges, for five-year terms.453
Further indicative of the independence of Iran’s judiciary is Article
164, the constitutional prohibition against removal of a judge from his post
unless he is first tried and proven guilty of an offense, or unless he has
committed “a violation [that] entail[s] his dismissal.”454 Likewise, a judge
cannot be transferred or reassigned “without his consent, except in cases
when the interest of society necessitates it,” but then only by decision of the
head of the judiciary in consultation with the chief judge of the Supreme
Court and the prosecutor general.455
Articles 165, 166, 168, and 169 call for transparency and fairness in
judicial proceedings. Article 165 says that all trials “are to be held openly
and members of the public may attend without any restriction.”456 How-
ever, there are two exceptions: (1) both parties in the trial may request a
closed hearing; or (2) the court in which the trial is being held may “deter-
mine[ ] that an open trial would be detrimental to public morality or disci-
pline.”457 Apparently, open jury trials are not an exception with respect to
“[p]olitical and press offenses.”458 They must be tried publicly, and with a
jury. Article 166 requires a court verdict “be well reasoned out and docu-
mented.”459 Article 169 bars the ex post facto application of criminal
laws,460 a “familiar” feature of constitutional rule.461
• Military
451. Id. at art. 156.
452. Id. at art. 161.
453. See 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 162.
454. Id. at art. 164.
455. Id.
456. Id. at art. 165.
457. Id.
458. Id. at art. 168.
459. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 166.
460. See id. at art. 169.
461. See Horowitz, supra note 42, at introductory section.
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The military, then, is the protector of the Islamic Revolution, against
any threats, foreign or domestic. The other three branches may have some
influence in how it so protects, but they do not direct it in fulfilling this
strategic aim. Articles 143–151 (discussed above) constitute Section 3, cov-
ering the army and IRGC. This section is part of Chapter IX, which con-
cerns the “executive power.” Thus, it is the president who, from the textual
placement, has the greatest say (i.e., greater than the legislative or judicial
branch) over the armed services.
However, the president is not the ultimate commander in chief over the
military. There is a special role for the army462 and IRGC463 to preserve the
Islamic Revolution. And there is the practical reality (also discussed earlier)
about the IRGC and its special relationship to the supreme leader.464 Thus,
the independence of the military is elevated to a level akin to that of the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
• Checks and Balances
Among the provisions in the Constitution that most clearly demon-
strate an effort at separation of powers are Articles 88 and 89. They concern
legislative oversight of executive power. Article 88 authorizes the Islamic
Consultative Assembly to order the appearance of the president or any of
the ministers in his Council of Ministers, rendering them answerable to the
assembly. Specifically, if at least one-fourth of the assembly members pose
a question to the president, then the president must attend the assembly and
answer the question within one month.465 If any individual member poses a
question to a minister, then that minister must appear to answer the question
within ten days.466 In both instances, a delay is permissible for “an excuse
deemed reasonable” by the assembly.467 But even more dramatic is the
prospect of removing the president or a minister, which Article 89
contemplates.
The first paragraph of Article 89 is a legislative check against the
Council of Ministers or any single minister, while the second paragraph
concerns removal of the president. The first gives the assembly the power
of interpellation over the Council of Ministers, or any individual minister,
on a matter “deem[ed] necessary” by the assembly, through a motion signed
by at least ten assembly members.468 Within ten days of that motion being
462. See 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 143–44, 147–48.
463. See id. at art. 150.
464. See infra p. 560.
465. See 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 88.
466. See id.
467. Id.
468. Id. at art. 89. If presidential powers are assigned to the first deputy of the president (as
per Article 131), then ministers cannot be interpellated by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, nor
can the assembly pass a vote of no confidence against them, and a national referendum cannot be
held. See id. at art. 132. As for the ministers themselves whom the president appoints, they must
be presented to the assembly for a vote of confidence. See id. at art. 133
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tabled, the council, or interpellated minister, must appear before the assem-
bly to address the motion and obtain a vote of confidence.469 If the council,
or minister, fails to attend the assembly, then “the Assembly will declare a
vote of no-confidence if it deems it necessary.”470 If the assembly “does not
pronounce a vote of confidence,” then the council, or minister, is dismissed,
and any interpellated minister cannot become a member of the next council.
The second paragraph imparts to the assembly interpellation power
over the president. If at least one-third of the assembly members “interpel-
late the President concerning his executive responsibilities in relation with
[i.e., to] the Executive Power and the executive affairs of the country,” then
the president must attend the assembly within one month of the tabling of
the interpellation motion to “give adequate explanations in regard to the
matters raised.”471 Following the reply of the president, and statements in
favor of and opposition to the president, two-thirds of the assembly mem-
bers may “declare a vote of no confidence.”472 A declaration of no confi-
dence in the president must be “communicated to the Leadership for
information and implementation” under Article 110(10).473 Article 110(10)
lists as a “duty and power” of the leadership the dismissal of the president
based on a no-confidence vote “testifying to his incompetence,” or a deci-
sion by the Supreme Court pronouncing him guilty of violating his constitu-
tional duties.474
Simply put, the assembly can remove the president in coordination
with the supreme leader. Dismissal of the president is, of course, ultimately
the decision of the leader. An outright confrontation between the assembly
and leader would provoke a constitutional crisis, in terms of legitimacy of
the president in view of the no-confidence vote (or judicial judgment)
against the president.
• Executive and Legislative Branch Collaboration on Fiscal
Policy
On certain matters, Iran’s Constitution assigns shared responsibility to
two or more of the branches. Economic management, specifically, fiscal
policy (that is, taxation and expenditures), is an example. The government
(i.e., executive branch) must “draw[ ] up” a budget each year and “submit[ ]
[it] to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for discussion and approval.”475
The assembly, then, can reject the government’s spending or taxation plans
and priorities, in whole or in part. Once the assembly approves the budget,
it is the job of the government to collect taxes and deposit them in the
469. See id. at art. 89(1).
470. Id.
471. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 89(2).
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id. at art. 110(10).
475. Id. at art. 52 (emphasis added).
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“central treasury.”476 However, no tax may be imposed (or tax reduction or
exemption granted) “except in accordance with the law.”477 To the extent
the assembly enacts tax laws, the government—as a practical matter—must
collaborate in the legislative process.
The assembly has a further role, as regards expenditures. It is charged
with oversight of the National Accounting Agency. This agency, estab-
lished by Article 54, is “directly under the supervision of the . . .  Assem-
bly.”478 The agency operates in Tehran and each provincial capital. Its job
is to “inspect and audit . . . all the accounts of ministries, government insti-
tutions and companies as well as other organizations that draw, in any way,
on the general budget.”479 Article 55 mandates that each year, the agency
submit to the assembly a report—with “its own comments”—on the gov-
ernment’s budget, chronicling whether, and how, expenditures were made
for their “specified purpose[s],” and did not “exceed[ ] the allocations ap-
proved.”480 “This report must be made available to the public.”481 Note,
then, the theory underlying Articles 53 and 54—namely, fiscal transparency
and anti-corruption: the existence of the agency, overseen by the assembly,
which reports on the “settlement” of each budget, offers a potentially criti-
cal analysis and produces and publishes a report.
As per Theme 2, all branches of government are under the guidance of
the supreme leader. In theory, that apex power need not destroy separation
of powers among the branches, nor prevent them from operating as checks
and balances against one another.
V. IF NOT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EDUCATORS, THEN WHO?
International lawyers are supposed to solve problems, preferably
through peaceful negotiations. Distinct from patriotism, nationalism is a
problem. It cannot be squared with two thousand years of sound Christian
teaching. Yet, nationalism remains endemic in several countries, and its his-
torically evidenced consequences include violent cross-border conflict. In-
ternational legal educators are supposed to train future international lawyers
to solve the problems of tomorrow, drawing on and applying insights from
yesterday. Teaching the same syllabi, from the same perspectives, will not
do. Curriculum innovation is needed to break out of death grips like that
which America and Iran have been in for over four decades.
Empathy is vital in this pedagogical process: studying legal texts of a
foreign culture from the perspective of that culture, just as the student
would wish foreigners do for the texts of that student’s culture. That is, as
476. Id. at art. 53.
477. 1979 IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at art. 51.
478. Id. at art. 54.
479. Id. at art. 55.
480. Id. at art. 55.
481. Id.
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to how the study of a foreign legal culture can increase empathy, it is the
open-minded, open-hearted study itself – the process itself. But that process
requires appropriate substantive curriculum. Challenging substantive curric-
ular options are equally vital to this pedagogy. For American international
legal educators and their students, the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran is one such option. Their ability to understand Iran, and quell
prejudice against it, would help combat nationalism that undermines the
human dignity of Americans and Iranians alike.
